a reader has sent me a nice email telling me that my recent tweets on Iran are too strident.
I realize that when I'm writing well, I'm being very analytic and avoiding adjectives, editorializing. Presenting facts is more persuasive than hectoring people.
Point taken.
I realize that when I'm writing well, I'm being very analytic and avoiding adjectives, editorializing. Presenting facts is more persuasive than hectoring people.
Point taken.
2/ few of my present readers probably realize that my entry into climate controversy was connected to 2003 US invasion of Iraq. My request to Mann for data was in week of invasion and because of invasion. It seemed to me that climate advocates' demand for pre-emptive policy were
3/ just as pre-emptive as US pretext for invading Iraq because of supposed WMD. I had enough international business experience that I presumed that Ahmed Chalabi would tell US intel whatever they wanted to hear and thought it madness that he was anywhere near US foreign policy.
4/ so I thought that it would be interesting to look at whether Mann's data supported the sort of pre-emptive war in climate that US was carrying out in Iraq. Years later, my interests have sort of reversed.
5/ I saw the shoddiness of Mann's work and data (and many others). I didn't view such analyses as proving or disproving any policy decision - only that the specific article(s) ought not to be relied on for policy decision. I used the analogy of a CIA analyst looking at aluminum
6/ tubes, and asking whether they are actually evidence for WMD or just ordinary aluminum tubes.
Now I'm asking similar questions about intel for new wars. Does the evidence for Douma "sarin" attack stand up? It doesn't. What do we really know about K1 attack? Not much.
Now I'm asking similar questions about intel for new wars. Does the evidence for Douma "sarin" attack stand up? It doesn't. What do we really know about K1 attack? Not much.
