Thread by @JJSchroden

Given recent events in #Afghanistan & my focus on that country since 2008, I’ve been engaging in a lot of professional reflection of late. I'm going to share some results of that in this (long) THREAD. 1/n

To do this, I went back and re-read everything I’ve written publicly on #Afghanistan over the past two years, as well as a few pertinent older pieces. I’ll post links to these articles as I go. 2/n

I’ll start w/this article I wrote in @WarOnTheRocks in 2016. In it, I described how the #Taliban were steadily encroaching on key rural areas of #Afghanistan & how the #ANDSF were struggling to stop them. 3/n
warontherocks.com/2016/12/afghan…

@WarOnTheRocks Key quote: the #ANDSF “are only capable of holding the line in areas absent of sig #Taliban pressure, where the coalition has maintain[ed] a steady advisory presence & where there are strong leaders...In areas where these aspects have been lacking, [they] are slowly failing” 4/n

@WarOnTheRocks By 2018, then-President Trump declared his intent to withdraw, so I wrote this paper for @WarOnTheRocks titled “So the President Wants Out of #Afghanistan: What Happens Next?” 5/n warontherocks.com/2018/12/so-the…

@WarOnTheRocks In it, I highlighted an earlier assessment we @CNA_org had made in 2013: “if the US & NATO do not maintain a training & advisory mission in #Afghanistan, the absence of advisors…is likely to result in a downward spiral of [#ANDSF] capabilities—along with security." 6/n

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org I also said: “[the #ANDSF] have been steadily losing ground to the #Taliban, even w/substantial spt from the USMIL...it's likely they wouldn't be able to hold out militarily on their own for long…the resultant downward spiral would occur over the course of 6 mos to 2 yrs.” 7/n

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org I also assessed that a “CT-Only” (status quo) option would fail due to the inability of the #ANDSF to keep the #Taliban at bay, a topic @LaurelMillerICG discussed much more elegantly a couple years later. 8/n foreignaffairs.com/articles/afgha…

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG In 2019, I discussed the costs of war & peace in #Afghanistan. Key point: While the US was bearing the brunt of $ costs for the war, Afghans bore the brunt of the human cost: I estimated the death toll for Afghans—including #Taliban—in 2019 would be ~17-25k (~45-70/day). 9/n

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG Also in 2019, I wrote about the USMIL’s strategy shift from COIN to pressure/attrition, consisting of: “⬆️kinetic strikes in support of the #ANDSF, targeting #Taliban revenue-generation mechanisms & expanding the train, advise & assist mission.” 10/n warontherocks.com/2019/05/milita…

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG Key points here: 1) the failure of the 2nd & 3rd elements, & resultant heavy reliance on airstrikes & #SOF/Commando raids as a result; 2) the cautious embrace by Resolute Support--& the whole-hearted embrace by #Afghanistan's MOD--of body counts as a metric for "pressure." 11/n

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG These articles were “explainers” & “think-ahead” pieces. I didn’t offer much in the way of predictions, beyond noting the likely cont'd degradation of security in #Afghanistan & failing of the #ANDSF, trends that were borne out but that weren't hard for obj audiences to see. 12/n

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG In 2020, I asked whether the US would “go to zero” troops in #Afghanistan. I concluded it wouldn’t--I assessed it would at least try to keep a small, uniformed presence at its Embassy in Kabul. 13/n lawfareblog.com/will-united-st…

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG I also argued that it should try to keep an advisory presence in place to stem the slow failing of the #ANDSF. The Biden plan was to keep 650 USMIL at the Embassy; they were to engage in at best a limited advisory capacity. 14/n

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG In late 2020, I wrote this piece for @lawfareblog titled “#Afghanistan Will Be the Biden Administration’s First Foreign Policy Crisis.” In it, I noted the #Taliban’s steady territorial gains & impending “siege” of the country’s cities. 15/n lawfareblog.com/afghanistan-wi…

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG @lawfareblog I offered 4 recommendations to the incoming Biden admin: 1) Prepare a compelling case that the #Taliban was not meeting its commitments in the US-TB Agreement & pause the timeline for completing the withdrawal of all US troops until such time as they did. 16/n

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG @lawfareblog 2) Signal limited patience for #Taliban intransigence w/the deal by allowing the #ANDSF to go back on the offensive; 3) Prepare CT options that didn't require a military presence in #Afghanistan, to include covert/clandestine options. 17/n

