Forgive a RT, but this requires more than 280 characters:
Deterrence requires a signal to an adversary that an ally/thing is above the threshold of response. Sometimes to reassure allies we place assets at risk (units in Europe, @PatDonahoeArmy in ROK etc)/1
Deterrence requires a signal to an adversary that an ally/thing is above the threshold of response. Sometimes to reassure allies we place assets at risk (units in Europe, @PatDonahoeArmy in ROK etc)/1
The RAND study recently released shows that assets heavy units are stronger in general deterrent value. In terms of the study, Units are coded heavy v light, bomber v fighter, etc /2
When coded in this way, the least mobile units had the most deterrent effect. With heavy ground at the top and air assets at the bottom. This begs the question: what accounts for their deterrent value? /3
The value of placing @PatDonahoeArmy on the 38th parallel is not his qualitatively superior fighting skill, but that his loss would steel American resolve and trigger a response. /4
Questions of resolve and assurance affect the deterrent value. A temporary rotation of Paratroopers would not do much to alter adversary intentions. At most, they would change timing. A permanent forward basing of tanks would signal be a better signal of intentions /5
That is because tanks take time. In a crisis, tanks cannot be evacuated quickly, therefore deploying tanks to an ally's backyard signals that we are with them for a minimum of the weeks and weeks it takes to redeploy tank unit. /6
However, as the RAND study also finds, when the US has surged forces forward during international crises, there is the lowest incidence of escalation. These "surged" ground forces able to deploy quickly in a crisis are almost always light or USMC /7
This undercuts the claim that heavy units have an advantage due to fighting power, instead, it demonstrates that their real power in deterrence is inertia. They aren't going anywhere. So the decision to send heavy forces v light forces is more an economic-based decision /8
If deterrence can be achieved through rapid surging of light forces OR permanent staging of heavy, what makes more sense for your force. Pay for repeated surges more frequently or base heavy tanks persistently. A 2nd decision would be integration with the ally's force. /9
To drive the point home, what would be the difference between an Armored BCT and a Light BCT in a defense against an overmatched enemy? If there isn't an immediate response by other assets, both types of units will not fair well. /10
Templated enemies rely on massed artillery, and extreme numerical advantages to compensate for qualitative disadvantages. Singular units, regardless of their type, lack the depth to absorb attacks, blunt penetrations, and counter punch. /11
Their strength is on their right shoulder patch🇺🇸. An attack on any American unit generally elicits a response. So I would argue the inertia that prevents quick withdrawal, means that tank units (despite their supposed survivability) puts them at greater risk, BUT /12
By accepting greater risk, we demonstrate greater resolve (this ice cream cone licks itself). Therefore, even though neither unit is particularly survivable against a massed, deliberate, surprise attack, a light unit could be recalled quickly. A tank unit could not. /13
So far from a glowing review of Tanks over Light infantry, the RAND study is an elaborate "fat tanker" joke.
@threadreaderapp unroll
