The extant literature measures #concentration using #industry classifications. Data are mostly aggregated at the national/regional level for all products. Yet, both the #geographic and the #product market definitions should be based on the #substitutability among products. 2/N
Our database identifies over 20,000 product/geographic #antitrust markets affected by over 2,000 mergers scrutinized by the European Commission between 1995-2014. This allows measuring concentration consistently on an economy-wide basis over time (diw.de/documents/publ…) 3/N
In a regression analysis, we identify factors that significant correlate with concentration. #Barriers to #entry are unambiguously positively correlated with concentration, irrespective of time periods, sectors of activity, and geographical market dimension analyzed. 5/N
Strict #merger#enforcement negatively correlates with concentration but this correlation was stronger in the earlier decade (1995-2004). #Intangibility of #investments displays consistent positive correlation with concentration only for wider than national #services markets. 6/N
Our results on entry barriers & past merger enforcement call for strict merger control #enforcement. However, tearing down barriers to entry can and should be supported by other policies (e.g. regulation, standard settings, international cooperation agreements). 7/N
Concentration in geographically wide services markets where intangible assets are particularly important might indeed be likely related to increasing #efficiency. It is the task of #antitrust authorities to strike the delicate balance between these forces. 8/N
All panelists agree: Market power in #digital markets is worrisome. Fiona and Tommaso think that #mergers can worsen this situation and directly harm consumers by killing actual or potential competition, reducing #innovation (either killing the innovation of the target or .. 2/n
…the innovation of the acquiring incumbents) and quality (including #privacy). Mergers can also cause indirect harm (Tommaso) by increasing prices in the other side(s) of the market (e.g. #advertising). 3/n