It has been a while since we posted a general assessment on #Russia-#Ukraine war.

The general overview, identified risks and consequences we posted on 7 February 2024 mostly stand. Therefore, we will primarily provide an update on unforeseen or misestimated developments.

1/19 First, you can read our previous #Russia-#Ukraine war overview and assessment here:



2/19

https://x.com/BalticDefRadar/status/1755204550292635909

Part 3: Strategy.

- #Ukraine's strategy for 2024 ought to be: foritfy, dig in and optimize the defenses; reconstitute and form new units with emphasis on more extensive training; accumulate the resources; intensify degradation of RU forces with long-range strike campaign.

1/n The increased scale of the US and European artillery production by 2025 should lead to significant deliveries to #Ukraine, providing them the much needed firepower. The availability of F-16 might also give some edge in firepower due to wider support of stand-off weaponry.

2/n

Part 2: Risks and their consequences in 2024.

- US Congress not approving the military aid for #Ukraine. It's becoming critical.

This leads to acute artillery ammunition shortage and, to a lesser extent, poses a risk of air defence missile shortage later down the road.

1/n #Europe is able to provide a small but steady flow of ammo, so #Ukraine will not run out of it completely. However, the critical lack of ammo would lead to high casualties, cracks in the defense line and progressive withdrawal, as UKR would be forced to trade land for lives.

2/n

Part 1: A quick overview.

- The current phase of the war between Russia and #Ukraine might appear like a stalemate, but the war itself certainly did not stalemate. Even if the front line has been mostly static, the fighting remains high intensity. The war will progress.

1/n - Both sides are accumulating resources, reconstituting and trying to ramp up the production of weapons. #Ukraine is quite limited in its capacity to produce weapons during the war and is largely dependent on the Western military aid, especially the artillery ammunition.

2/n

Agreed with @FRHoffmann1 about the need to seriously prepare for a war with Russia, including the retaliation strategies. However, his other points just do not make sense.

- On "Russian doctrine suggests that Russia would attempt to coerce NATO": Proposing that the ..

1/n

https://twitter.com/FRHoffmann1/status/1746589423251403236

.. weaker can coerce the stronger is interesting (not impossible, though). However, if NATO compromises on its fundamental purpose, that is the defence of its allies, then NATO as an alliance will cease to exit. That would leave all states vulnerable and on their own, ..

2/n

#Ukraine update: beyond the summer #counteroffensive and what to expect in the first half of 2024.

It has been a while since we discussed the situation at the front, including the strategic level and the general outlook. Here is a quick thread.

1/17 1) What happen with the summer counteroffensive?

#Ukraine made gains (significantly more than RU managed to make in their offensives) and managed to puncture the main RU line of defense. UKR forces also inflicted considerable damage to RU forces.

2/17

https://twitter.com/BalticDefRadar/status/1698978882911695186

#Ukraine #counteroffensive update (thread 3/3) – on the general outlook (summer/autumn):

It is bound to the loss rates and attrition ratios. We simply cannot know these ratios are and we will have to wait and see. It is also bound to resources.

🧵1/5 #Ukraine received a significant injection of the Western military equipment and ammunition; UKR forces are fully dependent on the military aid. Meanwhile, RU is forced to withdraw more and more equipment from storage. RU is also conserving the artillery rounds.

🧵2/5

#Ukraine #counteroffensive update (thread 2/3) – on the current situation (July 2023):

Unlike the Russian forces which just kept going with their futile attacks, taking massive losses during the winter offensive, UKR command paused the operation to rethink and adjust.

🧵 1/8 #Ukraine retains many of its recently formed brigades and still has the offensive potential. While re-assessing, the UKR command has changed its strategy. Instead of attempting large scale attacks, it switch to small scale, slower, grinding attacks in dismounted manner.

🧵 2/8

#Ukraine #counteroffensive update (thread 1/3) – on the initial push in June 2023:

- Ukraine's initial attempt in June to breakthrough in the south was not a success: 47th Mechanized Brigade suffered losses near Orikhiv-Robotyne and effectively stalled; ...

🧵 1/8 #Ukraine's attacks south of Velyka Novosilka had some success, but then were met by stiff RU resistance; moderate success around Bakhmut.

There are several reasons for this. First and foremost, breaching and advancing against entrenched peer enemy is VERY difficult.

🧵 2/8

Some folks have been suggesting that the #Ukraine-#Russia war shows that the value of expensive high-tech military equipment has diminished due to cheap and mass produced weapons. For example, cheap FPV drones can destroy multi-million dollar tanks.

It's not that simple.. 🧵
1/8 1) There is no wunderwaffe or a lasting game-changer weapon, strategy or tactics. Unless there is a disproportionate difference in technological and economic capacity of the combatants, any advantages are temporary as the other side adapts and finds ways to reduce the ...

2/8

#Russia blown up the Nova #Kakhovka dam in #Ukraine.

A reminder for some Western politicians: Russian regime just committed an ecological disaster and another major war crime. Russian fascism must be defeated and destroyed. It's perverted, sick and disgusting.

🧵 ...
1/4 On operational and other consequences:
- There will be no significant impact on UKR counter-offensive. #Ukraine may briefly pause to reassess the situation.
- The water level will increase, washing a lot of small settlements. #Kherson city is mostly on a higher land, though.

2/4

#France and #Macron deserve a thread in the context of #Ukraine, #Russia and beyond.

- First, some historical context: France, just like #Britain, is a declining power. This process started with the loss of colonies after the World War 2.

🧵 ...

1/18

theguardian.com/world/2023/may… - A clear geopolitical shift happen with the Suez Crisis in 1956, which marked the emergence of #USA and #USSR as the world powers.

- #France also experienced a humiliating military defeat by #Germany during the World War 2. That shaped rather pretentious politics of ...

2/18

#BBC and other media keeps quoting Russian mouth pieces issuing warnings. Whenever media quotes RU officials, the context and facts must be clarified. In this case:

- #Russia started its war of conquest against #Ukraine. Now they face consequences.

1/9

bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politi… - Nearly entire RU army was sent into #Ukraine. That force is spent. RU will not be able to renew its offensive capability for the rest of 2023.

- Tactical battles will contiue, RU keeps some reserve, but it is UKR #counteroffensive which will decide what will happen next.

2/9

#Ukraine: the window of opportunity for the #counteroffensive has opened. Only the Ukrainian General Staff knows when and where it will take place, but it is imminent.

Some notes and points to watch:

- It will be a tough fight against the entrenched RU forces ..

🧵 1/10 .. and #Ukraine will not avoid attrition, but UKR has the necessary capability and a very realistic chance of success.

- The stakes of the upcoming operation are very high. If UKR will fail to achieve the strategic breakthrough, then the war might head into a stalemate.

2/10

#Ukraine certainly needs F-16s in the long term, but they would also be beneficial in the short term. A quick thread:

- UKR Air Force operates MiG-29 and Su-27/25/24 with old airframes, old avionics, weak radars and nearly no integration with the Western missiles/pods.

🧵.. 1/7 This is an old and technologically inferior equipment which has to be replaced. F-16 is most widely available multirole Western fighter jet and therefore it is the most practical candidate for #Ukraine's transition from the Soviet-era to the Western jets and missiles.

2/7