This takes the total number of #Iran|ian personnel killed by #Israel in #Syria since 7 October 2023 to 16.
2. In November 2023 Iran's FM said killing of its personnel there would not go unanswered but it's unclear if there has been any direct retaliations for these deaths. 2/
3. Some important context is that dozens of #IRGC officers have been killed by #Israel in #Syrial since 2013 as part of the Israeli "campaign between wars" (not to mention a larger number of Axis of Resistance fighters and missile, air defense, and other infrastructure). 3/
(I'm working on a data-set on the pre-07 October "campaign between wars" to be able to do a better analysis of the objectives, scale, and results of this campaign but that's a long-term project). 4/
4. Bottom line: While the numbers/seniority of the personnel killed might push #Iran to carry out a bolder attack on #Israel or its personnel abroad I don't see a major direct strike coming from Iran itself b/c it doesn't want to invite a direct Israeli attack on Iran's soil. 5/
5. Of course it will continue and maybe scale up attacks on #Israel from #Iraq and/or #Yemen or its personnel elsewhere (but probably not by in #Lebanon given conflict dynamics or Syria because of its limited capabilities and vulnerability to Israeli tactical air power). 6/
6. Ultimately, however, #Iran is wary of a direct confrontation with #Israel (that could draw in the United States) and does not appear to have the appetite for a large-scale regional war. 7/
7. But this creates the major risk for #Iran that #Israel will have the time and space to dismantle the Axis of Resistance fronts one by one (possibly with the direct support and even participation of the next US administration) once major operations in #Gaza are complete. 8/
Actually, many signs since 7 October point to #Israel undertaking preparations for a major campaign in Lebanon, and that day's events probably necessitate that Israel SOMEHOW majorly change regional security and political dynamics lets survival is at stake long-term. 9/
8. The dismantling of one or more Axis of Resistance fronts would seriously undermine Iranian offensive and defensive capabilities in the region and could (especially under the next leadership) change its nuclear proliferation and/or regional security calculus. 10/
If you're interested in learning more about #Iran's relationship with the Axis of Resistance, I highly recommend my recent piece on the factors shaping Iranian control and influence on this network 👇 11/11
While #Iran and #Russia sanctions regimes are complex and comparison is hard #Iran sanctions are arguably more comprehensive. Critically its energy exports are sanctioned whereas #Russia's are relatively unfettered. Iran is a template for Russia sanctions not other way around. 2/
Now sanctions can be ratcheted up against #Iran in case of escalations by it on the nuclear issue b/c my sense is #Biden enforcement has slackened and EU and China can join. But there are reasons to doubt this will be a sufficient deterrent against Iranian nuclear escalation. 3/
3. How will it affect Iranian and regional politics? 1/
What does it mean for Iran's nuclear program? #Fakhrizadeh is said to have headed the AMAD plan: Scientific and technological projects allegedly aimed to give the IRI the capability to build a nuclear explosive device. This murder represents both practical and symbolic blows. 2/
We don't have full clarity on #Fakhrizadeh's current work and if he was indeed retired as some claim. But practically, if the IRI wanted to restart its alleged weaponization effort, his loss denies it an enormous technical-managerial talent who could have overseen/advised it. 3/
Excited to share my first piece in 18 months and in @ForeignPolicy, co-authored w/ Simon Miles, an assistant professor @DukeSanford, completing a book on US-Soviet relations during the early 1980s based on new Eastern bloc archival sources. 1/ foreignpolicy.com/2018/10/30/wha…
Context: @mike_giglio had an excellent piece last month on how the #Trump admin may be executing a strategy of "maximum pressure" against #Iran, partly inspired by the book "Victory" & its claim that Reagan used this strategy to defeat the Soviet Union. 2/ buzzfeednews.com/article/mikegi…
There's only one problem: "Victory" is not good history, to put it politely. The most basic critique is that the author didn't have access to US & Soviet archives when the book was published in 1994. You can find much harsher academic critiques online. 3/ amazon.com/dp/0871136333/…
New @nytimes piece captures recent wave of #Iran|ian nationalism, particularly among non-principlists (-conservatives), that seasoned analysts have been noting for some time. But there are some important caveats to consider. nytimes.com/2017/11/26/wor… 1/
Article starts w/ beheading of Mohsen Hojaji by #ISIL. Then, bizarrely, article attributes cause of nationalist wave to #Trump & #Saudi. ISIL carried out terrorist attack on #Tehran!!! It is arguably larger structural factor that triggered wave since 2014, but largely ignored! 2/
One piece of evidence given to prove #Trump & #Saudi have caused #Iran nationalist wave is popularity of #Soleimani & #Zarif. Only one problem: High favourability numbers for both predate Trump election & significantly heightened Iran-Saudi tensions iranpoll.com/publications/j… 3/