Post

https://twitter.com/evacool_/status/1447652990014345218

More from @evacool_

Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Jul 20

Thread 🧵
About nine days ago, tensions in the Druze-majority province of Suwayda in southern Syria began to escalate into street fighting, clashes, and Israeli military activity, threatening to assassinate interim Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa and destroying the Syrian General Staff building. This dangerous escalation did not begin on July 11 but rather has precedents and consequences. A geopolitical reading of the escalation in the Syrian province of Suwayda.
1/

First, I must clarify that the scene is extremely complex in Syria in general and in Suwayda in particular. To understand the details of what is happening now will not be possible without examining the file from a broader perspective. The disputes did not begin with a kidnapping by Bedouins of a Druze citizen, nor did they start with the military clashes that took place months ago in the Jaramana and Sahnaya areas around the Syrian capital, Damascus. Since the fall of the Assad regime last December, one of the most prominent clerics of the Druze community in Syria, Sheikh Hekmat al-Hijri, has refused the entry of any representatives of the new Syrian administration government into Suwayda Governorate, justifying this step at first by saying that Suwayda Governorate has own special nature and therefore the locals of the governorate should have priority in managing it. Then, as the Syrian administration made concessions on this matter and demanded at least that the governor appointed by the administration be allowed to enter the governorate and receive the requests and complaints of the governorate’s residents, the governor was subjected to physical attacks and was expelled. Then Sheikh al-Hijri raised his demands to demand decentralization in Syria, and that Suwayda must manage itself. He justified this by saying that the Druze in Syria do not trust the new Syrian administration, which, in his opinion, is composed of “jihadists and takfiris.” Every time the new Syrian administration, now an interim government, tries to negotiate with representatives of the Suwayda Governorate, Sheikh al-Hijri stands in the way of any rapprochement in viewpoints, despite the fact that Druze religious leaders, most notably Sheikh al-Hanawi and Sheikh al-Jarbou’, have confirmed more than once their acceptance of the entry of the Syrian interim government and Syrian security into the governorate. However, al-Hijri, who supports a militia called the Military Council of the Suwayda Governorate, which has now become his military arm and is primarily made up of former officers and members of the Assad army who fear prosecution by the new Syrian authorities for war crimes committed over the past 14 years. Some of them had direct relations with the Lebanese Hezbollah militia and Iran, and drug dealers within a wide network for the Captagon trade, previously linked to the Assad regime, Hezbollah, and Iraqi militias affiliated with Iran, in addition to groups that were previously part of the so-called National Defense in the governorate who are loyal to him. Thus, Sheikh Al-Hijri, in addition to his religious influence in the province, has military and financial influence, supported by his close relations with Sheikh Muwaffaq Al-Tarif, the leader of the Druze in Israel, giving him regional backing to justify his intransigence in confronting the Syrian administration.
2/

It must be emphasized that the new Syrian authorities inherited a country torn apart in every way, and that political life was definitely dead in Syria under the rule of the Assad family and the Baath Party. It is natural that any new administration would face difficult challenges and make mistakes. However, the new Syrian authorities were more preoccupied with foreign affairs, building relations with Sunni countries in the region, opening a new page with the European Union, and culminating in their international efforts with Sharaa’s meeting with Trump in Riyadh and Washington’s lifting of economic sanctions on Syria. Domestically, Sharaa’s administration was less flexible and more chaotic. Every internal step taken was largely symbolic and lacked practical implementation on the ground. The National Conference was worthless, and the Constitutional Declaration was written hastily and without broad consultation with Syrian society in all its spectrums, while the Ministry of Defense’s announcement of ending factionalism was a symbolic step that did not exist on the ground. Then came the bloody events on the Syrian coast, which began with terrorist attacks by remnants of the Assad regime against Syrian security, to which the new Syrian authorities responded criminally and with a militia mentality, not a state mentality. Accumulated mistakes and a group of individuals monopolizing decisions internally and externally has increased divisions within Syrian society, which has just emerged from the most violent bloody conflict in the Middle East in decades. Trust has diminished and concerns have increased within this already fragmented society. Next, we have an administration in Damascus that has not done enough to prove its ability to bear its responsibilities and to guarantee the rights of Syrians in all their components. We also have a governorate with deep concerns which has previously suffered from terrorist attacks carried out by ISIS. The scene there is dominated by a cleric who has a militia and is protected by the most powerful country in the region. In this reality, it was certain that at some point it would lead to a military clash, which began a few days ago. Here, some may wonder why the Israeli military took action in Suwayda Governorate, while no movement occurred on the Syrian coast months ago, and none while Assad was destroying Syria and killing its people for 14 years? To answer this question, we must go back to the past decade.
3/

