I spent some time thinking about why Soleimani was the (almost) perfect target for a US retaliation. Here are my ideas. Premise one: I still believe this was an extremely problematic operation & the consequences will be huge and dangerous for many people in the region (1/12)
Premise two: I’ve absolutely no sympathy for Qassem Soleimani. However, my job is not about sympathy or antipathy. It’s about trying to understand reality, overcoming bias as much as possible. (2/12)
So why Qassem Souleimani was the (almost) perfect target? Well, not because of its enormous power and influence. People like @nargesbajoghli and @AOstovar have already questioned the largely overestimated impact that his death will have on IRGC effectiveness & strength (3/12)
Soleimani, however, was an almost perfect target because it was the emblem of Iran’s regional strategy, foreign adventurism, and proxy management. He’s been described as the real Foreign Minister of Iran. But most of all, he didn’t attract any sympathy outside his country. (4/12)
Soleimani, outside Iran, was the perfect evil. A sharp, relentless and ruthless commander directly responsible for the crackdown of protests in Iraq & Lebanon and many other violent operations. None will mourn him outside Iran. This made Soleimani a good target. (5/12)
There is a second, possibly more important, reason, however. Soleimani was too big to be killed. Strategically speaking, this could prove to have been a smart choice. Let me explain why. (6/12)
I’m still convinced that both Iran and the US are fully aware of the tremendous consequences of full scale war. Ultimately, both parties will restrain themselves as much as possible to avoid it. But the killing of a high-profile general is the perfect casus belli. (7/12)
This puts Iran in an interesting gridlock. The emergence of a casus belli means the emergence of war. Therefore, Iran should respond to Soleimani’s assassination accordingly. But they can’t because, rationally, they don’t want full scale war. (8/12)
The answer, then, will have to pass through proxy operations, targeted killing, strongly symbolic actions, etc. All extremely dangerous. All risky for the fragile stability of the region. But still not close to revenge a General that was too big to be killed. (9/12)
It seemed to me that the US have, for the first time, understood and mirrored Iran’s tactic of exploiting the enemy’s impossibility to accept a full scale conflict. It’s an extremely risky tactic but it may work if well designed and supported by diplomacy. (10/12)
Unfortunately, I don’t think this is the case. This US administration never had a credible Iran’s policy. The space for diplomacy is slimmer than ever. Plus, the US and Iran are lighting matches in a region that looks like a huge gas station. (11/12)
That’s why I think Qassem Soleimani was the (almost) perfect target for a US retaliation. But because the devil is in the detail, the almost part will unfortunately prevail over the perfect one. (12/12)
