Thread by @DevReimagined

THREAD: #China’s new white paper on international development cooperation was released 1 week ago. We’ve been analyzing it in depth so you don’t have to. Here are the headlines. 1/

xinhuanet.com/english/2021-0…

First, volumes. How much? On average, approx. $6.95bn a year over 2013-2018. That’s a considerable 70% increase from the $4.1bn per year from 2010-2012, in China's last such white paper (2014). 2/

The major increase is in traditional "aid". Grants have more than doubled from $1.48bn to $3.3bn, while loans have risen by 46% from $2.3bn per year to $3.35bn per year. The hit has been to interest free loans which have fallen to just 29 million per year. 3/

This means China’s development cooperation has become more concessional – the percentage of grants in the portfolio increased from 2010-2012 from 36.2% to 47.3% over 2013-2018, which is good news for countries in need. 4/

Are all China's loans included? This thread compares the WP figures to external estimates of Chinese loans. External estimates seem much higher, likely due to commercial loans. But most other countries do not count commercial loans as "aid" either. 5/

https://twitter.com/davidmihalyi/status/1349028845177995264?s=20

How big does this make #China? The calculations are complex as different providers audit differently, but we estimate this makes China the 7th largest aid provider in the world in absolute terms (behind #France & ahead of #Sweden), spending equivalent to 0.06% of GNI on aid. 6/

Second, where does #China’s #aid go to? The paper only breaks down volume by income level of countries and/or region, not by country. The share of China’s aid to LDCs has fallen from 61.1% over 2010-2012 to 45.7% now, but the share to LMICs has risen from 21.2 to 34.8%. 7/

In addition, the share of China’s aid to Africa has fallen from 51.8% over 2010-2012 to 44.65% now, but that still means an absolute increase from $2.1bn to $3.1bn annually over 2013-2018 – in other words $56m per year to each African country if split equally. 8/

No country figures is a shame - as recipient countries do want to understand #China's #aid. But, in a 2019 paper for @CGDev, @jonathanglennie @petergrin @hmryder noted China does share data directly with recipient govts to publish themselves. 9/
cgdev.org/publication/ch…

That means, recipient countries can & should continue to work with Chinese embassies & trade officials to gather #China's #aid data. This paper does not change that. This primer on #China's #aid by @LeahLynch_China & colleagues can help in doing so. 10/
cgdev.org/publication/ch…

In addition, in the WP, #China has a new category of spend on international orgs, 4.6% of the total. This includes spend from the South South Aid Fund, announced in 2015. Unlike other aid providers, the figure doesn't include “core” multilateral spend, worth approx. US$2bn. 11/

Third, what does the paper say #China’s #aid is spent on? A wide range of projects. The paper has case-studies from all over the world, and updated numbers on total medical teams, volunteers, and more. The paper also includes a box on #COVID19-aid, likely to rise in 2021. 12/

Fourth, is there anything new? Well, the paper reiterates something @LeahLynch_China and colleagues made v clear in the “primer on Chinese aid” for @CGDev from April 2019. Foreign aid will be highly linked to #China's #BeltandRoad Initiative goals 13/
cgdev.org/publication/ch…

The paper also makes strong links to @UN #SDGs – agreed in 2015 – and in contrast to the 2014 white paper talks about #aid as “#development cooperation”. This is @DevCooperation language & suggests #China is willing to be line with such principles. 13/

https://twitter.com/RudyakMarina/status/1348264976100831233?s=20

The new paper also refers to @cidcaofficial – #China’s new #aid agency, launched in March 2018. Creating a separate aid entity is in sharp in contrast to many other aid providers who over the last few years have folded agencies into foreign or trade ministries. 14/

There are also a number of new areas of cooperation mentioned - such as #gender equality, and sustainable and #innovation-driven economic growth, which were not mentioned in previous papers, as noted in this @Diplomat_APAC article 15/ thediplomat.com/2021/01/what-d…

We also notice a new strong emphasis in this WP on “recipient country needs”. It states the “control” of developing countries must be the focus in #trilateral cooperation - a point our CEO @hmryder emphasized in her 2019 ted-style talk in #China. 16/
facebook.com/watch/?v=89015…

Finally, the paper seems aimed at both domestic & international readers. Domestically, there's less emphasis on win-win and more on duty/responsibility – as global public goods (cc @jonathanglennie). Externally, the emphasis is on being "developing" 17/

https://twitter.com/StellaHongZhang/status/1348185436468830212?s=20

Those are the highlights of our analysis - with refs to those of others where relevant. If you want to dive deeper, ask questions, get a more in-depth briefing or even organize a presentation on this for your organisation, contact us! We’re here! /END]