En teori er, at "pæne" folk ikke kan styre følelserne, når de er online. I en ny forskningsartikel viser vi, at den teori er forkert: psyarxiv.com/hwb83/.
Grafen viser, at den almindelige dansker klart oplever, at online politiske debatter (mørke-grå fordeling) er mere negative og ubehagelige end offline debatter (lyse-grå fordeling). (2/8)
Men hadet skyldes et lille fåtal. Langt de fleste er ikke hadefulde, dvs. er placeret omkring (0,0) i grafen. Og dem der er hadefulde er lige hadefulde online og offline. (3/8)
Det, der driver hadet blandt de hadefulde, er et brændende behov for status og anerkendelser. Og det er lige vigtigt ift. online og offline had. (4/8)
Det får betyder, at dem med et mindre behov for status holder med at debattere politik - og dataene tyder på, at de særligt holder op med at debattere politik online. (5/8)
Men når dem, der er hadefulde online også er det offline - hvorfor føler vi så, at online debatter er så slemme? Fordi de hadefuldes angreb er offentlige og derfor mere synlige. Det er ikke os selv, der angribes. Men vi ser fremmede blive det. Offline sker det privat. (6/8)
Alt dette betyder, at kurser i "digital dannelse" ikke løser hadproblemet. For hadet er ikke et uheld, men en strategi blandt dem, der tørster efter status. Og den tørst skaber hadefuld adfærd både online og offline, selvom førstnævnte er mest synlig. (7/8)
Snarere kræver det, at techgiganterne gør det muligt at holde folk ansvarlige, og at vi alle selv tager ansvar for at intervenere, når vi støder på hadet. Og ikke mindst: At #dkpol håndterer de problemer, som gør, at folk går rundt og føler, at de mangler anerkendelse. (8/8)
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Status-seekers are hostile online & offline, but their online attacks are more visible. Nice people do not go crazy online.
🧵(1/10)
We use representative surveys from the US and Denmark to document that people perceive online environments as more hostile than offline. In figure, higher values equals more perceived hostility and dark gray plots show distribution for "online debates". (2/10)
A common narrative, the mismatch hypothesis, says this reflects a mismatch between (a) a psychology adapted for face-to-face interaction and (b) the impersonal online environment. We test 3 versions of this hypothesis: Mismatched-induced change, selection and perception (3/10)
🚨 How should authorities communicate about #covid19 vaccines? A concern is that transparency about side-effects will induce hesistancy. In our new paper in @PNASNews, we show that even if transparency induces hesistancy, it is key for sustaining a core resource: Trust. 🧵 [1/7]
In 2 pre-registered tests with 13,000+ Americans & Danes, we show how transparency & content of vaccine info shapes acceptance, trust & conspiracy beliefs. We compare transparency with an often used form of communication in patient-doctor relationships: Vague reassurance. [2/7]
We show that transparency regarding negative features of a COVID-vaccine decreases acceptance. Importantly, so does vague reassuring communication ("Don't worry - it is fine!"). Vagueness is, in essence, seen as a cover-up. [3/7]
Regeringen udgav i går en rapport om "fake news" (kum.dk/aktuelt/nyhede…). Den viser, at der er stor bekymring for "fake news". Derfor må SoMe medier reguleres og traditionelle medier styrkes.
MEN diagnosen er forkert og kan i sig selv gøre ondt værre.
Rapporten viser, at mange danskere er bekymrede for "fake news". Rapporten siger dog eksplicit, at den ikke ønsker at redegøre for problemets faktiske omfang. Men det bliver man nødt til, hvis man ønsker at bruge bekymringen som argument for faktisk politik. [2/6]
Trods suspensionen af AZ-vaccinen er opbakningen i DK og en række andre lande uændret. I DK er opbakningen stadig særdeles høj. [2/9]
Ligeledes er tilliden til sundhedsmyndighederne og forskere ikke faldet trods AZ-tumulten. Den er snarere steget. Forskning fra HOPE viser, at transparent kommunikation om negative forhold ved vacciner netop kan øge tilliden (psyarxiv.com/vx84n/). [3/9]
In press at @apsrjournal: "Partisan polarization is the primary psychological motivation behind political fake news sharing on Twitter" (psyarxiv.com/v45bk). We find that fake news sharers are not less reflected or literate. They just hate the other party more. 🧵[1/13]
Method: We received permission from 2,300 survey users collected by YouGov to scrape their Twitter accounts. We matched their tweets against lists of "fake news" and "real news" web domains and categorized them according to their political slant. [2/13]
How much is shared? Consistent with prior work, fake news seems a small problem. 3 % of tweets link to a fake news domain & only 1 % of the panelists share 75 % of all fake news. Most fake news stories are pro-Republican. Most real news, in contrast, are pro-Democrats. [3/13]
An urgent sense of crisis made people disregard fear and trust and say, "tell us what to do & we'll do it", leading to history's largest behavioral change.
From March to May, we surveyed more than 26,000 individuals across 8 countries: 🇺🇸🇩🇰🇮🇹🇬🇧🇭🇺🇸🇪🇩🇪🇫🇷. We found high levels of especially avoidant (distancing) but also preventive (handwashing) across all countries, independently of covid-cases and policies. [3/8]