Thread by @JJSchroden

A thread with some thoughts on this recent paper by the @USSOCOM J5 on #SOF’s role in great power competition (GPC). 1/x

smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/sof-c…

1. It's a little weird that the @USSOCOM J5 published a paper that makes recommendations (& a lot of them!) to the command itself. Makes you wonder about how effective internal comms are & how empowered people feel to advocate internally for change. 2/x

2. The paper ignores the large body of work that @CNA_org has done on this topic (a few exs are below). I find it disappointing & odd that the paper treads over some of the same ground unnecessarily. 3/x

cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/…
cna.org/cna_files/pdf/…
warontherocks.com/2018/12/how-sp…

3. The section “Strategic Framing in Competition” seemed a somewhat unnecessary lecture; but more to the point the authors don’t use it much in advancing the rest of their argument, so it feels like an unneeded detour. 4/x

4. The bulleted list of ways that SOF can support GPC are a reasonable start, though the second bullet “Providing military or defense advantage…” seems a reach to me given SOF’s limited size and depth. Probably better stated as "support to the Joint Force" in doing this. 5/x

5. Concur w/this: “@USSOCOM guidance that establishes a unifying sense of purpose among [its components] would likely prove to be a valuable contribution.” Given the power of JSOC w/in the #SOF enterprise though, this is easier said than done. 6/x

6. The section on integrated campaigning over-focuses on C2 & systems. In our work on #SOF & GPC @CNA_org, we've identified a lack of knowledge on *how to campaign* w/in the @USSOCOM enterprise as problematic for its role in GPC. 7/x

7. Note that @USSOCOM has only recently joined the operational level of war via the two SOJTFs; it has no equivalent of SAMS/SAW for op planners; & has done mostly tactical ops for past 20 yrs. Integ campaigning against states is not a core competency of the #SOF enterprise. 8/x

8. Concur with the sentiment that @USSOCOM can do more in educating the interagency about #SOF capabilities beyond CT. There’s a lot that can/should be done by the command & components to get past the popular movie/video game images of the past couple decades. 9/x

9. They answer the Q of #SOF’s role in GPC as: “developing the access & placement to support & enable our partners in creating the influence required to support the creation of favorable foreign relations in support of national interests.” Let’s look at the parts of this. 10/x

10. “Access and placement” = Global SOF Network, ok. “Support & enable our partners” = interagency + partner nations/allies, ok. “Creating influence”, ok. But “to support the creation of favorable foreign relations”?? Since when did @USSOCOM supplant the @StateDept ? 11/x

11. Ultimately, the authors focus on #SOF’s placement & access as its core contribution to GPC: to sense & enable crisis response; to proactively shape & support deterrence; to build/maintain a network of partners/allies; & to position for advantage in a fight. 12/x

12. That’s a reasonable position, albeit one of mostly re-purposing SOF’s global network today. I wonder though why they didn’t frame it in NDS terms, eg #SOF as the “global contact force” to shape the environment, build coalitions, & enable the "blunt force" as needed. 13/x

13. Seems to me an argument about how @USSOCOM can best support the NDS (i.e., GPC) would be best couched in terms/frameworks the NDS itself uses. Would also help the command integrate its arguments better with the Services, who are using these terms/constructs. 14/x

14. Last thought: @USSOCOM can/should offer more than access & placement as its core contribution to GPC. IMO this is a pretty “land-centric” view of #SOF that misses a lot of what the likes of NSW, @AFSpecOpsCmd, etc., can do ISO of the NDS. 15/15