There's a reason that simplistic, purportedly empirical takes like this begin with self-serving definitions of monolithic abstractions and proceed with scant reference to, and no analysis of, actual historical cases. The reason is that history doesn't bear them out.
The argument is sloppy. Against those who "point to... religious scientists," he writes: "I’d argue that this is compartmentalization, not compatibility, for how can you reject the divine in your laboratory but accept that the wine you sip on Sunday is the blood of Jesus?"
But the question is what do *they* argue? *Do* they "reject the divine" in the laboratory or simply not take it up? Is their *belief* in Jesus of the same nature as their assent to scientific results? Assuming that it *must* be begs the whole question.
"Argument" is a pretty strong word for this. "Soliloquy" seems closer.
But more breathtaking even than the absence of empirical evidence or serious engagement with other views is the slapdash way in which "the past" does get invoked.
But more breathtaking even than the absence of empirical evidence or serious engagement with other views is the slapdash way in which "the past" does get invoked.
"Others argue that in the past religion promoted science and inspired questions about the universe. But in the past every Westerner was religious, and it’s debatable whether, in the long run, the progress of science has been promoted by religion."
Ah yes, the old, "In the past, everyone believed X" -- the rhetorical refuge of writers who don't know enough about the past to say anything specific, and certainly aren't going to waste time learning.
This is lazy writing and lazier thinking, and it does a disservice both to the history of science (and religion, but that's intended) and to readers.
For one thing, it is true that virtually every major figure in the history of science before the 19th century, and many since, "was religious". Why this should *rule out* the influence of religion on science, rather than make it obvious, is hard to see.
But what is it to "be religious"? Is it to adhere to orthodox doctrine? To go to church? To connect one's intellectual activities with one's religious beliefs? To risk persecution for heterodoxy in both? Flattening all of these into "everyone was religious" makes no sense.
And what is it to "be scientific"? Why should we assume a definition's validity rather than look, empirically, at what it has actually meant to the people who have created "science" over time?
For the author, the coexistence of religious faith and scientific activity in one person is invariably a matter of "compartmentalization", a kind of hiving off of conscious religious belief from conscious scientific thought. But how does that work in different cases?
We might indeed imagine that some early modern Jesuits who were rebuked for their scientific work by their superiors had to "compartmentalize." Their religious vocation clashed with their intellectual work, rather than reinforcing it.
That makes a lot less sense for people like Boyle or Newton whose scientific work was expressly inspired or informed by religious motivation. Natural histories motivated by the study of Creation come to mind. So do Newtonian arguments sustained by a vision of divine Providence.
That's just the production side. In terms of reception, there's little question that a major mode of "scientific communication" in and after the "Scientific revolution" was the sermon. Science wasn't just "accommodated" to religion. Religious institutions and beliefs promoted it.
There were also, of course, major clashes between theological commitments (and their representatives) and scientific discoveries and theories. That these were tensions within as well as between individuals itself suggests that "compartmentalization" is a dodge, not an answer.
But what all this suggests is that it's a immensely complicated question worth exploring -- not something to be dismissed with an ignorant wave of the hand.
