This was indeed a fantastic and very insightful panel! Perhaps a summary of the main points can be useful. Thus, a long thread. 1/n
All panelists agree: Market power in #digital markets is worrisome. Fiona and Tommaso think that #mergers can worsen this situation and directly harm consumers by killing actual or potential competition, reducing #innovation (either killing the innovation of the target or .. 2/n
…the innovation of the acquiring incumbents) and quality (including #privacy). Mergers can also cause indirect harm (Tommaso) by increasing prices in the other side(s) of the market (e.g. #advertising). 3/n
Luis thinks that digital mergers can be beneficial for innovation because it is difficult to protect #IP in such markets, #acquisitions are a good way to transmit #technology, #complementarities are important, and prospect of acquisition is a strong incentive for innovation. 4/n
Tommaso and Fiona think that there is too little merger control enforcement in Tech (essentially no enforcement at all), that small entrants should be better protected as potential competition plays a key role: complements products today can become substitutes in the future. 5/n
All agree that #uncertainty in digital markets is greater than in traditional markets and the law is not well able to cope with this. Also, #antitrust authorities lack the resources (financial, personnel, #data) and sometimes the political will to go against tech giants 7/n
This calls for a calibration of laws and regulations. The views on this issue diverge (a bit). All agree on the need of a #regulatory approach for digital markets. 8/n
Regulation could define which firms are dominant in which markets. This might help having easier access to the data they own, and dealing with other issues like privacy concerns, especially the negative externality not covered by the informed consent a’ la #GDPR (Tommaso). 9/n
On #competition policy enforcement views diverge. Fiona and Tommaso call for a stricter merger policy. Fiona proposes to reverse the burden of proof, at least for #dominant firms. Tommaso proposes a rebuttable structure of presumption:... 10/n
a ban to merge for very dominant #platforms unless they can prove merger-specific #efficiencies. Luis disagrees and embraces the suggestion to increase the fees for notified mergers (increase resources of antitrust authorities) ..11/n
..but then not to enforce merger policy more vigorously to avoid type I errors. He rather proposes to use more ex-post #remedies (#antitrust) if firms abuse their dominant position as well as regulation. 12/n
@ProfFionasm, @luismbcabral, @TomValletti please correct my summary if I misunderstood your thoughts! END
