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Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Jan 10

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General Joseph Aoun is the fourteenth president of the Lebanese state, after more than two years of vacuum and internal political struggle and international and regional movements. This important development comes amid a state of anticipation on the Lebanese-Israeli border, a political earthquake in Syria, and panic in Iran. A reading of the Lebanese scene after the election of Joseph Aoun and the difficulties he will face in the next stage.
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Even 24 hours before the start of the first round of voting in the Lebanese parliament, General Joseph Aoun did not have the 86 votes that would suffice for him to win the elections, and bypass article nr. 49 of the Lebanese constitution that prevents any first class employee in the Lebanese state from running for the presidency unless he has resigned or retired at least two years before the voting date. Thus, the 86 votes necessary to amend the constitution mean that the representatives of Hezbollah and the Amal Movement would vote in support of Joseph Aoun, which was not possible at that time. However, contacts led by the French presidential envoy, Jean Le Drian, personally, with the support of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United States of America, and Qatar, created a breakthrough in the position of Hezbollah and Nabih Berri, who chose not to vote for Joseph Aoun in the first round, then supported his vote in the second round, so that he won 99 votes out of 128, and Lebanon entered a new phase different from what it was in the past three decades.
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Indeed, during the past three decades, the election of the Lebanese president was either by a decision from the Assad regime in Damascus or through pressures and blackmail by the Hezbollah militia. Today, General Joseph Aoun, although he is supported by the US, France and the Arabs, also represents the aspirations of a large part of the Lebanese people, Christians, Druze and Sunnis. This internal and external support will be a dire need for him in the coming stage, in which he will be forced to adopt decisions that some may not like internally and regionally, and to begin implementing UN Resolution 1701 and the annex that was agreed upon by the US envoy Amos Hochstein and the Netanyahu government, to which Hezbollah claims that it does not agree.
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Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Jan 9

Thread 🧵
Αt dawn on December 7th, 2024, less than 24 hours before Bashar al-Assad fled the Syrian capital Damascus, while the Syrian armed opposition forces were still stationed on the outskirts of Homs, the Free Syrian Forces stationed in the al-Tanf area began an attack on the city of Palmyra in the heart of the Syrian desert, with support from the American warplanes. The target was ISIS positions in the area. A reading of ISIS’s next move after the fall of the Assad regime.
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After the killing of the leaders of the Islamic State in Iraq, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, in 2010, the organization entered a state of collapse and dispersion, to the point that many observers specializing in jihadist groups thought that it was the end. Indeed, the number of their fighters decreased to hundreds, hiding in the Anbar desert and its hills, or being hunted in the border villages with Syria. (This scene looks similar to what the organization is experiencing today, whose presence in Iraq and Syria has become limited to the Anbar desert and the Syrian desert). However, with the outbreak of protests in the Sunni areas of Iraq denouncing the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, the organization began to reorganize its forces, publishing a statement called “Anbar Spring,” in which they confirmed that they were present in Anbar and that their revival was a matter of time. Indeed, in the summer of 2013, the organization attacked the Taji and Abu Ghraib prisons, as part of an operation called “Destruction of the Walls,” and released about 500 of their fighters, who were the nucleus of what was later called the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant “ISIS.” Will history repeat itself?
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After ISIS lost its last strongholds in the east of the Euphrates at the end of the Battle of Hajin in 2018, the organization adopted a policy of avoiding direct confrontation and concentration in cities and towns, and a policy of ambushes and hiding in the deserts of Iraq and Syria. During the past six years, the organization has not deviated from this policy except once in 2022 when it carried out a massive attack against the Ghuwayran Central Prison in Hasakah, northeastern Syria, managing to release hundreds of its fighters in this attack. Here, some may ask why the prison is the target when it would have been easier to storm one of the military bases in the region with the least damage?
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Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Jan 7

Thread 🧵
Two days before the Lebanese Parliament convenes to elect a president, and twenty days before the expiry of the 60-day deadline agreed upon for a ceasefire between Hezbollah and Israel, the political and field scene in Lebanon remains thorny and the state of internal division continues. A reading of the latest developments on the Lebanese scene.
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Before I present the latest developments in the presidency file and the ceasefire file on the Israeli-Lebanese border, it is important to shed light on the Hezbollah militia after a war that lasted for about a year in which they lost their leader Hassan Nasrallah and most of their military leaders, in addition to the damage to their strategic weapons stockpile and the great destruction of their financial networks. Today, the militia still exists, and it is still the strongest militarily in Lebanon, which is reflected in their political influence. The militia also still sees its connection with the Iranian regime as central to their existence. Therefore, I can say that Israel achieved half a victory and Hezbollah suffered half a defeat. Within this equation, Hezbollah does not accept any concessions internally because it sees them as a complement to its military defeat and thus a threat to its existence and influence in the Lebanese arena. This is how Hezbollah deals with the presidency file and the ceasefire agreement.
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The presidential file
The Lebanese capital is witnessing intensive regional and international diplomatic movement, the most important of which are visits by Saudi, French and American delegations on the one hand to learn about the position of the political blocs on the presidential file and on the other hand to give these countries their position on this election, which may be the most important in decades. Lebanon, which has experienced civil wars, wars on the Israeli border, a mandate from the Assad regime and Iranian hegemony, is today trying to choose a Lebanese president in the first place, but the atmosphere so far does not seem optimistic in this regard.
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Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Jan 4

