#Turkey 🇹🇷 under #Erdogan has been relatively successful at pursuing a pseudo third-worldist policy that paints Ankara as the defender of oppressed people worldwide.
What the #west isn’t saying about the #TurkishLira crisis, is that it’s a deliberate devaluation, a policy pursued by #Turkey 🇹🇷 to make the country more attractive and accessible to poorer countries, & NOT a function of Erdogan’s economic heterodoxy (2/9)
A less valuable Lira creates a bigger barrier between Turkish society and the 🇪🇺, making it harder and more expensive for most Turks to go to Europe. (3/9)
A weaker Lira levels the ground between 🇹🇷 and developing countries, offering something more accessible than the west, but with a foot in key western organizations. Likewise, a devaluing Lira makes it easier for countries to pay back their debts. (4/9) trtworld.com/magazine/how-t…
Regional differences in living standards and social values are also very high in Turkey, & a high value lira made economic development in the eastern parts of Turkey challenging, & is part of the reason for massive internal migration to eastern to western Turkey (5/9)
Turkey’s policy of devaluing the Lira thus resembles the monetary policies of other large & highly regionally unequal countries, & the Turkish lira is increasingly reaching parity with the #Russia/n Ruble, and the #India/n Rupee. (6/9)
Turkey’s ultimate objective is not ‘neo-ottomanism’ per se, rather, it is to leverage its NATO membership to create a mini-imperial system within & under the cover of NATO, modelled on France’s privileged position in West Africa. (7/9)
France is able to mitigate the high value of the € relative to the currencies of West Africa, via the French treasury which pegs west African Currencies currencies to the Euro. (8/9)
🇹🇷 is not in a position to do what 🇫🇷 has done by pegging the CFA to the €. Instead, 🇹🇷 pursues a policy of Lira devaluation and aims to consolidate itself as the key node on both a Turkic ethno-national dimension & on the basis of Islamic solidarity (Ummah). (9/9)