Thread by @arash_tehran

I finally listened to the whole 3:11 hours of #Iran's foreign minister @JZarif 's leaked interview (which is from an apparently 7-hour whole), part of the oral history interviews done by Sayeed Leylaz with all cabinet ministers of Hasan Rouhani's administration

Some points:

Others have discussed the leak in detail but thought I'd share some points from them that were of interest to myself

Zarif is unequivocal, and says repeatedly, that not just in foreign ministry but in all affairs of the country, what he called 'Meydan' (the battlefield), clearly an euphemism for the IRGC, rules the roost . This is quite significant

That the Iranian presidents have been playing second fiddle to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei for the last 20 years or so is an open secret, of course. This has been especially evident throughout Rouhani's reign despite all his pretensions to power and his security background

But Zarif's admission is significant since it points the fingers particularly to military men and not just Khamenei; and shows the depth of just how powerless he was next to Soleimani & other IRGC heads.

In other words, #Iran is already some ways toward being a a military dictatorship; a country like Egypt or Algeria. A process that will be completed if someone like Sayid Mohammad wins the presidency and next SL after Khamenei's death becomes a pliant figure to the Guards

We already knew that Qassem Soleimani decides who Iranian ambassadors should be in countries like Iraq or Syria. But Zarif's account went much further.

We find out, for instance, that following the lifting of sanctions on Iran Air, Soleimani had used it repeatedly to help Iran's intervention in #Syria. This was not even KNOWN to Roads Minister @AkhoundiAbbas oreven CEO of Iran Air! Zarif essentially BEGS Soleimani to not do this

and to use the Mahan Airlines, which he had used before, for his monkey business in Syria. But Soleimani won't hear any of it. Zarif and Rouhani have no power to enforce their will in this regard.

On many other key matters, like Iran's attack on Eyn Assad following Soleimani's killing, shooting down of #PS752, details of Iran's operations in Syria, Zarif is not even INFORMED, let alone him having any role.

I should quickly add that Rouhani had already admitted to this in domestic affairs as well. As have Khatami and Ahmadinejad in different forms.

One curious point for me was how Zarif was adamant that Qassem Soleimani is way more popular in the country than he is because the propaganda of the state TV (known to be anti-Zarif and Rouhani and pro-IRGC) and due to Iranians ' love for military heroes vs. diplomats

To prove his point he also cited University of Maryland polls that are critiqued by many scholars and many critics of the regime as notoriously unreliable. Leylaz keeps disagreeing with this (Soleimani being more popular than Zarif) but Zarif insists. Why?

Is it because Zarif genuinely believed in the polls?

I think not. I believe this is part of what we call the 'Mazloom' pose: a pretense of an unpopular hero who is unappreciated by everybody and attacked from everywhere.

At least that's my theory!

It also doesn't sit well with other claims of Zarif, including those in this very interview, about him being very popular in Iran. He's said before that he is sure he'd win enough votes to become president if he ran.

Another interesting point is his take on Iran's relations with China and Russia. Here we hear of Islamic Republic's top diplomat the very belief shared by millions of Iranians who have been mocked as paranoid and unsophisticated by too-clever-by-a-half DC pundits

Zarif basically says that he was worried on relying too much on relations with Russia and China and that they had an investment in #IranDeal not working since they wanted an Iran with bad ties w the west who would only have them to turn to.

Another point, let's not forget this words of @JZarif :

"So long as the identity of the Islamic Republic doesn't change, Iran will never be friends with the United States."

Absolutely no one in the IR has worked more in building ties with the US or knows the Iran-US file better. Whatever job he's had, Zarif has always been in charge of this file (except for the 2009-2013 period).

This is a significant admission of what he really thinks.

Those silly pundits or even 'historians' who believe if US just offered a bit of a concession here or there, the nature of Iran-US relations will fundamentally change should contend with naked truth on display here.

Zarif does suggest that Iran and US should put all their issues on the table and get to what he calls 'managing their conflict' and he thus implies that diplo ties could be restored but he is clear that Iran won't give up on many of the root causes of the clash

Among the issues Iran can't climb down from, he mentions two: "Nature of the Islamic Republic," "Non-recognition of the Zionist regime [#Israel]."

This, again, for those who believe Iran is a 'realist' power, always one stop from recognizing Israel and never a real threat to it

This confirms the analysis (and suggested policies) of people like @ksadjadpour who have a much more realistic view of Iran than those who have made an art of ignoring the elephants in the room. (Read Karim's recent piece in the Atlantic)

Zarif is also adamant that he is a loyal servant to Khamenei (as we've always known and written about) and that he believes in the fundamentals of the Islamic Republic. Not only he's not a democrat of any kind, in some ways he is more of a hardliner than the IRGC folks!

The IRGC folks are clear that the only way they can remain in power is by repression and by the use of force in the region, by keeping the region unstable, intervening in Arab countries, etc.

In contrast, Zarif really seems to live in the illusion that people of Iran believe in the ideals of the Islamic Republic and it should rely on the power of this ideals to advance its foreign policies. Most IRGC folks one speaks to don't have such illusions.

Such is the tragedy of @JZarif : A skillful diplomat who has built much of the diplomatic apparatus of a regime that uses him only as a troubleshooter, to discard him whenever convenient

One is tempted to paraphrase Wotton and make up a quote about Zarif.But I leave that to you!