Head of Asia Pacific, Grant Wilson on RISK PARITY: It has been presented as an alternative to the classic 60/40 allocation b/w equities & bonds. (Thread 1/8). Originally featured as an opinion piece in @FinancialReview
2/8: Risk Parity equalizes contributions to risk from different asset classes in portfolio. Typically targets #volatility for portfolio as whole, in range of 10-15%. Equity, bonds, & other sector allocations derived based on measures of expected return/risk/correlation.
3/8: Risk parity has become synonymous with an ‘all weather’ portfolio. In March, #COVID19 roiled financial markets & we saw the short-comings of this slogan.
4/8: Early on, risk parity functioned, w/ sharp decline in equity prices, counterbalanced by lower bond yields. 10yr US yield reached historic intraday low of 0.32%. From there things went wrong. $SPX fell a further 13% through Mar 18, yet bond yields reversed higher, to 1.19%.
5/8: This was worst-case for risk parity - involved drawdowns on both sides of book. Fed came to the rescue w/ unlimited #QE Mar 23, restoring market functioning & liquidity - effectively bailing out the risk parity sector.
6/8: There has been some recovery in risk parity performance (owing to rally in equities/credit), but **our view is that risk parity is beyond being retooled. It is fundamentally broken now**.
7/8: 1). levered bond component. w/ nominal yields so low, portfolio protection limited. 2). Real yields now deeply neg - capital may be preserved nominal terms but inflated away in real terms. 3). Structural decline in FI vol & breakdown in realised correlation b/w equity/debt.
8/8: Time to Exit: Sheer weight of money & influence that underpins risk parity ensures that it will not go away gently. We expect more rejigging/rebranding & are wary. *We think it is time to exit risk parity in full, & return when its basic precepts are restored by the market*
Last week (Thu to Wed) saw a third consecutive week of robust inflows to both global equity ($13.7bn) and fixed income ($11.9bn) funds, totaling global inflows of $28bn in equity and $45.3bn in global fixed in the first three weeks of the year
Inflows to global fixed income were explained by purchases of EM debt by foreign investors ($2.6bn), the highest record since February 2019, but also for purchases of US fixed income by domestic investors ($3.1bn).
Inflows to global equity were driven by foreign purchases of EU equities ($2.7bn), the highest record since May 2017 and mainly explained by purchases of US domiciled funds ($2.5bn), but also for inflows into EM ($3.4bn) and Chinese ($3.6bn) equity.
Given intense focus on foreign, especially Japanese activity vis a vis the US Treasury market we share some of the data we use to track these flows...🧵wsj.com/articles/japan…
The latest Japanese data show sales of US LT debt of about $17bn in September. That brings such sales to $113bn YTD.
We know that the MOF sold FX totaling about $20bn in September and another $43bn in October via intervention. While unusual this is not historically large (relative to reserve holdings)...
New Substack: 🔹Petrodollars: Where are the surpluses? Part 1 🔹by @EtraAlex and @Shekhar_HK17 . Combo of global pandemic & energy crisis is having an impact on global imbalances - a roughly once-in-a-decade event. (Thread) #OOTT@middleeast
US, EZ, Japan, Korea will likely have current account deficits soon. Where are the counterpart surpluses to these shifts?
#Shanghai#COVID#lockdown means that intercity travel to Shanghai is practically zero, weaker than during Spring 2020. But many neighbourhoods were locked down weeks before that; travel to Shanghai started to decline in early March - THREAD (1/4) #ZeroCovid
Outbound travel from Shanghai is similarly weak.
Subway usage remains near zero, too. In 2019 and 2021, around 10mn people took the subway every day at this time of the year. In recent days, that number has been <1,500 people.
1. THREAD: Series by @GeneralTheorist
*To catch a falling knife: US Treasuries and the Fed*
The continued US deficit in 2021 puts Treasuries in focus, with 10y yield already having moved about 80bps higher to 170bps, & a number of weak primary auctions in Q1. What’s going on?
2. In a series of Substack blogs, we attempt to frame the unique situation in the US this year. Post-GFC and last year, the US fiscal deficit was the natural counterpart to private sector surpluses.
3. In 2021, the Federal deficit remains high despite the acceleration in private consumption and investment on vaccines and lockdown ending. How to reconcile both sectors attempting to move into deficit?