Thread by @Eljarh

A thread to shed light on the recent short statement released by the @USEmbassyLibya regarding the unfolding events in Zawiya. This statement, which could potentially be interpreted as an endorsement by the US Embassy for the Government of National Unity (GNU) to utilize

1 - .... drone strikes against their adversaries in western Libya, requires some context. Here, I delve into the background and offer insights into this intriguing stance taken by the United States.

2- While the US Embassy/officials have made public declarations in support of holding elections in #Libya in recent months, there has been a parallel effort by agents of the US government on the ground to advocate for & bolster the power-sharing agreement between the LNA & GNU.

3- This powersharing agreement is facilitated/brokered by UAE. Spearheading this effort on behalf of the LNA is Saddam Haftar, while Ibrahim al-Dabiaba leads the charge for the GNU.

4- This situation reveals the existence of two distinct factions among United States policy advisors and decision-makers involved in Libyan affairs. One faction supports the electoral process, the efforts of UNSMIL, and the HoR-HCS track, which is backed by Egypt.

5- On the other hand, another faction lends its support to a power-sharing arrangement between Haftar and Dabiaba. Presently, the faction favoring the Haftar-Dabiaba power-sharing deal has the upper hand.

6- However, for a successful power-sharing deal between Haftar & Dabiaba, it is imperative that Dabiaba attains full control, or at least improved military and security control, over the western region. Such control is necessary for the successful implementation of the agreement.

7- Consequently, Dabiaba must either win over his staunchest opponents in the western region or neutralize them through force. Winning over his opponents is a challenging task, as evidenced by his previous unsuccessful attempts.

8- More time is required to accomplish this, but Dabiaba is under pressure due to the 6+6 committee finalizing their agreement on electoral laws & new unified Gov to oversee the elections. Hence, Dabiaba is resorting to the use of force to confront his opponents at this time.

9- For the US, this situation bears resemblance to Bolton's "if you want to do it, do it quick" approach in 2019. However, as 2019 demonstrated, this strategy carries significant risks & is not easily achievable given the intricate security/military dynamics in W-Libya.

10- For now, the Turks appear willing to permit the use of their drones. However, if Dabiaba fails to swiftly conclude his campaign, the risk of escalation will prompt Turkey to intervene in order to maintain peace, potentially taking over the control of drones.

11- It is worth noting that Turkey does not view Haftar as the ideal partner for them or their proxies in Libya. Instead, Turkey holds a longer-term strategy that awaits Haftar's downfall. A strategy that goes through Cairo instead of Rajma to get to E-Libya. #Libya

12- Once again, this entire episode underscores the luxury of experimentation that US policymakers have in an environment like #Libya.

13- However, this trial/error approach by the United States Government comes at a tremendous cost to the future of Libya as a country and, most importantly, the livelihoods and prospects of the Libyan people.

#End