Thread by @CorporalFrisk

The massed attacks on #Ukraine today again raises the question about different approaches to managing the long-range ballistic and cruise missile threat. 🧵

I am not claiming to have written the book on the topic, but I did write a chapter with that headline for the Swedish Defence Research Agency (@FOIresearch) a few years ago, so I have given it some thought. The tl;dr version is that it's hard. foi.se/en/foi/news-an…

Ballistic missiles (such as #Iskander) are very difficult targets, and only the most high-end systems are able to intercept them and then within a rather limited range. Cruise missiles (#Kalibr) are easier targets, and many systems are able to at least in theory target them.

But low altitude mean ground-based systems have a small time window to identify and fire upon them. It's also possible to overwhelm air defence batteries, i.e. send more missiles their way than they can handle (too few missiles ready to fire or can't target all incoming ones).

One of the things my chapter got wrong was that I didn't deal with long-range conventional precision weaponry used for terror bombings. Not because I thought Russia wouldn't commit war crimes - we had plenty evidence to the contrary from e.g. Syria - but because it's ineffective.

History shows civilians won't bend, and the cost in cold hard cash is high, in particular for the limited effect. However, #Russia keeps doing counterproductive and brutal things just for the sake of it, so I guess it fit their pattern.

What then is the answer to managing the threat? It will have to consist of a patch-work of things, many of which #Ukraine are already doing.

To begin with you can't *defend* against the threat meaning that you create an iron dome which won't let any weapons through, physics just doesn't work that way and even a quick calculation of the cost shows it is prohibitively high.

Side-note: someone will bring up Gaza. Yes, Israel has a remarkably successful defence against rockets fired by terrorists. However, these are simpler weapons fired from a very limited geographical area, and still the cost is high enough that they are looking at other options.

Air defences can however mitigate the threat. Any cruise missile shot down on before reaching the target is a small win. The best weapons here are high-end medium-range systems, as for a given cost you get more medium-range batteries than long-range.

How to set up the batteries and coordinate between them is a complex matter, but the big thing is that for geographical coverage numbers will matter more than range (especially at low altitude).

As such, delivering these kinds of air defence systems to Ukraine is key, as well as ensuring appropriate training, supply of spares and munitions, and appropriate C4I-systems. #NASAMS is a good example, though far from the only suitable candidate.

Another kinetic method is to destroy the systems before launch. This is also difficult, but could include striking airbases, ships, and launch vehicles. Alternatively intercepting the supply of the missiles to the operational units or striking the depots might be done.

However, some missiles will always get through, and at the end of the day you will have to get to boring passive measures such as dispersion, redundant systems, fortifications, and so forth.

As such, the answer to the question "What will Ukraine need to stop the attacks?" is "Victory". However, the suffering can be lessened through sending air defence systems (including systems that aren't great against cruise missiles, as they would free up the high-end ones).

Another key component is long-range strike capabilities. Everyone talks about #ATACMSforUkraine, which is good but only half the answer. Something like F-16 and #JASSM would be great, though unfortunately I believe we are still some time away from that.

Something like long-range loitering munitions or UCAVs might be politically more acceptable and might help, even if capability-wise it would be one step below own cruise missiles.

Another question is why Russia chooses terror bombings instead of striking targets such as water and electricity supplies, if they want to go down that route? There is basically two answers: either the Russian targeting is really poor, or they think terror bombings might work.

I could certainly see a case being made for both options, e.g. Syria has shown that causing civilian suffering apparently is part of Russian strategy despite the earlier mentioned historical evidence to it working poorly.

We have however also seen many indications that the Russian ISTAR-efforts just aren't effective above the tactical level. They are great at directing fire from an artillery regiment or two, less so at operational and strategic levels.

The long-read version of this thread:

https://twitter.com/CorporalFrisk/status/1579553480607694848?s=20&t=GlrY9gBuIOvSY0saCpr00g