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG @lawfareblog 4) Reform the #ANDSF to make them less dependent (“Part of the reason the #Taliban have been emboldened is that they see the US providing less support to the Afghan army & police & they believe these forces will collapse if & when the US leaves the country”) 18/n

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG @lawfareblog I concluded: “None of these suggestions will be easy to implement, but they are nonetheless necessary to prevent a quick failure of US policy in #Afghanistan.” The Biden administration did only the 3rd of these. 19/n

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG @lawfareblog Earlier this year, my work shifted to more predictive analyses, largely IRT being asked to address forward-looking Qs. The 1st was this article for @CTCWP, who asked: “After a US withdrawal, would the #ANDSF or the #Taliban have the mil advantage?” 20/n ctc.usma.edu/afghanistans-s…

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG @lawfareblog @CTCWP To answer that, I did a net assessment across 4 tangible + 1 intangible factors: size, resources, external support, force employment & cohesion. I found that post-US withdrawal, the #Taliban would have a *slight* military advantage b/c of better strategy & stronger cohesion. 21/n

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG @lawfareblog @CTCWP In APR, I looked at the history of #ANDSF development & its decidedly mixed results. I floated the idea of establishing a remote advisory cell in the wake of a US withdrawal, to stem the impact of removing US support functions from a shaky ANDSF. 22/n l4p.odi.org/blog/security-…

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG @lawfareblog @CTCWP [My @CNA_org co-author Alex Powell & I later expanded on the idea of a remote advisory cell for the #ANDSF & concluded it was a feasible & useful option.] 23/n

realcleardefense.com/articles/2021/…

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG @lawfareblog @CTCWP Also in APR, @RyanBaker51 & I published an article on the logistics of #Afghanistan withdrawal. While its premise was to explain how hard it would be to get out by the 1 MAY deadline of the US-#Taliban agreement, it made a couple of prescient points. 24/n warontherocks.com/2021/04/why-is…

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG @lawfareblog @CTCWP @RyanBaker51 “The fact that the USMIL provides logistical & other support to its allies & partner forces in #Afghanistan means that the pace & order of the withdrawal should account for the distinct requirements of these forces. This includes…Afghan forces..." 25/n

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG @lawfareblog @CTCWP @RyanBaker51 "...who will likely be expected to take control of the bases & any residual equip the US & its NATO partners leave behind, & who will have to adjust their posture & operations to account for the departure of critical enabling capabilities such as advisers, air & fire spt..." 26/n

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG @lawfareblog @CTCWP @RyanBaker51 "...& contracted maintainers & logisticians. Failure to account for the needs of these partner forces could lead to their collapse, which would increase the security risk to US personnel still in the country & have significant diplomatic & reputational costs.” 27/n

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG @lawfareblog @CTCWP @RyanBaker51 In JUN, I was asked to address another predictive Q: Will #Afghanistan Collapse When the US Withdraws?

I compared the post-Soviet withdrawal experience w/what seemed would be the likely situation post-US withdrawal. It's worth dwelling on this a bit. 28/n thediplomat.com/2021/05/will-a…

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG @lawfareblog @CTCWP @RyanBaker51 Notable quote: “scholar Thomas Barfield wrote, ‘It was universally believed that once the Soviets left, the mujahedin would overrun govt outposts, take regional cities & march on Kabul in a matter of months, if not weeks.’ & yet Najibullah held his govt together for 3 yrs...”29/n

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG @lawfareblog @CTCWP @RyanBaker51 In that vein, I noted: “At the time of Biden’s [withdrawal] announcement, there were a flurry of predictions that the #Taliban would move quickly to overrun govt outposts, seize regional cities & ignite a broader civil war or march on Kabul to topple the government..." 30/n

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG @lawfareblog @CTCWP @RyanBaker51 "...But will these predictions turn out to be accurate? Or will they, like those of Najibullah’s quick demise, prove to be overly dire?" 31/n

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG @lawfareblog @CTCWP @RyanBaker51 To answer these Qs, I referenced a paper by @US4AfghanPeace while he was @RANDCorporation. He noted 3 incorrect assumptions made about the Najibullah regime: 1) it was brittle & likely to fragment once the Soviets left. 32/n

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG @lawfareblog @CTCWP @RyanBaker51 @US4AfghanPeace @RANDCorporation 2) The departure of Soviet advisers would decisively shift the military balance to favor the mujahideen; 3) The Soviets cared only about securing a “decent interval” between their departure & the government’s collapse. 33/n

