Speaking of #ruleoflaw backsliding, this is yet another groundbreaking and lengthy 253-paras long ((preliminary) ruling from ECJ thanks to brave Romanian judges who were left with no choice because Commission doesn't do its job as Guardian of the Treaties. Some quick takes ⬇️
Context: Romania under previous rule of corrupt autocrat Dragnea faced abrupt backsliding with multiple legislative changes aimed to annihilate judicial independence. Today's ECJ judgment is connected to these legislative changes following 6 PR requests verfassungsblog.de/how-to-adress-…
1st key aspect: TBOMK this is 1st ruling clarifying legal effects of CVM mechanism + reports with ECJ confirming EU principle of judicial independence imposes *positive* but also *negative* obligations (refrain from undermining) following Portuguese Judges line of case law
2nd key aspect: In addition to Romanian courts being covered by scope of Art 19(1) TEU, Romanian legislation governing organisation of justice falls specifically within scope of EU law via 2006 CVM decision
3rd key aspect of direct relevance to situation in Poland: EU law covers appointment procedures re judicial inspectorates + prohibits legislative interferences with ordinary appointment procedures (implies by extension PiS purge in 17-18 violated EU law but Comm didn't sue)
4th key aspect again of direct relevance to situation in 🇵🇱: special prosecution section with exclusive competence for offences committed by judges not compatible with EU law when used as instrument of political control. Worth noting: new emphasis on EU Charter in this context
5th key aspect again of relevance to situation in 🇵🇱: new emphasis TBOMK on EU law prohibiting legislation seeking to establish "instrument of pressure/intimidation" with regard to judges. In this case a special witch hunt prosecution unit ('instrument of pressure' used 9 times)
6th key aspect: ruling strictly regulates when personality liability of a judge may be sought. In this context, for 1st time TBOMK, ECJ directly/explicitly relies on concept of #ChillingEffect + connects it, innovatively, to 'instrument of pressure' opensocietyfoundations.org/publications/t…
7th key aspect: ECJ is sending 2 messages. To 🇵🇱's ruling party/puppet CT: primacy of EU law precludes rules, including with const status, which violate EU rule of law + to Polish judges: you have authority/must disapply these rules regardless of whether approved by sham CT (end)
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#RuleofLaw breakdown in #Poland: AG Tanchev Opinion in Case C-487/19 is indeed unprecedented to extent that it offers unambiguous, crushing indictment-type assessment of a sitting head of state, in this instance, (unconstitutionally elected) 🇵🇱 President @AndrzejDuda (Summary ⬇️)
1/ Duda violated 🇵🇱/🇪🇺 law by appointing individuals to CECPA in Oct 2018 "despite the fact that an appeal had been brought against" relevant resolution & "its execution had been stayed" & "despite the fact that the proceedings before the [SAC] had not been concluded” (para 7)
2/ by appointing individual in charge of examining WZ’s appeal to CECPA on 20 February 2019 "despite the ongoing proceedings” (para 9)
#RuleofLaw breakdown in #Poland: Just finished reading this very welcome/important judgment in Case C‑824/18 which however won’t decisively halt deliberate organised-crime type destruction of judicial independence due to inherent limits of ECJ jurisdiction in PR case (Thread)
1/ This limitation notwithstanding, judgment is extremely welcome as strongest confirmation to date that EUMS must respect EU Law in particular when it comes to "enactment of national rules governing the process of appointing judges” + connected rules governing judicial review
2/ ECJ essentially makes clear (but TBC by referring court) that Polish authorities have violated EU law by adopting legislative amendments with *deliberate/systemic* aim of *preventing the ECJ* from ruling on questions referred to it by (not yet captured) PL Supreme Admin Court
Speaking of unlawful puppet body known as Poland's "Disciplinary Chamber" & its unlawful "decision" to void ECJ AK ruling, this development was mentioned for 1st time at ECJ level by AG Tanchev in his Opinion of 17 Dec 2020 in C-824/18
@RULEOFLAWpl This is an important AG opinion which also for the 1st time mentions *and* makes use of Poland's Supreme Court resolution of 23 January 2020 which held the bogus "DC" not to constitute a court
On this resolution see my @reconnectEU post and paper
@RULEOFLAWpl@reconnectEU Another "1st" at ECJ level: reference to lack of effective constitutional review in Poland but AG is still too diplomatic here as EU Comm, EU Parliament & CoE Parliament have been explicit about total lack of effective review + unlawful composition of CT
EU toolbox update: New regulation "designed to protect EU funds from being misused by EU governments who bend the #ruleoflaw" approved by EP after being approved by Council on 14 Dec
To get my head around on how new mechanism will work I have put together yet another slide 😎⬇️
Step-by-step overview of new general (#ruleoflaw) conditionality mechanism for protection of #EUbudget
(any mistake PLMK)
(warning: rudimentary design of slide not pre-approved by @JoelleGrogan aka @stickytrickylaw but hope to convince her/"them" to help out with version 2.0)
Based on my first quick reading of draft EUCO conclusions re #ruleoflaw conditionality mechanism, have to agree with @alemannoEU but let me add some quick comments in thread below
(Health warning: have spent about 7 hours on zoom today so my brain no longer fully operational)
Para 1 of draft conclusions: 2nd sentence is legally wrong/poorly drafted. Art 7 not only procedure to address "breaches" of Art 2 TEU values as already established by ECJ re Polish Sup Court purge (both item under Art 7 and subject of successful infringement action in 6198/18)
Paragraph 2 gives a veneer of credibility to recurrent nonsense from autocrats that destroying national checks and balances is somewhat something which can be justified in the name of their alleged “constitutional identity”. Very poor but not end of world
This is a great post by @ADimitrovs on new but not adopted yet #RuleofLaw conditionality mechanism & EU budget. Have just finished myself reading the 20,372 words of trilogue "4-column" doc re this latest likely addition to EU's toolbox. My first reaction assessment in 🧵 below
Title of not yet adopted Regulation (at @EUCouncil's insistence) no longer mentions #ruleoflaw & concept of "generalised deficiencies" with reference instead to "a general regime of conditionality". Cosmetic rebranding to assuage autocrats or bad omen? Let’s continue to find out
Article 1 (subject matter): surprise! the rule of law is back BUT “breaches” have replaced “generalised deficiencies” (again at Council’s insistence) = deliberate attempt to force Commission to not see the wood for the trees…