THREAD: in closely following events since Oct 1, I feel it’s time to share some thoughts on what’s next for the protests and for Iraq…opportunities, obstacles and threats...
First of all, the fact that protests started in October was no surprise. The writing’s been on the wall since Basra last year. What is surprising is the protesters' tenacity, humanity, and organization. Iraqis never surprised me, until now... bit.ly/2NMF6Di
This movement, you can call it a revolution, won’t go away. A pause to recover or wait out bad weather will be brief. Iraq’s winters are mild, and short. But the longer this draws out, the more complications and opportunities for unsavory actors to muddy the waters.
Iraq’s political class has three choices: The first and most appropriate action is to accept meaningful political and economic change that preserves the state, prevents further bloodshed, and perhaps includes a considerably smaller role for themselves and their parties...
Another option is to run away. And the third and worst possible option is to fight back, risking everything. If I were them I’d go with option 1...
Many politicians are perhaps already packing suitcases and looking for the door. They can live comfortably for decades on what they collected/stole. But for Iran, its allies and some of the oligarchs, there is too much at stake and they will find it difficult to abandon the fight
...What we’ve seen so far is ‘killing to intimidate’. What will happen if Iran/militias start ‘killing to eliminate’?
Could Iraq go through something similar to what Iran went through in 1978 when the Shah started a bloodbath? Tyrants better remember that the more people they kill, the more martyrs there will be to sustain the people’s movement...
In such a scenario, one could imagine that Sadr or some other cleric would try to pull a Khomeini on the Iraqi protesters. I think any Khomeini copycat would be disappointed...
If militias start mowing down people, could the army/CTS actively join the protesters? I’m not talking about divisions and generals, but junior officers and small units?
Whether the militias and/or army enter the fray in more violent ways, neither could expect to rely on the hundreds of thousands on their payrolls. Those who stick around will be in much smaller numbers...
Back to reforms: what can those look like? First of all, Iraq’s problem is not lack of laws but rather poor implementation. Key reform is RULE OF LAW, and main obstacle to that are armed non-state actors
There’s understandable skepticism about the timing and value of election law reform and an independent IHEC. It’s true these are insufficient, but they are nonetheless crucial foundations for the future apnews.com/fdc8bf80df2648…
There’s also a need for showing immediate results on accountability. Show the people Nouri al-Maliki in handcuffs and you’ll absorb tons of public anger. The rest of the political class better start thinking who to scapegoat
Economy is key. Iraq needs to act yesterday to allow private sector growth to create jobs for 100s of thousands joining work force each year. Squeezing pension laws to generate a few thousand useless government jobs is not an answer. Iraq must stop being a rentier state.
Ending the oligarchs' stranglehold on economic life and modernizing banking and the bureaucracy could unleash much potential..
What can/should the US do? Well, Washington has a long history of PR fumbles in similar situations. Iraq 1991, Iran 2009, Egypt 2011, list goes on…plus, protesters are very protective of the independence of their movement
Therefore the US may want to keep some distance. Call out bad policies and atrocities, prepare for contingencies and put pressure on politicians to accept meaningful managed change.
US threats of more, scalable sanctions against individual politicians/militia leaders and movement restrictions could come in handy (@Mikeknightsiraq has some good ideas). So can movement on Security Council action against Iran/militias washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysi…
KRG interest in preserving status quo in Baghdad, as we saw lately with opposition to early elections, constitutional changes, can and will complicate reforms enablingpeace.org/ishm229/#Headl…
Down the road, expect renewed calls for separation, from people on BOTH sides. But as always, there’s the question Kirkuk. This roadblock could frustrate reforms, but discontent would build up again soon...
KRG may have to make compromises too in order to preserve some of its interests…At the end of the day, true, far-reaching reforms that establish rule of law would serve Arabs and Kurds, and members of every other community, equally
This is an opportunity to replace old political pacts based on greed and mutual fear of a tyrannical past with national pacts based on mutual respect and trust.