Thread 🧵
On January 3, 2020, General Qassem Soleimani was killed in a raid carried out by the US Air Force. Soleimani was not just the commander of the Quds Force, one of the brigades of the IRGC, but he was a cornerstone of Iran's project in the Middle East. While Iran's allies in the region moved on, Iraq was the most affected by the killing of Soleimani, and this day became the beginning of a new phase of Iranian influence in Baghdad. A reading of the Iraqi scene amid regional changes and internal tensions.
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Despite the importance of the leader of the Popular Mobilization Forces, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, in coordinating the work of this Iraqi militia in its war against ISIS, the final word was given by General Qassem Soleimani. After his death, Ismail Qaani was appointed as commander of the Quds Force but did not receive the same respect. According to informed Iraqi sources, disagreements occurred between the Iranians and a number of leaders of Iraqi parties and militias. Qaani was not able to impose his opinion on everyone, which forced Tehran to request the intervention of Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah to mediate. Later, Iran appointed Muhammad al-Kawtharani, a Hezbollah official, as responsible for the Iraqi file.
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With the end of the war against ISIS, the Iraqi militias and political parties entered into a state of internal conflicts over the division of influence and financial revenues of Iraq. Over time three groups were formed: the first is the Sadrist movement led by Muqtada al-Sadr, which is more moderate in its relations with Iran, the second is a movement affiliated with Iran but is more interested in extending its influence within the Iraqi state, with the Asaib Ahl al-Haq militia led by Qais Khazali considered one of the most important of this group, and the third group is militias directly affiliated with the IRGC which move within Iran's vision away from the Iraqi interest, one of the most important of these militias being the Iraqi Kata’ib Hezbollah. While this internal division in Iraq was expanding little by little, the attacks of October 7, 2023 came, and the entire Middle East entered a new turning point.
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Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Jan 2

Thread 🧵
Last March, Saudi Arabia signed, with Chinese mediation, a memorandum of understanding with Iran. Many observers considered this memorandum a concession by Riyadh in the face of the Iranian rise, which was at its peak in the Middle East. This understanding coincided with the Iranian axis’ announcement of the so-called ‘Unity of Fronts’ strategy. Today, in light of regional changes and the Iranian decline, it seems that the Middle East has entered into a competition between three projects, one of which aims to maintain the previous equation before the October 7 attack, and two of them want a new Middle East of their own. A geopolitical reading of the Middle East today.
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On January 15, 2016, the nuclear agreement between the P5+1 and Iran entered into force. This agreement was not a set of technical provisions that temporarily limited Tehran's ability to produce a nuclear bomb only, but rather an international concession that gave Khamenei's regime a green light to expand its influence and control over the Middle East, starting with supporting the Assad regime to control the city of Aleppo, through blackmailing Saudi Arabia with missiles from the Houthi militia from Yemen, up to the attacks of October 7. Today, it can be said that the understandings of the JCPOA agreement, in its regional aspect, have ended by a decision from Israel after Trump ended its economic aspect in his first term.
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Little by little, two projects began to emerge in the Middle East to reap the benefits of the decline of the Iranian project. The first is the New Middle East Project, which Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu referred to, and the second is the political Islam project, which is managed by Türkiye and was launched with the start of the Arab Spring, then temporarily subsided, only to return today with the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, but in a new, more pragmatic form. Has the Iranian project ended, and what is the nature of Turkish-Iranian relations and Turkish-Israeli relations in light of these changes?
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Eva J. Koulouriotis | إيفا كولوريوتي

@evacool_

Dec 31, 2024

Thread 🧵
While the official Iranian media and the speeches of the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei try to present regional developments as a summer cloud that Tehran will disperse, we as researchers monitoring the political, military and security movements internally, regionally and internationally notice the state of anticipation suggesting that Khomeini’s Iran is beginning to shake. A reading of the Iranian scene internally and internationally.
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A few days ago, I described in detail the Iranian regime plan for the region, which became clearer day after day. Today, the Iraqi Parliament Speaker has confirmed what I had previously mentioned about the adoption by the Iraqi militias supported by Iran of the decision to stop their attacks on Israel in agreement with the Iraqi government in Baghdad. In fact I predicted this step, which surprised many observers, after the earthquake of the fall of the Assad regime in Damascus. I suggest you go through it again.👇👇👇
x.com/evacool_/statu…
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Internally
About 10 years ago, negotiations between the Iranian regime and the P5+1 group had taken great strides to resolve the differences between the two sides. While the Obama administration was making many concessions on the issues of freedoms, human rights, Iran’s missile program, and even the nuclear program, regional files were also on the table. In the end, the two parties reached an agreement that that we could say was an international declaration of the beginning of the era of Iranian domination over the Middle East, and one of its results was the attacks of October 7 of last year. This political achievement of the Iranian regime was within an equation drawn up by Khamenei, for which Iran's Foreign Ministry, headed by Javad Zarif, shared responsibilities with the Iranian Quds Force, led by General Qassem Soleimani, and both made it a reality for the expansion of regional control and influence. Today, the Iranian regime finds itself in a more complex predicament that has prompted Khamenei to redistribute tasks between Iranian President Pezeshkian and his advisor Zarif on the one hand, and the IRGC on the other.
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