Read 10 tweets

Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Jul 12

Thread 🧵
While the obstacles are diminishing to reach a temporary ceasefire agreement in the Gaza Strip between the Israeli government and Hamas, with indications that this temporary cessation could be a first step towards ending the war that has lasted for more than 640 days, the political atmosphere in Lebanon and Iran appears less positive. A geopolitical reading on three fronts: Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran.
1/

Gaza
It seems that both parties to the war have begun to reach the conviction that ending the war now is the best solution, and that waiting will not increase the gains of either side but will only lead to further depletion. From Hamas’s side, and based on a field analysis of the war, despite their ability to inflict some human losses on the IDF recently through ambush tactics, the videos published by the militia of these ambushes show a noticeable shortage in locally manufactured anti-tank weapons, a serious indicator of the militia’s capacity to sustain the war for a longer period. Meanwhile, the decrease in the number of attacks confirms a reduction in the number of fighters despite the continuation of security incidents on an almost daily basis, which is due to the IDF forces feeling comfortable, leading to field mistakes. On the popular side, Hamas cannot deny the public discontent in the Gaza Strip over the continuation of the war, which is reflected in the popularity of the militia and the rise of voices demanding an end to the war, even if the price is the withdrawal of the militia from the Gaza Strip, and the formation of groups of Gaza residents who cooperate with the Shin Bet to carry out security operations and gather information. Regionally, Hamas leaders hoped that the conflict would expand in the region, leading to losses on the Israeli side, causing Israeli losses that would pressure Israel to end the war with a deal offering better terms to Hamas. These hopes have collided with the reality that Hamas’s allies in Iran and Lebanon have suffered severe blows that have pushed them to abandon Hamas. Within this field, military, internal and regional equation, Hamas today wants to stop the war even if it is forced to make further concessions that were categorically rejected two months ago.
2/

From the Israeli side, in my opinion, Netanyahu's delay in accepting a prisoner exchange and ceasefire deal in recent months was linked to two factors. The first is his government partners, who insist on rejecting any ceasefire deal with Hamas and that the war must end with military and security control over the entire Gaza Strip. Therefore, Netanyahu's move toward a temporary deal that would stop the war, while Washington might increase its pressure to prevent the resumption of fighting, would mean the collapse of the government coalition and early elections, which was not in Netanyahu's interest a month ago. The second factor is that Netanyahu had devised the plan to attack Iran to deliver a severe blow to Iran's nuclear and missile programs. Therefore, he did not want to end the war in Gaza before striking Iran. Of course, the two factors are interconnected. Netanyahu has thus far been able to prove to the region and to the Israeli people that he has managed to strike the Iranian axis from head to toe, something he believed was impossible or at least would be extremely costly. Yet this important achievement was realized with minimal damage, even more than the most optimistic members of Netanyahu’s government and his security and military leadership expected. It also translates into the return of the popularity of the Likud Party under Netanyahu’s leadership, which had declined significantly after the attacks of October 7. Therefore, Netanyahu today no longer fears the fall of his government and early elections. In fact, some advisers may see that going to elections in the upcoming fall would be better for Netanyahu’s party than waiting for the natural election date in October 2026. On the other hand, the continuation of the war in the Gaza Strip no longer adds more military gains given that most of Hamas’s top leaders have been killed while international, especially American, pressure on the Israeli government is increasing. Thus, Netanyahu can today move toward a temporary ceasefire that will result in the release of half of the hostages held by Hamas, which will have positive domestic impact. During this period, he can negotiate further achievements in the normalization file with Arab and Islamic countries in exchange for a complete end to the war in Gaza, thus securing a new victory that would make calling early elections the next logical step.
3/

