1. The attack on #Kabul Cricket Stadium is as yet unclaimed, but it’s worth noting that, as of today, #ISKP has been inactive for 13 days in a row.
That’s the longest period since September 2021, when it was gearing up to launch the most intensive campaign in its recent history.
2. This summer’s slump has seen #ISKP become somewhat sidelined as an issue in #Afghanistan.
This graph shows mentions of the keyword “Daesh” on #Taliban social media since mid-2020.
Note how things peaked in Q4 2021 when #ISKP was at its most virulent.
3. We’ve also seen a slump in official #ISKP media releases (as in, those published through #IS’s Central Media Diwan).
Importantly, this lull hasn’t been reflected in the activities of #ISKP’s less globally prominent Pashtu and Dari media offices.
4. In recent days, #ISKP’s local language media offices have published a raft of content, anything from long-winded (as in, 100+ pages of text) attacks on the #Taliban to calls for attacks on places of “polytheist” worship (especially #Shia).
5. To be sure, this relative lull may simply reflect the fact that the #Taliban has been exacting a lot of pressure on #ISKP of late.
However, #IS typically pauses ahead of spectaculars, as we’ve previously shown in #Afghanistan, #Iraq, and #Syria.
6. On that basis—especially given the fact that we are not far from the Shia festival of #Ashura and that #ISKP has been ramping up its sectarian communications of late—another campaign could be on the horizon.
7. And, given what #ISKP has been publishing locally of late, said campaign (if it happens) will likely have a dual focus on #Taliban “apostates” and #Shia/#Hindu/#Sikh “idolaters.”
We’ll be monitoring this in the coming weeks. Visit ExTrac.io for more information.
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1. In recent months, we’ve been tracking chatter about the World Cup in #Qatar across #IS, #AQ, and Shi'a militant group (#SMG) networks online.
2. Interest has been fairly limited in #AQ & #SMG ecosystems but #IS|ers have been calling for attacks, with momentum for these calls spiking in recent days.
Graphs show incidence of posts with “Qatar” (yellow), “World Cup” (blue), and “football” (red).
3. One #IS call-to-arms singles out teams / supporters of Coalition member states, above all #US and #France.
There have also been multiple assertions that attacks needn’t happen only in #Qatar, the logic being that an attack anywhere during the WC will be maximally disruptive.
1. Following the explosions at #Saky airbase on Tuesday, satellite imagery (from @Planet) of their aftermath has emerged.
Multiple buildings and aircraft were destroyed – with at least three distinct craters clearly apparent.
L: 9 Aug
R: 10 Aug
2. Several aircraft housed in 3-sided berms were destroyed, while others closer to the apparent impact craters seemed to survive.
There are a few possible explanations for this (for e.g., some aircraft may have been carrying munitions while others were not).
L: 9 Aug
R: 10 Aug
3. In videos shared across pro-#Kremlin Telegram that had reportedly been shot immediately after the first 'strike,' smoke can be seen billowing before a large explosion at the site.
1. Over the last few days, we’ve been tracking a major new influence campaign being deployed by the #Taliban in #Afghanistan.
On 22 July, its networks on Twitter and Telegram were three times more active than usual – more active than they've been across all of 2022 to date.
2. This surge was the result of a defensive comms campaign aimed at legitimising the #Taliban, sparked when @Meta banned its media agencies, Bakhtar/RTA, last week.
In the wake of that, thousands started tweeting #BanTaliban in the hope that @Twitter would follow suit.
1. We’ve been tracking #Kremlin comms around the #Kremenchuk strike last week.
The dynamics—which see pro-war online ecosystems serving as a staging area for conspiracies that are ultimately adopted by the #Russia|n state—are similar to what we saw after #Bucha and #Kramatorsk.
2. This cycle repeats whenever #Russia finds itself accused of atrocities.
First, there’s denial.
That then morphs into scattershot conspiracies.
Then, the theory that “sticks,” best slotting into #Russia's campaign narrative, ends up being adopted as the official line.
News of the 27 June attack spread rapidly on Telegram.
Within minutes of the missile’s impact, a popular pro-#Kremlin channel reported that “something big” had been hit, sharing a photo of a smoke pile as evidence.