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG @lawfareblog @CTCWP @RyanBaker51 @US4AfghanPeace @RANDCorporation I explored these assumptions in the context of contemporaneous #Afghanistan: 1) Was Ghani’s govt brittle? I gave a mixed answer: Ghani’s govt had a stronger popular mandate than Najibullah (though still not a strong one) but Ghani had less firm backing from his int’l patrons.34/n

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG @lawfareblog @CTCWP @RyanBaker51 @US4AfghanPeace @RANDCorporation 2) Would the #Taliban have a decisive military advantage post-US withdrawal? I relied on my prior net assessment to say their advantage would be “slight,” but not decisive. 35/n ctc.usma.edu/afghanistans-s…

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG @lawfareblog @CTCWP @RyanBaker51 @US4AfghanPeace @RANDCorporation 3) Did the US only care about a “decent interval?” Or would its support be sufficient to prevent a collapse? I wrote that the US resource commitment was firm, but “what is not clear is whether the US has a well-crafted and synchronized post-withdrawal strategy.” 36/n

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG @lawfareblog @CTCWP @RyanBaker51 @US4AfghanPeace @RANDCorporation I concluded w/several predictions about a post-US withdrawal period: 1) “those predicting the quick demise of the [@ashrafghani] government are likely to be wrong”... 37/n

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG @lawfareblog @CTCWP @RyanBaker51 @US4AfghanPeace @RANDCorporation @ashrafghani 2) The #Taliban likely don't have the manpower or the conv mil resources to seize & hold more than a few provincial capitals – & any massed attacks on the cities are likely to incur the same vulnerability to airstrikes that the mujahideen faced in their assault on Jalalabad. 38/n

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG @lawfareblog @CTCWP @RyanBaker51 @US4AfghanPeace @RANDCorporation @ashrafghani 3) The #Taliban are more likely to lay siege to #Afghanistan's cities IOT generate political concessions in #Doha than they are to “empty the madrassas” in #Pakistan for a Tet-style gambit to seize the country by force. 39/n

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG @lawfareblog @CTCWP @RyanBaker51 @US4AfghanPeace @RANDCorporation @ashrafghani 4) It is unlikely that @ashrafghani's government will be overthrown purely militarily in the next couple of years. Rather, political dynamics will decide his future and that of his government. 40/n

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG @lawfareblog @CTCWP @RyanBaker51 @US4AfghanPeace @RANDCorporation @ashrafghani I concluded: “it seems that predictions of the imminent demise of #Afghanistan’s govt are as precariously reasoned as those of Najibullah’s time. However, this is not to suggest that such an outcome is impossible.” I offered a few key indicators to watch as tests of this. 41/n

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG @lawfareblog @CTCWP @RyanBaker51 @US4AfghanPeace @RANDCorporation @ashrafghani 1) Attrition rate of aircraft; 2) Cont’d contactor support to the #ANDSF; 3) The extent to which the #Taliban went hard at provincial cities vs laying siege to them; 4) What happens to Ghani’s political coalition.

All of these indicators went south quickly after publication.42/n

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG @lawfareblog @CTCWP @RyanBaker51 @US4AfghanPeace @RANDCorporation @ashrafghani That’s a lot of recap. What have I learned from this? What should you learn from it?

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG @lawfareblog @CTCWP @RyanBaker51 @US4AfghanPeace @RANDCorporation @ashrafghani My earlier works (2016-2019) were attempts to explain what was happening & think ahead of it. Not to be predictive, but anticipatory. In this, I was (along w/others such as @JamesC0706) correct that the #ANDSF weren’t as strong as #DOD or the Afghan govt wanted to believe. 44/n

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG @lawfareblog @CTCWP @RyanBaker51 @US4AfghanPeace @RANDCorporation @ashrafghani @JamesC0706 I was (along w/various @CNA_org co-authors & others such as @VFelbabBrown & @billroggio) correct that the #Taliban’s strategy was to capture #Afghanistan from the outside in (rural to urban) & that they’d make considerable progress doing this post-US surge. 45/n

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG @lawfareblog @CTCWP @RyanBaker51 @US4AfghanPeace @RANDCorporation @ashrafghani @JamesC0706 @VFelbabBrown @billroggio I was (along w/various @CNA_org co-authors) correct that the withdrawal of US advisory & other support would result in a downward spiral of #ANDSF capability, especially after the USMIL’s switch to an attrition strategy heavily predicated on air power & #SOF raids. 46/n