Read 10 tweets

Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Jun 26

Thread 🧵
At dawn on Tuesday, US President Trump announced that Washington, with diplomatic mediation from Qatar, had reached a ceasefire agreement between Israel and Iran, ending the war that Israel had started under the name "Operation Rising Lion" about 14 days ago. The American announcement was surprising in a timing that seemed unsuitable for both the Iranian regime and the Israeli government. In an analytical reading of the 12-day war, as Trump called it, I attempt to answer some questions, the most important of which is: What comes after this round of war?
1/

Of course, it is still too early to estimate the extent of the military damage sustained by the Iranian regime, whether in their nuclear or missile programs, or their human losses among military leaders and scientists specializing in nuclear development. However, there is no doubt that the Iranian regime has suffered a severe military blow that will require years before it can restore its capabilities and the billions of dollars that Tehran does not have amid continued US economic sanctions. Iran, today, is exposed in the air, as its air defenses and anti-air missiles collapsed in less than 48 hours, and it is exposed in terms of security, in light of a horrific human and electronic security breach that is still ongoing. However, the most important and essential point that Israel has managed to prove is that a military operation against the Iranian regime is not impossible and will not bring catastrophe to the world or the region. Iran, which the American and European media have always presented as a frightening power in the Middle East, was by the Israeli "Rising Lion" operation to be a fragile state in terms of security and militarily and strategically weak. What contributed to this reality is the Israeli military movements that began after October 7, 2023, in the region. But of course, there was severe human and material damage on the Israeli side, given the limited capabilities of the Israeli Iron Dome to intercept some types of Iranian missiles, which put pressure on the political leadership in Jerusalem. With the start of the first hours of the ceasefire, each side began to present what had happened as a victory. Did Israel win or did Iran?
2/

Before answering this question, we must first answer another one: Why did Tehran agree to the ceasefire, when just 48 hours before the announcement, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that diplomacy was over? And why did Israel agree to the ceasefire despite the statements of a number of its officials, led by the Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir who confirmed about 24 hours before the ceasefire that the IDF would continue their military operation until its goals were achieved?
3/

Read 9 tweets

Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Jun 19

Thread 🧵
After about seven days since Israel launched Operation Rising Lion against the Iranian regime and its nuclear program, Iranian missiles continue to target Israeli territories amid what appears to be American hesitation. A geopolitical and military analysis of the developments in the war, the options available to each side, and the prospects for a diplomatic solution.
1/

First, I will provide a summary report of the latest military developments from each side and what each party has been able to achieve so far, starting with Israel.
Israel:
Since the first moment of this war, the IDF have been operating across four military levels targeting Iran. The first level involves military assassinations, the latest of which was the targeting of General Ali Shadmani, who served as deputy commander of the Khatam al-Anbia Headquarters, the most important Iranian military base. Shadmani was promoted after the assassination of the Chief of Staff and his deputy on the first day of the Israeli military operation, and according to Israeli sources, he assumed the position of Chief of Staff of the Iranian army. While Iranian sources denied his death, Iranian media confirmed he sustained serious injuries. The assassination followed the targeting of the head of Iranian intelligence and his deputy. It is likely that the assassination campaign will remain a priority for the IDF and Mossad in the coming days. The second level of the Israeli military operation concerns the Iranian missile program. From the first hour of Operation Rising Lion, missile depots and launch pads were at the top of the targets. This can be observed by examining the pattern of Israeli air attacks, which focused on the vicinity of the Iranian capital, Tehran, where a large number of military sites and missile depots are located. Additionally, strikes have targeted western Iran in the provinces of East and West Azerbaijan, Kermanshah, and Ilam, where the main missile storage and launch platforms of the Iranian military and the IRGC are situated.
2/

