The #EU has been sidelined in this crisis by design. Military security dialogue with #Russia remains outsourced to #NATO/#OSCE or takes place bilaterally. How could the EU contribute to managing military security beyond #deterrence? Some ideas 1/6 feps-europe.eu/component/atta…
2/6 The EU should establish a permanent expert dialogue with 🇷🇺on military security issues. Existing bilateral formats (Germany, France, Netherlands etc.) risk undermining unity. Possible starting point: Mil-to-mil dialogue between @ChairmanEUMC and the Chief of the Russian GS.
3/6 The EU should invest in independent capabilities for monitoring, analysing and reducing military escalation risks. A European Centre for Crisis Prevention and Risk Reduction would recognise the need for more co-ordination and data sharing.
4/6 Finally, EU member states should invest in saving the #Openskiestreaty by preventing additional withdrawals. This requires both diplomatic/ technical engagement, particularly with regard to #Belarus. Long term, could create a new regional aerial observation regime with 🇷🇺
5/6 None of these steps will replace NATO/OSCE, but the EU needs the capacity to communicate & act efficiently on military security issues with Russia, particularly when Euro-Atlantic institutions for engaging Moscow on military security become dysfunctional for mil-mil dialogue.
6/6 A low-risk wait-and-see strategy that ascribes responsibility and initiative to either Moscow or Washington is not sustainable. It will only foster Europe’s irrelevance in military security on the continent and cement existing dependencies.
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#Russia wants a commitment to the "#indivisibility of security" concept but its meaning has shifted over time. In fact, the #West introduced it during the #CSCE negotiations 1972-1975 in order to establish a linkage between human (non-military) & politico-military security 1/11🧵
2/ At the time, the Soviet Union/WVO stressed the politico-military dimension but the West/Neutrals wanted both concepts to be treated as parts of #comprehensive security. Respect for #humanrights was to apply also within the Eastern Bloc in order to change the status quo.
3/ However, the term #indivisibility was only mentioned in the Preamble of the 1975 Final Act, where it was reduced to a vague notion of general common interests. After 1975 the debate over indivisibility focused on the indiscriminate implementation of human rights principles.
We don’t need #Yalta 2.0 or #Helsinki 2.0 in #Europe now. We need #Stockholm 2.0: The Conference on Confidence- and Security-building measures and Disarmament in Europe 1984-1986. Crucial at the time, largely forgotten today. A thread. 1/14
2/For context: Before Stockholm East-West relations had hit rock bottom. In 1976, the SU started to deploy SS-20. In 1979, it invaded Afghanistan & NATO took its double track decision. In Sep 1983 the SU shot down Korean aircraft 747. In Dec 1983 Pershing II arrived in Europe.
3/In response the SU walked out of the ongoing bilateral talks with the US on INF missiles in Geneva and stopped negotiating conventional arms control (MBFR) with NATO in Vienna. But at the same time Moscow agreed to talks in Stockholm. The conference opened in Jan 1984.
#Russian Foreign Ministry has published its proposals on security guarantees as submitted to the US and #NATO: "Agreement on measures to ensure the security of the Russian Federation and members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization", 9 articles mid.ru/ru/foreign_pol… 1/x
2/ "Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Security Guarantees", 8 articles, mid.ru/ru/foreign_pol…
3/ Excellent thread by @walberque below although I disagree with the overall conclusion: The NATO-Russia agreement proposal goes way beyond the 2009 European Security Treaty in at least three main respects:
Russian MFA publishes a list of demands the West must meet to defuse tensions & ensure Russian security: It wants legal guarantees from NATO not to expand to the East and a formal renouncement of the 2008 Bucharest summit decision on Georgia & Ukraine 1/x mid.ru/foreign_policy…
2/It also wants NATO members to legally guarantee that they will not deploy weapons (strike-systems, probably long-range) that pose a threat to Russia on the territory of neighboring countries, regardless of whether they are NATO members or not.
3/In seeks reactions by NATO on previous proposals to reduce tensions by limiting military exercises in the border zone, clarifying safety distances for warships in the Baltic and Black Sea, and the return to direct mil-to-mil dialogue, Russia-NATO, US-NATO.
Now public: On 22 December Russia send a verbal note to #Openskiestreaty members stating that w/o written guarantees until 1 January 2021 on data non-proliferation & territorial access, it might be forced to initiate withdrawing procedure. 1/5 sueddeutsche.de/politik/luftue…
2/5 Negative answer by 16 foreign ministers, including Heiko Maas and Jean-Yves Le Drian, followed on 30 December. They are ready to organize an extraordinary OSCC meeting but otherwise want to discuss the Russian initiative at the next ordinary session on 25 January.
3/5 Translated quote from SZ (not original): "We believe that the new condition expressed in your verbal note reflects a preference on your part as a necessity". Indeed, it is unclear, why Russia is forcing the review process of decision No. 9/02 that itself initiated in November
The #Openskiestreaty docs published by #Russia yesterday also include the manuscript by S. Ryabkov from the state conference on July 6. His speech (in Russian) includes one surprisingly blunt remark and three practical issues that will come up soon 1/10 mid.ru/en/foreign_pol…
2/10 Ryabkov takes issue with Georgia's position. Remember that Tbilisi ended its treaty obligations towards Moscow in April 2012 in response to Russia implementing the treaty's 10 km border rule to non-member states with respect to Abkhazia/South Ossetia (since 2010).
3/10 This status conflict (unrelated to the treaty as such) in consequence stopped the treaty's implementation in 2018, because Russia succeeded in making a bid for a flight over Georgia. In turn, Georgia refused to give its consent to the entire quota distribution that year.