In our Brussels Edition newsletter this morning: All eyes on Budapest, where the leaders of Poland and Hungary meet at 11 am CET, as pressure builds on them to relent on their opposition to the EU's budget and jointly financed stimulus: bloomberg.com/news/newslette…
One Polish official signaled that without any plan to draw up a counterproposal, the meeting is unlikely to provide the breakthrough many are waiting for. In Brussels, diplomats will decide on the next steps after today's meeting bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
One idea making the rounds in Brussels is to end the ongoing Article 7 rule of law procedure against Hungary and Poland (the Council concluding that there are no grounds for sanctions), in effect providing a clean slate before the new mechanism for the budget kicks in
This idea isn't officially part of the discussion (at least as of last night), as Hungary and Poland still insist on delaying or amending the rule-of-law conditionality for the disbursement of funds. This will not fly with other governments - especially frugals.
Not sure whether the idea to end Art. 7 procedures before the budget conditionality kicks in would fly either. In addition to causing media uproar, it would send a signal that the rest of the EU can be blackmailed. Greece tried this in 2015, and then the U.K - it didn't work.
What is certain is that if there's no compromise in sight, there's pressure to go ahead and formally adopt the rule-of-law conditionality (which only requires qualified majority) and then wait for Hungary and Poland to climb down the tree
If they don't, then the rest will go ahead with other options for bypassing their veto, by setting up a mechanism outside the EU budget for the recovery funds. This will allow much needed cash to flow towards the south while waiting for Poland and Hungary to relent.
... Meanwhile, the EU would be running on an emergency monthly budget, which probably means a partial shutdown a of Jan. 1. Leftovers from the current budget will be subject to rule of law conditionality, which means Hungary and Poland will risk losing access to those also.
In many ways, the standoff reminds me of what Tsipras tried (and miserably failed) to do in 2015. But won't go into that because this thread will get really long.
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Υπάρχει σοβαρό πρόβλημα με το Ταμείο Ανάκαμψης και τον Κοινοτικό Προϋπολογισμό. Χθες, στη συνεδρίαση της Επιτροπής Μονίμων Αντιπροσώπων, έγινε περιγραφή της κατάστασης με δραματικούς τόνους. Ελλάδα και Κύπρος (όπως και οι άλλες χώρες του Νότου) θα δεχθούν πλήγμα σε τρία μέτωπα:
Παρένθεση - η Επιτροπή Μονίμων Αντιπροσώπων στις Βρυξέλλες (COREPER) είναι το επίπεδο όπου τα κράτη-μέλη της ΕΕ λαμβάνουν το 98% των συλλογικών αποφάσεων τους. Οι υπουργοί *συνήθως* βάζουν μία τζίφρα σε αποφάσεις & κείμενα που έχουν ήδη συμφωνηθεί στο COREPER. Εξ ου και..
... ο Μόνιμος Αντιπρόσωπος κάθε κ-μ είναι η πιο σημαντική θέση της διοίκησης, πιο σημαντική από υπουργού. Τα κ-μ είναι ο βασικός νομοθέτης στην ΕΕ (σαν άνω Βουλή). Και οι αποφάσεις τους λαμβάνονται μέσω του COREPER. Κλείνει η παρένθεση. Χθες λοιπόν...
If 🇵🇱 & 🇭🇺 don’t drop their veto by Dec. 7, then the EU will have to operate via monthly emergency budgets as of January. That would mean financial paralysis & the progressive suspension of all but essential spending, the Commission warned today bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
The budget situation will get progressively worse, for reasons related also to Brexit, the Commission explained to EU ambassadors today. The French envoy warned the rule of law quarrel could signal a “fundamental rupture,” which raises questions about the very future of the EU.
There are procedural and legal reasons why this is the case, which can’t fit in a tweet, and don’t matter that much. The point is that the situation is serious. Spain’s envoy urged his peers to communicate to capitals how grave is the situation
Δυο λόγια και στα ελληνικά για το τι συνέβη στη Σύνοδο Κορυφής: σε ό,τι αφορά την Κύπρο, δεν πήρε φυσικά αυτό που ζητάει εδώ και μήνες - τη διεύρυνση της λίστας κυρώσεων που έχουν επιβληθεί για τις δραστηριότητες της Τουρκίας στις επίμαχες περιοχές.
Η 🇨🇾 κατάφερε όμως να βγουν από το κείμενο διατυπώσεις που θεωρούσε προβληματικές, καθώς σύμφωνα με τη Λευκωσία φαινόταν να «υιοθετούν Τουρκικά επιχειρήματα». Το ότι μπήκαν στο αρχικό κείμενο όμως δείχνει ότι αυτά τα επιχειρήματα έχουν απήχηση στις Βρυξελλες
Στο τέλος βγήκαν αυτές οι διατυπώσεις (όπως μας εξήγησε κορυφαίος αξιωματούχος ΕΕ, το αρχικό κείμενο κατατέθηκε έτσι, ώστε να αλλάξει και να βγει από τη Σύνοδο η Κύπρος έχοντας κερδίσει κάτι), αλλά αυτό δεν σημαίνει και πολλά. Η ρίζα του προβλήματος θεωρείται το Κυπριακό
1/ Some insights from senior EU official briefing after the #euco: if you read the entire statement #Turkish foreign ministry statement (official read it very carefully) it’s actually positive. There’s a sense that Turkey is willing to engage. Then the usual about all options etc
2/ Official appeared fully convinced that EU/Turkey relations won’t be normalised unless if the Cyprus issue is resolved. Said that a UN initiative is coming with considerable urgency after the election in the North. The EU will push in this direction.
3/ According to the official, no one wins everything in a negotiation and has the sense that Greece at least is fully aware of this. For example, the ICJ won’t give Greece everything that it wants and yet Greece is willing to go there.
It's the first day of a two-day summit dedicated to conveying the image of a more assertive Europe. Here's what's going to happen: bloomberg.com/news/newslette…
Let's start with China. In a wording that echoes many of the concerns raised by the US, EU leaders will declare that the bloc needs to rebalance its relationship with China. Leaders will also give credit to themselves for Xi's carbon commitment. Our story: bloomberg.com/news/articles/…
On industrial policy, EU leaders will declare that strategic autonomy is a `key objective' of the Union. But what exactly does this mean? We have covered this issue extensively. See for example: bloomberg.com/news/newslette…
So 🇭🇺, 🇵🇱, 🇸🇪, 🇫🇮, 🇩🇰, 🇳🇱 & 🇧🇪 opposed 🇩🇪’s compromise proposal on how to tie #NextGenerationEU & #MFF disbursements to the rule-of-law. 🇦🇹 & 🇱🇺 abstained. The proposal still got the required qualified majority. But in theory, any of these countries could still block the package:
Allowing the European Commission to raise the agreed debt (750 billion) needs unanimity. So the rule of law legislation only needs qualified majority, and 🇭🇺’s objections can be bypassed there, but if 🇭🇺 wants, it can block the “own resources” decision and blow the whole thing up
Plus we need to keep in mind that the EU Parliament also needs to give its backing to the package (by simple majority). Germany only got a mandate from Member states today to negotiate with the Parliament on the rule of law conditionality. It’s something, but not the end of it.