Thread by @Ex_Trac

1. The attack on #Kabul Cricket Stadium is as yet unclaimed, but it’s worth noting that, as of today, #ISKP has been inactive for 13 days in a row.

That’s the longest period since September 2021, when it was gearing up to launch the most intensive campaign in its recent history.

2. This summer’s slump has seen #ISKP become somewhat sidelined as an issue in #Afghanistan.

This graph shows mentions of the keyword “Daesh” on #Taliban social media since mid-2020.

Note how things peaked in Q4 2021 when #ISKP was at its most virulent.

3. We’ve also seen a slump in official #ISKP media releases (as in, those published through #IS’s Central Media Diwan).

Importantly, this lull hasn’t been reflected in the activities of #ISKP’s less globally prominent Pashtu and Dari media offices.

4. In recent days, #ISKP’s local language media offices have published a raft of content, anything from long-winded (as in, 100+ pages of text) attacks on the #Taliban to calls for attacks on places of “polytheist” worship (especially #Shia).

5. To be sure, this relative lull may simply reflect the fact that the #Taliban has been exacting a lot of pressure on #ISKP of late.

However, #IS typically pauses ahead of spectaculars, as we’ve previously shown in #Afghanistan, #Iraq, and #Syria.

6. On that basis—especially given the fact that we are not far from the Shia festival of #Ashura and that #ISKP has been ramping up its sectarian communications of late—another campaign could be on the horizon.

7. And, given what #ISKP has been publishing locally of late, said campaign (if it happens) will likely have a dual focus on #Taliban “apostates” and #Shia/#Hindu/#Sikh “idolaters.”

We’ll be monitoring this in the coming weeks. Visit ExTrac.io for more information.