In H1 2024, threat actors refined their tactics and introduced new techniques to evade detection and disrupt defenses. Zero-day exploits & sophisticated malware dominated the landscape. Here's what we observed 👇 Newly disclosed vulnerabilities in Ivanti, PAN-OS, and Windows SmartScreen were heavily exploited, even after patches were released. The availability of proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit code fueled persistent targeting.

At peace and war, China’s #cyber activities alter its target’s actions with threats to punish unwanted behaviors and apply pressure to coerce. Insikt Group® analyzes the 2 elements of #weishe theory in its application against Taiwan and more. 1/5 Read: bit.ly/3VjLQd1 In weishe, coercion comprises two distinct theories of action to change the behavior of a target: #Deterrence and #Compellence. Deterrence uses the threat of punishment to prevent undesirable actions, and compellence wields punishment to motivate desirable behavior. 2/5

Discover multinational #InfluenceOperations at work. See how #Iran and #Venezuela can use state-sponsored media outlets, social media influencers, proxies, surrogates, and political activists in the #AlexSaab influence campaign. Read full report: bit.ly/3EPYPhv 1/8 Insikt Group® identifies four phases of a multiyear influence campaign centered around indicted Alex Saab, the alleged financier and special agent to Iran for the Nicolás #Maduro regime. The Alex Saab timeline shows significant events from indictment to postponed trial. 2/8

Take a look at how #China #Russia #Iran and #DomesticExtremist conduct influence operations – #disinformation and #misinformation campaigns – to disrupt and influence US #Midterms2022 elections. Read the full report here: bit.ly/3ew3zhN The #Russophobia theme emerged on a #RussiaTimes interview with #DmitryBabich and in June 2022 with FSB-directed #Southfront. This appeal to ethnic Russians could drive tension between them and US govt, possibly motivating a hack-and-leak or hack-and-fake #OctoberSurprise. 2/7

Recorded Future analysts monitor targeting of ethnic and religious minorities by Chinese state-sponsored groups. In the first half of 2022, #TA413 exploited zero-days #Follina and CVE-2022-1040 with new custom backdoor #LOWZERO in Tibetan targeting. 1/9 bit.ly/3LwzoDf #MalDoc lures, in Tibetan language, pose as applications for compensation, contest... This one sent from tibet[.]bet was weaponized with #RoyalRoad SHA 028e07fa88736f405d24f0d465bc789c3bcbbc9278effb3b1b73653847e86cf8, drops #LOWZERO and contacts hardcoded C2 45.77.19[.]75. 2/9