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG @lawfareblog @CTCWP @RyanBaker51 @US4AfghanPeace @RANDCorporation @ashrafghani @JamesC0706 @VFelbabBrown @billroggio In 2020, I was asked—& sought—to be more predictive. In this, I was less successful & in some cases dead wrong. My net assessment predicted the #Taliban would have a *slight* military advantage. 47/n

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG @lawfareblog @CTCWP @RyanBaker51 @US4AfghanPeace @RANDCorporation @ashrafghani @JamesC0706 @VFelbabBrown @billroggio While lots of people (including many in #Afghanistan) panned me for this conclusion at the time, this turned out to be closer to accurate than most. But it was still off the mark. Why? 48/n

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG @lawfareblog @CTCWP @RyanBaker51 @US4AfghanPeace @RANDCorporation @ashrafghani @JamesC0706 @VFelbabBrown @billroggio It was too focused on tangible aspects. I included cohesion, a critical intangible, but I should have included other intangibles as well. Morale would’ve been good but very hard to ascertain. To me, in hindsight, the most important missing factor was information operations. 49/n

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG @lawfareblog @CTCWP @RyanBaker51 @US4AfghanPeace @RANDCorporation @ashrafghani @JamesC0706 @VFelbabBrown @billroggio The #Taliban waged brilliant PSYOPs during their offensive. Their narrative of inevitability was backed by whisper campaigns, outreach to political figures (nationally & locally), pics of captured weapons/gear, videos of #ANDSF surrenders + amnesty, & lots of bluster. 50/n

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG @lawfareblog @CTCWP @RyanBaker51 @US4AfghanPeace @RANDCorporation @ashrafghani @JamesC0706 @VFelbabBrown @billroggio [The dangerousness of this narrative was evident to me & many others, including US military leaders at the time.] 51/n

https://twitter.com/JJSchroden/status/1409701138232795142?s=20

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG @lawfareblog @CTCWP @RyanBaker51 @US4AfghanPeace @RANDCorporation @ashrafghani @JamesC0706 @VFelbabBrown @billroggio The govt’s narratives were two-fold:

1) “It’ll all be fine after the US leaves, the #ANDSF have got this”

2) “It’s all #Pakistan’s fault. #SanctionPakistan & the #Taliban will die on the vine.”

Neither of these rang true w/anyone paying attention. 52/n
tolonews.com/afghanistan-17…

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG @lawfareblog @CTCWP @RyanBaker51 @US4AfghanPeace @RANDCorporation @ashrafghani @JamesC0706 @VFelbabBrown @billroggio Had I included that as part of the net assessment, the balance would have been a strong #Taliban military advantage; more reflective of what we actually saw. Strong lesson on the importance of *intangible factors* in military analysis. 53/n

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG @lawfareblog @CTCWP @RyanBaker51 @US4AfghanPeace @RANDCorporation @ashrafghani @JamesC0706 @VFelbabBrown @billroggio In my @Diplomat_APAC article, I was right that Ghani’s fall would happen politically—the #Taliban victory wasn’t purely a mil one; it was a political & psychological campaign, buttressed by mil action. But I was wrong that Ghani’s fall wouldn’t happen before 2022. Why? 54/n

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG @lawfareblog @CTCWP @RyanBaker51 @US4AfghanPeace @RANDCorporation @ashrafghani @JamesC0706 @VFelbabBrown @billroggio @Diplomat_APAC 2 reasons. 1) Faulty assumptions. I assumed the pace of US withdrawal would be measured, IAW the logistical challenges @RyanBaker51 & I articulated in @WarOnTheRocks. I assumed the US would devise a plan for what came after, that included maintaining contract log/maint spt. 55/n

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG @lawfareblog @CTCWP @RyanBaker51 @US4AfghanPeace @RANDCorporation @ashrafghani @JamesC0706 @VFelbabBrown @billroggio @Diplomat_APAC I assumed the US would attempt to est a remote advisory cell to bolster #ANDSF confidence. I assumed the #Taliban would play a long game—employing siege tactics vs assaults on cities. & failing that, I assumed the #ANDSF would defend the cities. 56/n

https://twitter.com/JJSchroden/status/1425887144346853376?s=20

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG @lawfareblog @CTCWP @RyanBaker51 @US4AfghanPeace @RANDCorporation @ashrafghani @JamesC0706 @VFelbabBrown @billroggio @Diplomat_APAC 2) Missing pieces. I missed how damaged the power networks in #Afghanistan’s north were. I missed how weak the warlords had become, in part b/c of @ashrafghani's deliberate undermining of them. I missed that the #Taliban had perceived these trends & sought to exploit them. 57/n

