3 June: 🇨🇳#China has a fleet of at least 15 🐟fishing ships working both sides of 🇧🇳#Brunei’s & 🇲🇾#Malaysia’s exclusive economic zones, while all 3 countries’ defense officials are gathered at the @IISS_org#ShangriLa talks in #Singapore. [🧵1/3]
2/In addition, two probable 🇨🇳#China maritime militia ships—Qiong Lin Yu 11016 & 11587—are at the SE edge of the fishing fleet, providing security on 🇲🇾#Malaysia’s side of the boundary, together with a 75m cargo ship, Qiong Lin 11011 (possible 🐟fish carrier?). [🧵2/3]
3/Per @AsiaMTI & @C4ADS’ 2021 report “Pulling Back the Curtain on 🇨🇳#China’s Maritime Militia”, Qiong Lin Yu 11587 is identified with “high confidence” as militia. QLY 11016’s activity here seems to implicate it as well. [🧵3/3]
1/Yesterday a flotilla of #China maritime militia ships moving SE executed an unusual 90deg turn, spread out & began moving SW—on a course that would intriguingly lead them directly into the #ASEAN-#India Maritime Exercise group headed NE from Singapore.
But wait… [🧵1/5]
2/What I didn’t see then was the militia ships were escorting survey ship Xiang Yang Hong 10. While seeing #China’s survey ships in #Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone isn’t new, it’s odd to see them escorted by so many militia.
Wait, there’s more… [2/5] marinetraffic.com/en/ais/details…
3/Three hours ago, 2 #China Coast Guard ships also suddenly appeared on AIS, visibly joining the flotilla. How long they’ve been there is unknown, but now they want to be seen.
Also of note, #Vietnam fisheries ship Kiem Ngu 414 began shadowing the flotilla yesterday.
So… [3/5]
1/My comments in this article mostly focused on the #Philippines' newly increased leverage in negotiations with #China. My full comments (including those left out of the article) follow: [1/6]
2/"Diplomacy is always important, especially in the face of increased tensions. However, reducing tensions should never be the sole objective in pursuing dialogue with China, which often uses bilateral talks to intimidate countries it sees as weak and easy to push around."
[2/6]
3/"The Marcos Administration, by its recent moves to embrace a bold new maritime transparency policy and to enhance its security relationships with partners like the U.S., Japan and Australia, has shown strength and given itself leverage for negotiations."
[3/6]
1/ANATOMY OF A SWARM: How #China sent its ships to swarm & intimidate the #Phlippines’ largest outpost in the West Philippine Sea, then scattered after its tactics were made public, 3-11 March 2023.
By 5 March the swarm of Pag-Asa Island was well underway. (1/9) #SouthChinaSea
2/However, by 10 March—perhaps due to the #Philippines’ new transparency initiative—#China had apparently recalculated & decided that swarming was no longer in its interest. Only 10 ships remained in the Pag-Asa Cays. Where did the rest go?
(Hint: not very far) (2/9)
3/Maritime open-source intelligence (#OSINT) relies on a suite of tools. The automated information system (AIS) broadcast by most ships is the simplest, but it has limitations. We used AIS to track the arrival of 7 new PRC militia ships to the Pag-Asa Cays on 3 March. (3/9)
1/[Quote] While fewer Chinese vessel seen in Philippine waters may seem to indicate an effort by the Chinese to deescalate tension, “looks can be deceiving,” according to an international maritime expert. (1/4)
2/“Where did they all go? The answer is most are probably still in the area … they’ve just made themselves less visible,” said retired US Air Force Col. Raymond Powell in a series of tweets on Friday. (2/4)
3/He said that was particularly the case of the more than 40 CMM vessels which were recently near Pag-asa that China had scattered around the area to make them less noticeable from the air. (3/4)
1/#China Coast Guard 5203 less than 3nm from Pag-Asa (Thitu) this morning with 3 militia ships (those visible on AIS). This is even closer than noted by @coastguardph yesterday, but not unusual. #China rejects the #Philippines’ right to a 12nm territorial sea around Pag-Asa (1/5)
2/The 2016 @UN Arbitral Tribunal case ruled that Pag-Asa carries the legal status of a “rock” under int’l law, meaning it’s always above water but can’t organically support human habitation. This affirmed its right to a legal 12nm territorial sea. (2/5) amti.csis.org/thitu-island/
3/The Tribunal took no position on who “owns” which features in the Spratlys. For Pag-Asa it noted the #Philippines has occupied it since 1970 & claims only the 12nm sea earned by “rock” status (no separate exclusive economic zone). Pag-Asa lies outside any country’s EEZ. (3/5)
1/The preponderance of the evidence suggests that on 6 Feb #China Coast Guard ship 5205 stopped, harassed and followed #Philippines Coast Guard BRP Malapascua near Sabina Shoal for 8+ hours, preventing it from returning to Palawan. Let me explain my reasoning. [Thread 1/7]
2/BRP Malapascua (@coastguardph MRRV-4403) left Pag-Asa (Thitu) Island moving SE on 5 Feb/0930 PHT after anchoring overnight. Its companion for that night, BRP Teresa Magbanua (MRRV-9701), would move off to the NE 14 hours later. [2/7]
3/BRP Malapascua seemed headed to Palawan, but 3 hours after it left Pag-Asa CCG 5205 (marked "Unknown") left Mischief Reef moving west, came to a stop right across Malapascua's path & then at 1940L went "dark" (stopped transmitting its Automatic Identification System/AIS) [3/7]