The third level is the Iranian nuclear program. According to the IDF, the Natanz nuclear facility sustained significant damage, both to the above-ground and underground structures. Powerful strikes have also been directed against the Isfahan nuclear facility and the Arak reactor, in addition to several other nuclear facilities and research centers. A large-scale assassination campaign was also carried out, targeting Iranian nuclear scientists directly responsible for developing this program. The fourth level involves the army of agents. The scale of these agents' activity since the first hour of this war, their technical and military capabilities, and their widespread deployment confirm that we are not dealing with small cells with a limited number of individuals, but rather an army that spans the entire Iranian territory. From the far east of Iran, where an Iranian fuel transport plane was destroyed at Mashhad Airport, through the dozens of drones launched by this army in Tehran and its surroundings, all the way to the far west of Iran, where these agents target any air defense batteries attempting to intercept Israeli warplanes. Approximately seven days into this war, these four levels of operation continue, with Iran attempting to reorganize its military and security capabilities to mitigate losses.
3/

Read 9 tweets

Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Jun 13

Thread 🧵
Thirteen hours after the Israeli Defense Forces launched 'Operation Rising Lion' against Iran's nuclear program, which began with the implementation of a shock and awe strategy through a large-scale assassination operation that included key commanders of the Iranian army and the IRGC, the official in charge for the Iranian nuclear program, and key Iranian nuclear scientists, it seems we are facing a new turning point in the Middle East. A preliminary geopolitical and military analysis of the "war" between Israel and Iran.
1/

Initially, in the military context, the IDF has, so far, carried out more than seven waves of attacks inside Iranian territory, targeting the following: Iranian military and IRGC commanders, nuclear scientists, the Natanz nuclear reactor and several facilities affiliated with the nuclear program, air defense bases, military airports, ballistic missile warehouses and launch pads, facilities used within the Iranian missile program, drone production plants, and some oil refineries. By tracking the map of the strikes, we notice that the Israeli attacks have mainly focused on the Iranian capital, Tehran, and its surroundings, as well as central and western Iran. This focus, particularly Tabriz and Kermanshah, is due to the fact that Iran has a limited number of ballistic missiles capable of striking Israeli territory, with an average range of about 1,800 km, which are primarily stored in western Iran. In the absence of Iranian air defenses and their near-total destruction, Israeli warplanes and drones continue to fly in Iranian skies with greater freedom to strike any Iranian military bases suspected of posing a threat. This overwhelming attack has clearly impacted Iran’s response so far.
2/

On the Iranian side, the assassination of the army and IRGC leaders has disrupted the chain of command and control. The officers who have been promoted to senior positions are in a state of confusion amid the ongoing attacks, the inability to fully assess the extent of the damage inflicted on the army and the IRGC, and the fear of Iranian communications being breached, which would mean the assassinations could continue. All these factors render Iran almost paralyzed militarily, unable to show any form of resistance in the face of the technologically advanced Israeli Defense Forces, which is ready for this war (it has been preparing for it for years). These facts confirm that the Iranian regime is currently in a predicament, which Iranian officials may view them as an existential threat to the regime. It is important to emphasize that Iranian society is fundamentally internally divided, and some Iranians want to change the regime. This increases fears in Tehran that this attack could spark an internal popular movement, forcing the Iranian regime to keep some of its focus internally. But the most important question at the moment is: What are Khamenei's options?
3/

Read 8 tweets

Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Jun 6

Thread 🧵
Yesterday evening, the Israeli Air Force carried out its largest wave of airstrikes on Beirut's southern suburbs and the most significant, as described by the IDF, since the ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel was declared in late November. According to the IDF, the attack targeted Hezbollah infrastructure responsible for the production and development of drones for military use. The strike came just days after the Trump administration dismissed its envoy to Lebanon, Morgan Ortagus, and amid Hezbollah's continued refusal to discuss the surrender of its weapons to the Lebanese state. It also occurred just days before the Lebanese army began its plan to withdraw weapons from the Palestinian camps in Beirut. An analytical reading of the Lebanese scene, highlighting the Beirut-Ramallah agreement regarding the disarmament of the Palestinian camps on Lebanese territory.
1/

