A few thoughts about 🇺🇦🇷🇺 #ceasefire#negotiations:
Like 🇷🇺's war against 🇺🇦, they did not start after 24 February 2022. They started in 2014, after 🇷🇺 had illegally annexed #Crimea and instigated a military conflict in #Donbas. 1/19
In other words: 🇺🇦🇷🇺 negotiations have already lasted 8 (!) years. They went through different stages:
1. From 2014/15 through to 2022, 🇺🇦 and 🇷🇺 negotiated about the implementation of the #MinskAgreements.
2/19
They never managed to agree on elementary status questions and the sequence of political and security-related provisions – which is why the implementation of the MA remained blocked. Negotiations took place in two formats:
3/19
the Normandie 4 (🇺🇦🇷🇺🇩🇪🇫🇷) and the Trilateral Contact Group (🇺🇦🇷🇺, OSCE, de-facto authorities of the occupied territories regularly present). Things went downhill from 2018 at the latest. In 2021 tensions escalated, with 🇷🇺 troops deployments along the 🇺🇦 border...
4/19
... and Moscow’s ultimatum on „security guarantees“ in December 2021. This was an attempt to switch levels and force the US and NATO (after their chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan) into an agreement about 🇺🇦 and a European security order à la russe.
5/19
2. It didn’t work, and #Putin decided to attack 🇺🇦, thereby shattering all existing negotiation formats along with the Minsk Agreements. After all, they had been based on the principled recognition of 🇺🇦’s territorial integrity by all sides
6/19
(from a 🇷🇺 perspective: without Crimea). In the early days of the invasion 🇷🇺 formulated maximal demands tantamount to total capitulation and the dissolution of the 🇺🇦 state. Kyiv turned this down but entered negotiations nonetheless – the military pressure was too strong.
7/19
A first round of talks, facilitated by 🇹🇷, led to the #IstanbulCommuniqué, which the 🇺🇦side presented on 29 March. It offered far-reaching concessions, but also demands (security guarantees for 🇺🇦!). It could have formed the basis for a negotiated settlement.
8/19
3. Further negotiations about the proposal continued until mid May. The sides made some progress but were unable to reach agreement about two points: security guarantees and the status of Crimea and the Donbas.
9/19
Meanwhile 3 developments fundamentally altered the political and military context of the talks: the discovery of 🇷🇺 war crimes against civilians in #Bucha, #Irpin and other areas liberated in April; increasing Western military support for 🇺🇦; and the battle of #Mariupol.
10/19
In a nutshell, in April and early May support for a compromise with 🇷🇺was fading rapidly while 🇺🇦 was making first tangible advances in the battlefield. On 17 May, one day after the 🇷🇺 capture of Mariupol, first 🇺🇦 and then 🇷🇺 officially suspended the talks .
11/19
4. But contacts continued after 17 May, in three areas: First, humanitarian questions. The repeated exchanges of prisoners over the past months are a result of these efforts. Secondly, 🇺🇦 grain exports, over which an agreement was reached on 22 July,
12/19
again facilitated by 🇹🇷 President #Erdogan and UN General Secretary Antonio #Guterres. This tremendously important and fragile #graindeal is under constant jeopardy (from 🇷🇺). Putin already once walked away from it at the end of October but was summoned back by Erdogan.
13/19
The agreement foresees renewal every 120 days – we will see if it survives the coming 2 weeks. Thirdly, the situation in 🇺🇦’s #Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. This last track was smashed by 🇷🇺’s proclaimed #annexation of 4 additional 🇺🇦 oblasts, including Zaporizhzhia.
14/19
With this illegal and criminal step 🇷🇺 also ultimately killed the Istanbul Communiqué and made any diplomatic resolution extremely unlikely for the foreseeable future.
This is where we stand today in terms of peace talks.
15/19
Peace negotiations are always shaped by the military situation, the balance of forces between the warring parties. What remains to be done is to support 🇺🇦in order to shift this balance and bring about a „ripe moment“ for real cease-fire talks. The goal of which must be...
16/19
...for 🇺🇦to preserve its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Apart from that, Western states can flank the ongoing efforts of 🇹🇷and the UN, particularly also with regard to the grain deal; get ready to give 🇺🇦 security guarantees and...
17/19
...prepare an international peacekeeping mission, which will be needed on the ground once a ceasefire is in place; and engage with third actors like China and India against 🇷🇺 threats to use nuclear weapons.
18/19
Peace for 🇺🇦 is a long way off. 🇷🇺 is waging a war of aggression and has so far sabotaged a negotiated solution. An end of the war now would likely mean an end of independent 🇺🇦. So not only 🇺🇦 but also its supporters need to stay the course.
