The last time I visited #China, I knew it would be the last time. 5 minutes after sitting down with a #Uyghur friend, she was called by her cadre 'minder' questioning her why she was talking to a foreigner. Like so many, we've never heard from her again.
I made the choice not to return as a researcher because it endangers people. Or you can go back but you must construct your research in a way that the Chinese government approves and ignore people like my friend who has disappeared. And write about #China like it never happened.
That research access is based on approving or refusing to challenge the deadly lies which the government tells. When I worked in #China, it was clear many people maintain that access despite being racist towards Chinese people. This has nothing to do with respect for China.
The night I decided to leave I shared a table with a lonely migrant construction worker who missed his family. He spends his life traveling from city to city far from home living in a portakabin and working crazy hours to build stuff that nobody really needs.
Some colleagues thought I was a bit strange for talking to Chinese people from different walks of life. So they didn't want to join and went to a "western restaurant" for the 100th day in a row. One even said "I don't like the Chinese" and he's still there doing research.
My conscience is clear when I criticise the party-state's genocide in #EastTurkistan. I do that from love not hate. It is also not anti-Chinese and people know this very well. Also, Chinese people don't want British democracy but many hate their government for good reason.
Now external observers with the resources and privilege to act freely celebrate their return to #China to write projects that ignore genocide, crimes against humanity, racism, forced labour, torture for beliefs, etc. These things matter to Chinese citizens who are not privileged.
In a situation of brutal oppression by a government that believes thought is an act of terrorism, archaic academic contributions do not help anything but the pension status of the author. The fear which the party state governs produces the silence of #chinastudies.
So if you are returning to #China as a researcher, will the knowledge you produce improve people's lives? Will it shed light on lesser known urgent social issues that we can tackle together? Will it provide crucial new knowledge that shapes our understanding of the world?
I'm going to flip the table and say that researchers returning to #China may be anti-Chinese. You can only conduct research if you refuse to listen, support, or intellectually analyse those Chinese citizens who challenge the arbitrary state violence that opresses them.
Writing about #China without addressing state violence & targeted voices produces knowledge that silences Chinese citizens. It causes harm to them by producing knowledge that invisibilises those people & their lives. It reproduces an image of China constructed by the party-state.
#Chinastudies does not want to talk about this but must. Its silence on arbitrary state violence emanates from the party-state's governance inside #china. But people outside have every right, power, and resource to do whatever they choose about it.
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There has been surprise and awe as protestors in China chant “Xi Jinping, stand down” (习近平下台). Yet from our knowledge of power and resistance in authoritarian states, these demands should be expected to emerge sooner or later. 🧵 #ZeroCovidChina#UrumqiFire#ChinaProtests
1/ The late, great Stephen White who taught Post-Communist Politics 101 emphasised that the more personalised an authoritarian system, the more that social discontent will focus on that leader as the sole actor responsible for policy and with power to change course.
2/ The more violent the leader, the more violence expected in state transformation. For example, no analyst wonders why Nicolae Ceaușescu’s end was so violent. It is explained in relation to the intensity of levels of state violence and personalisation of the political system.
Urumchi is not Zhengzhou. I lived there for several years, observing and interviewing around many protests. I want to add some overlooked background to #UrumqiProtest conversation. Many dominant voices on the subject have never been there. 🧵
1. @guardian / @Reuters quoted 1 respected political scientist but who does not research the region. Alternatively, many foreign and Uyghur experts who know the city are available, sharing videos and analysis on the capital city of their homeland.
2.
Bypassing experts guarantees ideological framings (“Chinese protest” & “civil society”), ignoring local dynamics where Han protestors often describe themselves as “vanguard” and Uyghurs died in a building fire under ethnically targeting and excessive covid controls.
Six essential books to help understand how the current crisis in the region known as #Xinjiang emerged. These overlooked, multidisciplinary works, published before the current crisis, range from history to anthropology to political science. #Uyghurs#Centralasia#China#Islam
Obviously I think you should read my book too! It explains how the goals of #China's ethnic policy shifted from gradual to rapid assimilation, exacerbating insecurity and cycles of violence between Han Chinese, #Uyghurs, and the state in #Xinjiang.
NEW REPORT by @lauratmurphy, @nyrola, and myself uncovers massive networks of forced labour and transfers of Uyghur people managed by the Bingtuan and commanded by the central party-state. An explainer 🧵
The Bingtuan (#Xinjiang Production & Construction Corps) is a state-run corporation, functioning as regional government, paramilitary organisation, prisons bureau, media empire, education system, and one of world’s largest state-run corporations.
2.
Established in the 1950s by former PLA and GMD soldiers, the Bingtuan describes itself as representing China’s ancient “settling the frontier culture” (屯垦文化) with “plough in one hand, gun in the other”
The report analyses Xi’s thinking and the centralised decision-making behind Xinjiang policy, institutional shifts to ensure policy implementation, and the arbitrary nature of mass detention of Turkic-speaking Muslim communities.
2.
It explains how China’s political system operates and analyses the thinking behind genocide in Xinjiang. The PRC is moving towards totalitarianism: personalised rule, mass mobilisation and surveillance, and ideological education.
Some book reviews! My fieldwork in Urumchi #Xinjiang planned to explore relations between Han, #Uyghurs, & party-state, particularly how urban groups most exposed to party education understand each other and how interactions shape #nationalism#security
What wasn't planned was 2009 mass violence. Han & #Uyghurs explained violence with narratives familiar from living there previously but crystallised into starker boundaries & insecurity. #China's party-state framed Uyghur identities as security problems, intensifying insecurity.
I had hoped to live there again during more peaceful times and even explore some themes in the reviews below. But Xi's ethnic extinction policies and his closed "new era" means we have to learn and use new methods.