Lebanon remains in a state of negative stagnation. Despite the election of Joseph Aoun as president and the formation of a more independent government, the political, economic, and military landscape remains unstable. Politically, the results of last month's municipal elections were disappointing, revealing that a large part of Lebanese society is still unprepared for change and a revolt against the current political elite. In Shiite areas, Hezbollah and the Amal Movement still hold the undisputed upper hand, while most independent candidates have failed. Economically, the political stalemate and unstable military situation are affecting Lebanon's standing as a country attractive to international investment. Even a number of Gulf businessmen who had shown interest in returning to open projects in Lebanon have backed off from this step. Militarily, the Lebanese Army and the US-led security committee continue to operate in areas south of the Litani River to end Hezbollah's presence there. However, the task remains incomplete due to Hezbollah's refusal to hand over maps of these sites. My sources also confirm that Hezbollah has begun relying on local manufacturing to compensate for the shortage of foreign weapons supplies. At the same time, there are ongoing intensive attempts to import weapons via Syria, in light of daily announcements by the Syrian security forces about the discovery of arms shipments coming from Iraq and the Syrian coast heading towards Lebanese territory. The Lebanese scene can be summarized as the Lebanese state stands at a crossroads. The Lebanese state has a desire to begin a new era, and this ambition receives both Arab and international support. However, this desire is hindered by the issue of Hezbollah’s weapons, which, according to its leader, Naim Qassem, will not hand over its weapons unless the IDF withdraw from five positions in southern Lebanon, unless Israel stops its air strikes inside Lebanese territory, and unless the Lebanese state begins the reconstruction process. These conditions seem complex and difficult to fulfill, placing the Lebanese state in an extremely precarious position. To find a way out of this dilemma, the issue of weapons in Palestinian camps has come into focus.
2/

Some may wonder about the significance of the Palestinian camps file in Lebanon and why the Lebanese state is going to end it. It can be said that there are three parties supporting this initiative. The first is the Lebanese state. According to the ceasefire agreement, which was based on UN Resolution 1701, the restriction of weapons to the Lebanese state also includes the Palestinian camps. On the other hand, the Lebanese government is facing international pressure to implement the outcomes of Resolution 1701 and withdraw Hezbollah’s weapons as soon as possible. Therefore, in order to buy time and avoid confronting Hezbollah at the current stage, focusing on the Palestinian camps issue becomes an appropriate solution. The second is Hezbollah. Yes, Hezbollah, despite its close relations with Hamas and Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah benefits from this step. In a conversation I had with a Lebanese official, it was confirmed to me that Hezbollah, in one of the discussions that took place between one of its representatives and officials from the Lebanese state, indicated that the militia refuses to hand over its weapons as long as there are weapons in the Palestinian camps. The Hezbollah official referred primarily to the Ain al-Hilweh camp in the city of Sidon, where he pointed out that the Palestinians in the camp are Sunni, and that withdrawing Hezbollah’s weapons without withdrawing the weapons of the Palestinian camps might put the Shiites in Sidon and Lebanon In danger. Of course, this claim is simply a justification for Hezbollah's tacit support so that the Lebanese state prioritizes the Palestinian camps issue, thus giving Hezbollah more time. If the weapons withdrawal from the Palestinian camps fails, Hezbollah will refuse to hand over its weapons. The third party is Israel, as the Palestinian militias in Lebanon still pose a threat to Israeli territory. During the last war with Lebanon, these militias participated in attacks towards northern Israel by launching rockets and conducting infiltration operations across the border. Therefore, it seems that this month will be focused on the Palestinian camps in Lebanon.
3/

Read 7 tweets

Share this page!

Enter URL or ID to Unroll

Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

More from @evacool_

Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Don't want to be a Premium member but still want to support us?

Send Email!