19/END
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Die Argumente der „#Friedensverhandlungen zwischen der #Ukraine und #Russland jetzt!“ Rufer:innen lassen sich in 5 Kategorien aufteilen: Realismus, Russland ist wichtiger, Pazifismus, Paternalismus und Angst.
1. Realismus: Großmächte sind wie sie sind und werden kleinere Staaten immer unterdrücken. Das liegt in ihrer Natur. 🇷🇺 ist da nicht allein, 🇺🇸 sind genauso. Der Westen ist schuld, er hat 🇷🇺 bedrängt bis #Putin nichts anderes mehr übrigblieb als loszuschlagen.
2/11
2. Russland ist wichtiger: 🇷🇺 ist eine Großmacht und hat Rohstoffe, die wir brauchen. Wir treiben außerdem 🇷🇺🇨🇳 in die Arme, wenn wir es isolieren. Die 🇺🇦 ist so ein korruptes Land! Wahrscheinlich (oder bestimmt, je nachdem) ist auch was dran am Faschismus-Verdacht.
3/11
Leider kursiert gerade sehr viel Unsinn über 🇷🇺-🇺🇦 #Verhandlungen: niemand redet mit 🇷🇺, 🇺🇦 verweigert Verhandlungen, Westen verbietet 🇺🇦 zu verhandeln etc.
Deshalb kommt hier doch noch ein 🧵in drei Thesen: (1/16)
These 1: Es wird verhandelt, und zwar dauernd und schon sehr lang!
Das Normandie-Format (🇩🇪🇫🇷🇺🇦🇷🇺) verhandelte 2014/15 die Minsker Vereinbarungen + 8 Jahre lang deren Umsetzung - die nie gelang, weil 🇺🇦🇷🇺 sich über grundlegende territoriale und Statusfragen uneins waren. (2/16)
Am wichtigsten aber: 🇷🇺 bestritt seine Rolle als Konfliktpartei (die es war!) + versuchte, die Verhandlungen zu missbrauchen um seine politischen Ziele in 🇺🇦 zu erreichen.
Von 12/2021 bis 02/2022 fanden intensive Verhandlungen über 🇷🇺 Forderung nach „Sicherheitsgarantien“ statt.
1. Die #Annexion ist ein extremer Akt der imperialistischen Aggression, mit dem #Putin noch einmal unterstreicht, dass es ihm um die Zerstörung der unabhängigen Ukraine geht. Er macht damit einen weiteren Quantensprung weg von einer Verhandlungslösung...
2/
..., die für die Ukraine als eigenständigen Akteur akzeptabel wäre. Mit der Mobilmachung zu Hause demonstriert er außerdem, dass er den Krieg auf lange Sicht zu führen gedenkt.
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2. on this basis it will illegally consider 🇺🇦 attacks on these territories as targeting 🇷🇺itself and use them to legitimize future escalations in its war against 🇺🇦.
3. Putin creates a path dependency that future 🇷🇺 leaderships will find difficult to get rid of. The new 🇷🇺 constitution, adopted in from 2020 in extremely doubtful circumstances, stipulates that it is illegal to “dispropriate” 🇷🇺 territory.
So now we have it: #Putin is escalating #RussiaInvadesUkraine. The events that started unfolding today indicate that we will experience a repetition of the week of 21 Februar (recognition of #DLNR and beginning of the invasion) – only at a different level. #StandwithUkraine
All four occupied or partly occupied territories (Luhansk, Donezk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson) have declared they will hold (fake) referenda 23-27 September. This looks very much like a concerted action, steered from Moscow (and, in the Kremlin administration, Sergey Kirienko).
Statements coming from the State Duma and the RU MFA support this assumption. Chief propagandist Margarita Simonyan (once again) calls upon Putin to „take the territories home“.
A long 🧵 about a painful issue: #visaban for 🇷🇺 citizens:
The sight of 🇷🇺 tourists in the EU is difficult to bear. It is difficult to tolerate that people from the aggressor country that wages this horrific war in Ukraine can go somewhere, and have a good time. 1/14
I flew from Istanbul to Moscow in June. I found it hard to accept that I was surrounded by tanned 🇷🇺s returning home from the Turkish coasts. We were flying NOT over 🇺🇦, for obvious reasons, but over Moldova, Poland, Latvia, then turned east towards Moscow. 2/14
I kept staring on the screen in front of me, following our heartbreaking flight route. No one else seemed to care.
I also so often hear democratically minded 🇷🇺 friends who hate this war but cannot or do not want to leave 🇷🇺 permanently talk about... 3/14