1/12 Lessons from @rusi_org #Finland. The overall military doctrine of #Finland is correct against the expected adversary. As situation, particularly in long-distance precision fires is better than #Ukraine, the results can be expected faster.
2/12 The area defence doctrine can be expected to blunt, wear out and destroy an invading force, possibly in space of days or couple of weeks if the supply chain can be destroyed. The #Ukraine fighting resembled closely #Finland doctrine. 
3/12 The mobilization plan of #Finland cannot be blocked by #Russia entirely, but dispersal must take place, and the first stages of mobilization must be ordered early enough. The mobilization of the remaining force must take place in short time.
4/12 The new dispersed combat #tactic of the infantry is correct and prevents the destruction of the force by massed artillery fire. However, communications can be blocked by EW, requiring high independence of companies, platoons and squads.
5/12 #Finland has adequate number of artillery and long-range precision fires such as 155 mm artillery, #M240 #MLRS, #JASSM and #JDAM to attack the logistics, HQ:s and concentrations deep in battlespace. The number of munitions must be increased.
https://twitter.com/KainuunPR/status/1594999799601926147
6/12 #Ukraine deception plans must be studied and importance of deception also on tactical level, practiced also by reserve junior leaders, emphasized as #Russian C2 can be disrupted by deception.
7/12 #Drones are a key system. Main part of the drones must be relatively cheap and disposable as they can be expected to operate only for 3 – 6 flights. The main use of medium drones is surveillance, not strikes.
8/12 Unlike #Russian or #Ukrainian air force, #Finnish air force can be expected to penetrate the enemy air defense to some depth. We can prevent the use of our airspace with the exception of the line of contact. Deconfliction must be by area
9/ Unlike #Russia and #Ukraine, #Finland has a competent, modern and sufficient navy to prevent naval blockade and landings. Together with allies we can reach full control of #Baltic. However, we lack capacity for sealift to support our allies.
10/12 In #Finland majority of the terrain is more forested and broken by water than in northern #Ukraine, allowing delaying tactics and ambushes even more than observed
11/12 The large and medium size cities are the main source of reservists, particularly leaders. Protecting them and mobilization in them is a key task not always sufficiently underlined.
12/12 Ballistic and cruise missile strikes are the main threat to #Finnish cities, civilians and key infrastructure. Launch sites must be destroyed. The missile defence must be improved as planned.
Note: in #Finland except for SOF all platoon and squad leaders and most company commanders are reserve officers and NCO:s. In second line and rear, even battalions are led by reservists. Especially for older #ROTC and #NCO conscripts keeping skills up to date is important.
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