2/ Proponents of the deal in the West argue that the law will eventually come as agreed, and it’s ‚only‘ a non-binding introductory text and the delay that was given to Hungary and Poland, so it's an EU-win – I think they are wrong.
3/ For one, these were fully unnecessary give-aways; fidesz didn’t actually have a negotiating position, all they had was bluffs and aggression.
The RoL law could have been decided by qualified majority voting, if need be against the resistance of PL & HU;
4/ thereafter, if PL & HU had vetoed the budget, they would have been among the biggest losers, and the Covid fund could have been built up without them, leaving them with exactly nothing to win.
All it would have taken by the EU is a slight bit of determination.
5/ Moreover, Fidesz' obstruction of the EU-budget was not even in Hungary popular, this at a time when they are in a downward trend in terms of general popularity in Hungary and the country needs the EU-funds more than ever.
6/ Most recent opinion polls show Fidesz losing support: they’re backed by 30% of the population, vs 36% in August. Losses are especially high with people with tertiary education (46% -> 27%) and young people (33%
-> 22%) – and these numbers do not yet include the Szajer-effect.
7/ This just once more shows that Fidesz’s support is much less rock-solid as it might seem from afar, and that Fidesz had much more to lose from the current stand-off with the EU than some in Brussels possibly realized.
8/ I'm convinced that if the EU had taken the stand-off just a bit further, it would have exposed that Fidesz simply can’t maintain their veto.
9/ Orban‘s ultimate threat of of #Huxit, cited as a key factor in convincing EU-leaders to give him something, is the mother of all bluffs.
It’s absurd: Huxit would drain the lifeblood of his crony-network (EU-funds) and take away from the wider population e.g. Schengen.
10/ Huxit would be a desaster on all fronts, the idea is hugely unpopular in HU; Orban would likely be thrown out very quickly if he seriously started working in that direction.
Honestly it's difficult to imagine how anyone could take this Huxit threat of his seriously.
11/ Now on the 'compromise': some say a delay of 1-2 years in implementing the RoL law does not matter much – I disagree. Strongly, actually.
It's by far not just the humiliation of not being able to introduce a fully agreed law after watering it down multiple times already,
12/ all in order to find a compromise; caving in to aggression once more, or entering muddy waters / creating a troublesome precedent by the Council instructing the Commission to refrain from applying a law until the judiciary has spoken.
13/ But it has very practical, material implications for Hungary and the RoL there.
An obvious one, Orban can steal further billions of Euros and continue destroying institutions in the next 1-2 years.
But he won time to study the law and redesign his grand theft machine too.
14/ This point should not be underestimated: he has an entire state apparatus at his disposal, and the delay may well lead to a situation where by 2022 the system is re-designed so that the RoL mechanism cannot capture anymore the theft of billions of Euros each and every year.
15/ Finally the quite important point that incidentally, there are general elections in Hungary in 2022.
The ‚compromise‘ presumably means the law will not show any real-world effect before that, which might have exactly been Orban's true negotiating goal.
16/ Now he can further tweak the electoral system and prepare for the elections under status quo, all cash flowing to his network 'as it should', win 2022, and then has further 4 years to figure out how to handle the RoL mechanism, with no general elections again before 2026
17/ Now, it is obviously not the EU’s role to engage in national politics and tailor laws to the events and givens of national politics in a member state.
18/ However, does the Council not do exactly that when it agrees to postpone the de-facto entry into force of an agreed law about fundamental values, which are not honored in a MS, to after its national elections?
19/ This is why I belive this RoL agreement is a fail: it awards the perpetrator time to prepare for & circumvent the law, and evade paying the political price for his crimes; thereby inevitably & greatly reducing the law's ultimate effect on the real world.
END
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1/ So, Kinder. Wir wiederholen nun das Gelernte – bitte gut aufpassen, denn ihr und eure Eltern müssen den Stoff bei den nächsten Landtagswahlen gut beherrschen.
