2/ #Prigozhin stated that #Russia is fighting “exclusively with #Ukrainians” who are equipped with #NATO-provided equipment and some “russophobic” mercenaries who voluntarily support #Ukraine - but not NATO itself.
3/ #Prigozhin also noted that #Russian officials most likely knew that #NATO would offer #Ukraine military aid, because “it is ridiculous to think that when [#Russia] decided to conduct this special military operation it did not account for NATO’s help to Ukraine.”
4/ #Prigozhin added that he is unsure about the “denazification” objectives in #Ukraine, because he does not know if there are “Nazis” in Ukraine.
5/ #Prigozhin effectively rejected the #Kremlin’s pre-war and post-war claims that #Russia needed to defend itself against a NATO threat in #Ukraine and undermined the necessity and probability of Russian President Vladimir #Putin’s stated maximalist objectives for this invasion.
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
NEW: #Wagner Group financier Yevgeny #Prigozhin has softened his rhetoric towards the #Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) likely out of fear of completely losing his mercenary force in #Bakhmut.
2/ #Prigozhin voiced his concerns about a possible Ukrainian counteroffensive in eastern UKR during a 23-minute interview on March 23 in which he claimed that UKR has 200,000 reserves concentrating to attack along the entire eastern frontline, into Belgorod Oblast, & in Bakhmut.
3/ #Prigozhin also claimed that the Ukrainians currently have 80,000 troops in #Bakhmut, Slovyansk, and Kostyantynivka to counterattack Bakhmut – a claim that former Russian officer Igor #Girkin observed was dubious.
2/ "It is possible that Russian forces are [focusing on #Avdiivka] at the expense of their operations around #Bakhmut and the stalled offensive around #Vuhledar," we wrote last night.
3/ "Russian forces appear to be drawing more combat power to the #Avdiivka area which may allow them to increase their rate of advance, although there were no confirmed Russian advances in the area on March 22."
#Russian forces may be deploying significantly outdated T-54 and T-55 tanks from long-term storage to #Ukraine to compensate for significant armored vehicle losses. (1/4) isw.pub/UkrWar032223
2/ The deployment of inferior equipment to replenish the #Russian military's ability to conduct mechanized maneuver warfare may prompt a further degradation of Russian manpower in #Ukraine.
3/ #Russian forces are unlikely to achieve preferable resource attrition rates on the grounds that T-54/55 are cheaper than anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) ammunition, as some have argued. isw.pub/UkrWar032223
The tempo of #Russian operations around #Bakhmut appears to be slowing amid Western reporting that Russian forces may be attempting to launch offensives in other directions. (1/5) isw.pub/UkrWar032223
2/ #Russian forces made additional marginal advances in southern #Bakhmut, and Ukrainian forces conducted counterattacks on the southwestern and northwestern outskirts of the city on March 21 and 22.
3/ #Russian forces are currently increasing the tempo of their offensive operations around #Avdiivka aiming to encircle the settlement - possibly at the expense of their operations around #Bakhmut and the stalled offensive around #Vuhledar. isw.pub/UkrWar032223
#Xi’s refusal to explicitly align #China with #Russia in #Putin’s envisioned geopolitical conflict with the West is a notable departure from China’s declared “no limits partnership” with Russia preceding the start of the Russian invasion of #Ukraine. isw.pub/UkrWar032023
2/ #Xi’s rhetoric suggests that he is not inclined to fully give #Russia the economic and political support that Russia needs to reverse setbacks in #Ukraine.
3/ #Putin and #Xi offered somewhat similar visions for increased Chinese-Russian economic partnership, and it is likely that the two will sign bilateral trade and economic agreements during Xi’s visit, some of which will likely aim to facilitate schemes for sanctions evasion.
Chinese President #Xi Jinping met with Russian President Vladimir #Putin in #Moscow on March 20 and offered a more reserved vision for Russian-Chinese relations than what #Putin was likely seeking. 🧵(1/6) isw.pub/UkrWar032023
2/ #Xi and #Putin touted the strength of Chinese-Russian relations in their meeting on March 20, but offered differing interpretations of the scale of future relations in articles they published on March 19.
3/ #Putin published an article in Chinese state media arguing that #Russia & #China are building a partnership for the formation of a multipolar world order in the face of the collective West’s seeking of domination & the US policy of dual containment against China and Russia.