1/10 A high-level Turkish delegation travelled to #Tripoli yesterday and signed a series of MoUs with the #GNU.
This latest development introduces a new episode to the Libyan crisis that will have repercussions on national, regional, and international levels. 🧵
2/10 The MoUs were kept secret, with only #Turkey & Dabaiba’s inner circle aware of the agreements. Many ministers within the GNU found out last minute without having access to the text itself.
Dabaiba’s foreign allies such as the UAE have also been kept in the dark.
3/10 Dabaiba, like his predecessor Sarraj, signed the agreements out of despair to ensure Turkey’s role as a strategic ally to stay in power.
For him, the deal is essential as he thinks only Turkish can help him contain and manage his alliance of armed groups in Tripoli.
4/10 For Turkey, this is yet another strategic manoeuvre to widen its interests within the greater East Med.
Although conscious that such a move will be met with resistance, Ankara seems confident that neither Libyan nor international actors will be able to stand in its way.
5/10 The MoUs were met with widespread outrage in #Libya, with 72 HCS & 92 #HoR MPs denouncing it, along with the leadership of the HoR & #GNS. #Egypt & #Greece heavily condemned the MoUs stating that the GNU lacks the mandate to sign such deals in accordance with the LPDF.
6/10 The EU, on the other hand, issued a half-hearted rejection of the Turkey-GNU MoUs, warning against any moves that could lead to escalation.
Going forward, Dabaiba will have to come out publicly to defend the MoUs & convince the public that they are within their interests.
7/10 We expect he will embark on another populist policy giving handouts under a new pretext to address any public backlash against him, his government, and Turkey.
8/10 Sources well-informed on the matter have informed us that through his new Deputy Interior Minister, Emad AlTrabelsi, the GNU will begun dispersing funds across the western mountains to prevent any grassroots action against Turkey’s presence in AlWatiya Military Airbase.
9/10 As far as Haftar is concerned, this amounts to the third time he has been cheated by Dabaiba.
The first being after he voted for Dabaiba’s list in the LPDF.
Second was the NOC agreement that saw Bin Gdara’s appointment as NOC Chief before being stripped of his authorities.
10/10 Finally, the signing of these MoUs with Turkey, without consulting Haftar’s ally in the Oil & Gas sector, i.e., Bin Gdara.
This points to escalations on all levels.
This latest episode hugely undermines peace and security, not just in Libya but the region as a whole.
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1/ Seems #Haftar has pulled off a last minute upset after finding himself being cornered by his allies locally and internationally.
While his allies find themselves shuffling to make sense of yesterday’s developments, Haftar is positioning himself as sole negotiator of the east.
2/ For #Haftar to successfully achieve this goal, he will need to carry out a hard reset as his advisors are now blamed for failing to secure a new executive consisting of their allies.
#Agila is facing heavy criticism both socially and politically in Eastern #Libya.
3/ #Agila was warned by constituents to avoid a deal with #Bashagha and to have a back up plan that allows a ‘socially’ acceptable candidate take his place such as #Baraghthee of #AlWafi (in that order).
The competition for social credit is now between #Haftar & #AlMnefi.
1/4 The winning list for the #LPDF is the most difficult to enforce.
The international community designed and pushed for a #Bashagha/#Agila victory, and were prepared to deal with the difficulties that may face it.
However, this scenario was not in their calculations.
2/4 The new Prime Minister, Abdulhamid #Dbaiba’s name is synonymous with corruption in #Libya and there is currently an investigation underway looking into allegations of bribery made against him in the #LPDF.
3/4 As for Mnefi, the new head of the Presidential Council: He is known to be affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood and has no weight in Eastern #Libya, which he is meant to represent.
This list fails to take into account regional considerations with regards to #Egypt.
A lot of the questions that came up during @LibyaDesk consultations in #Tunis had to do with the return of former #Gaddafi officials and supporters to the scene.
It came as no surprise that a lot of the available information was false.
This thread will attempt to clarify things.
Since 2011, tribes and figures that supported the former strongman were sidelined and persecuted, forcing many to flee #Libya.
The first return of ‘green’ Libyans (Gaddafi supporters) was in 2014 #Benghazi when #Haftar called on them to assist in the war against #terrorism.
This created a safe zone in east of #Libya which resulted in many families in exile that could no longer afford living in #Egypt or #Tunisia to move to towns in the east.
Politically, the first return of former #Gaddafi officials to political life was due to #Sarraj..