2/ Also: wie ihr wisst, wütete in unserer Heimat im Frühling eine gefährliche Krankheit. Das war die Zeit, wo die Schule 6-8 Wochen zu war, und ihr zu Hause saßt und Däumchen drehtet, weil es in Deutschland, anders in den meisten anderen Ländern, keinen Online-Unterricht gab.
3/ Dank den Einschränkungen hat man das Virus eindämmen können, und ab ging es in den Urlaub. Leider war es klar, dass es im Herbst wieder losgeht. Das haben die sog. WissenschaftlerInnen, deren Job es ist, solche Schwierigen Sachen zu verstehen, in aller Deutlichkeit gesagt.
1/
One more 'oldie but goodie' from Orban-land, this time less of a rule-of-law gem but more a tale of fidesz' pathological urge to lie, and you may take note of the sheer fear palpable in the players' actions all along the chain of events.
Here comes: 'The President's PhD'
2/ A foreword: Hungary's president Pal Schmitt had been an olympic gold medalist in fencing; a true nihilist in politics with no views whatsoever and the mere desire to get some important role. Orban personally chose him as president for his relative popularity as a sportsman
3/ and his ignorance, leading to Schmitt indeed singning into law every single Orban-notion which carpet bombed Hungary's democratic institutions and carved state capture into stone. As president, he did not even attempt to show any trace of own will.
This article contains a lot of true statements - and still is fundamentally mistaken and wrong.
Thread.
2/ The article takes autocracy in the East as a given, like an irresistable natural force, and thus establishes the false choice of accepting an autocratic East or giving up the EU as a project unifying the European Continent.
Nothing could be farther from the truth.
3/ For one: we can see with our bare eyes that it is precisely the EU's inaction, the constant vacillation that is tearing it apart, by ever appeasing an actor whose hunger can never be satisfied.
2/ It happened in April 2013 that Orban's government surprisingly announced that the retail sale of cigarettes shall be restricted to a low number of specialized shops across the country, as soon as from July 1st.
3/ All other existing sellers (1000s of small shops, supermarkets, gas stations etc) shall be forbidden to sell cigarettes in less than three months. The number of new authorized dedicated cigs shops was so small that they would have effective monopolies in their surroundings.
V. Orban attackierte in 2009 noch aus der Opposition wüst die Managementgehälter im Staatswesen und bei staatlichen Firmen und machte damit Wahlkampf (unmoralisch; das Land brauche das Geld mehr usw).
2/4 Nachdem er die 2010-er Wahlen gewann, ließ er das Parlament eine Gehaltsobergrenze von umg. 8,000 EUR / Monat für alle Staatsbediensteten verabschieden. Diese galt logischerweise zu dem Zeitpunkt für Leute, die noch von der Vorgängerregierung in ihre Ämter berufen wurden.
3/4 Diese „Alten“ wurden zudem mit einer Steuer von 98% auf ihre bevorstehenden Abfindungen bedacht.
Dafür gab es bei der Obergrenze Ausnahmen; für Politiker und typischerweise für die von Fidesz bereits ernannten neuen Chefs.
1/12
Unter der deutschen Ratspräsidentschaft, und teilweise deutschen Vorschlägen folgend, wurde der EU-Rechtsstaatlichkeitsmechanismus wiederholt (z.B. im Juli 2020 und September 2020) und weitgehend ausgehöhlt.
2/12
Dabei wurde u.a. nicht nur die notwendige Mehrheit für die Anwendung des Mechanismus deutlich erhöht, sondern auch der Geltungsbereich des Gesetzes von "general deficiencies" auf solche konkrete Verstöße reduziert, die einen klaren Bezug zur Verwendung von EU-Geld haben.
3/12
Somit ist es auch faktisch keine Rechtsstaatlichkeitsregelung mehr, was auf dem Tisch ist, sondern eine bloße "stiehl bitte mein Geld nicht"-Regelung.