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG @lawfareblog @CTCWP @RyanBaker51 @US4AfghanPeace @RANDCorporation @ashrafghani @JamesC0706 @VFelbabBrown @billroggio @Diplomat_APAC I missed the #Taliban’s desire to push hard while the mantle of jihad against the foreign occupier remained, as opposed to standing by & watching us go. I missed the group's willingness to sustain massive casualties in an offensive vs utilizing a siege + talks in #Doha. 58/n

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG @lawfareblog @CTCWP @RyanBaker51 @US4AfghanPeace @RANDCorporation @ashrafghani @JamesC0706 @VFelbabBrown @billroggio @Diplomat_APAC I missed the *extent* to which Ghani’s govt was popularly disliked across #Afghanistan & how little people would stand up for it. I missed the *extent* of his govt’s incompetence, especially in the security sector. 59/n

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG @lawfareblog @CTCWP @RyanBaker51 @US4AfghanPeace @RANDCorporation @ashrafghani @JamesC0706 @VFelbabBrown @billroggio @Diplomat_APAC I’m sure I missed other things as well, that will only become apparent in the weeks & months to come. 60/n

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG @lawfareblog @CTCWP @RyanBaker51 @US4AfghanPeace @RANDCorporation @ashrafghani @JamesC0706 @VFelbabBrown @billroggio @Diplomat_APAC What should we take away from this? 6 things. 1) Qual analysis is hard & messy, but less so when the intent is explanatory & anticipatory. Predictive analysis is incredibly difficult. Assumptions matter enormously & need to be cont challenged via indicators of falsification. 61/n

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG @lawfareblog @CTCWP @RyanBaker51 @US4AfghanPeace @RANDCorporation @ashrafghani @JamesC0706 @VFelbabBrown @billroggio @Diplomat_APAC 2) Primary research & ground-level knowledge is critical. My earlier work benefitted enormously from frequent trips to #Afghanistan. My work over the past two years has suffered from the lack of it—multiple trips had to be cancelled due to #COVID19. 62/n

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG @lawfareblog @CTCWP @RyanBaker51 @US4AfghanPeace @RANDCorporation @ashrafghani @JamesC0706 @VFelbabBrown @billroggio @Diplomat_APAC 3) I got a fair bit right, though it was never fun or enjoyable to be right about things like the #ANDSF failing as an institution or the #Taliban winning on the ground. I like to think I improved as an analyst, though some will dispute that. 63/n

https://twitter.com/JJSchroden/status/1364912561330733057?s=20

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG @lawfareblog @CTCWP @RyanBaker51 @US4AfghanPeace @RANDCorporation @ashrafghani @JamesC0706 @VFelbabBrown @billroggio @Diplomat_APAC 4) I am only human. I get things wrong. I understand the implications of getting these things wrong & feel *terrible* about them. I will pray for those affected by the things I didn’t get right & strive to do better in the future. 64/n

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG @lawfareblog @CTCWP @RyanBaker51 @US4AfghanPeace @RANDCorporation @ashrafghani @JamesC0706 @VFelbabBrown @billroggio @Diplomat_APAC 5) We are all only human. Many got this wrong. The fingers of blame are out. Beware those who point them too far beyond themselves. I accept my share of blame, tho I was never in a pos'n of authority. I encourage those who were to accept it as well. 65/n slate.com/news-and-polit…

@WarOnTheRocks @CNA_org @LaurelMillerICG @lawfareblog @CTCWP @RyanBaker51 @US4AfghanPeace @RANDCorporation @ashrafghani @JamesC0706 @VFelbabBrown @billroggio @Diplomat_APAC 6) We must all strive to do better. The US especially must learn from this experience. Unlike its post-Vietnam experience, the US cannot just put #Afghanistan behind it. A campaign of reflection & learning must now begin. I stand ready to support it, recognized flaws & all. 66/66

Another example of a USG leader accepting blame/responsibility 👇

nypost.com/2021/08/24/how…