Alexander Graef Profile picture
Feb 1 11 tweets 5 min read
#Russia wants a commitment to the "#indivisibility of security" concept but its meaning has shifted over time. In fact, the #West introduced it during the #CSCE negotiations 1972-1975 in order to establish a linkage between human (non-military) & politico-military security 1/11🧵
2/ At the time, the Soviet Union/WVO stressed the politico-military dimension but the West/Neutrals wanted both concepts to be treated as parts of #comprehensive security. Respect for #humanrights was to apply also within the Eastern Bloc in order to change the status quo.
3/ However, the term #indivisibility was only mentioned in the Preamble of the 1975 Final Act, where it was reduced to a vague notion of general common interests. After 1975 the debate over indivisibility focused on the indiscriminate implementation of human rights principles.
4/ The political changes within the Eastern Bloc in the late 1980s affected the relative significance of the three CSCE baskets & altered the concept of #indivisibility. The Paris Charter took a leap forward, because now democracy became the only legitimate form of government.
5/ In this spirit, the Paris Charter announced the 'end of division': “security is indivisible and the security of every participating State is inseparably linked to that of all the others”. The notion of #cooperativesecurity increasingly qualified the meaning of #indivisibility.
6/ The CSCE Helsinki Summit document from 1992 codified that paradigm shift by speaking of a “community of free and democratic States”and adding (for the first time) that “no state in our CSCE
community will strengthen its security AT THE EXPENSE of the security of other States”.
7/ It is essential to grasp this shift in meaning, because the idea to establish “new security relations based upon co-operative & common approaches to security” diverges substantially from the concept of cooperation during the Cold War, including
those prevalent within the CSCE
8/ Back then, limited East-West "cooperation" was not supposed to replace basic confrontation but to reduce the imminent risks of military escalation and to mitigate the worst consequences of the real geopolitical division for citizens: peaceful co-existence, not indivisibility.
9/ By contrast, during the 1990s OSCE documents, like the 1996 Lisbon Summit declaration, describe indivisibility of security as a fundamental element of the goal to achieve a common security space. The declaration speaks of "a common security space free of dividing lines".
10/ Now, in 2022 one has to admit that this vision of a OSCE based pan-European common security space has not materialized, even though "indivisibility of security" since 1990 (!) refers to the denial of spheres of privileged interests in Europe. A reality that causes confusion.
11/ Overall, the meaning of the concept of indivisible security depends on the underlying concept of political community. Today, indivisible security (unfortunately), once again, points to geopolitical stability & (only) basic security linkages among OSCE participating states.

• • •

Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to force a refresh
 

Keep Current with Alexander Graef

Alexander Graef Profile picture

Stay in touch and get notified when new unrolls are available from this author!

Read all threads

This Thread may be Removed Anytime!

PDF

Twitter may remove this content at anytime! Save it as PDF for later use!

Try unrolling a thread yourself!

how to unroll video
  1. Follow @ThreadReaderApp to mention us!

  2. From a Twitter thread mention us with a keyword "unroll"
@threadreaderapp unroll

Practice here first or read more on our help page!

More from @alxgraef

Jan 31
The #EU has been sidelined in this crisis by design. Military security dialogue with #Russia remains outsourced to #NATO/#OSCE or takes place bilaterally. How could the EU contribute to managing military security beyond #deterrence? Some ideas 1/6
feps-europe.eu/component/atta…
2/6 The EU should establish a permanent expert dialogue with 🇷🇺on military security issues. Existing bilateral formats (Germany, France, Netherlands etc.) risk undermining unity. Possible starting point: Mil-to-mil dialogue between @ChairmanEUMC and the Chief of the Russian GS.
3/6 The EU should invest in independent capabilities for monitoring, analysing and reducing military escalation risks. A European Centre for Crisis Prevention and Risk Reduction would recognise the need for more co-ordination and data sharing.
Read 6 tweets
Jan 8
We don’t need #Yalta 2.0 or #Helsinki 2.0 in #Europe now. We need #Stockholm 2.0: The Conference on Confidence- and Security-building measures and Disarmament in Europe 1984-1986. Crucial at the time, largely forgotten today. A thread. 1/14
2/For context: Before Stockholm East-West relations had hit rock bottom. In 1976, the SU started to deploy SS-20. In 1979, it invaded Afghanistan & NATO took its double track decision. In Sep 1983 the SU shot down Korean aircraft 747. In Dec 1983 Pershing II arrived in Europe.
3/In response the SU walked out of the ongoing bilateral talks with the US on INF missiles in Geneva and stopped negotiating conventional arms control (MBFR) with NATO in Vienna. But at the same time Moscow agreed to talks in Stockholm. The conference opened in Jan 1984.
Read 14 tweets
Dec 17, 2021
#Russian Foreign Ministry has published its proposals on security guarantees as submitted to the US and #NATO: "Agreement on measures to ensure the security of the Russian Federation and members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization", 9 articles mid.ru/ru/foreign_pol… 1/x
2/ "Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Security Guarantees", 8 articles, mid.ru/ru/foreign_pol…
3/ Excellent thread by @walberque below although I disagree with the overall conclusion: The NATO-Russia agreement proposal goes way beyond the 2009 European Security Treaty in at least three main respects:
Read 6 tweets
Dec 10, 2021
Russian MFA publishes a list of demands the West must meet to defuse tensions & ensure Russian security: It wants legal guarantees from NATO not to expand to the East and a formal renouncement of the 2008 Bucharest summit decision on Georgia & Ukraine 1/x mid.ru/foreign_policy…
2/It also wants NATO members to legally guarantee that they will not deploy weapons (strike-systems, probably long-range) that pose a threat to Russia on the territory of neighboring countries, regardless of whether they are NATO members or not.
3/In seeks reactions by NATO on previous proposals to reduce tensions by limiting military exercises in the border zone, clarifying safety distances for warships in the Baltic and Black Sea, and the return to direct mil-to-mil dialogue, Russia-NATO, US-NATO.
Read 15 tweets
Jan 4, 2021
Now public: On 22 December Russia send a verbal note to #Openskiestreaty members stating that w/o written guarantees until 1 January 2021 on data non-proliferation & territorial access, it might be forced to initiate withdrawing procedure. 1/5 sueddeutsche.de/politik/luftue…
2/5 Negative answer by 16 foreign ministers, including Heiko Maas and Jean-Yves Le Drian, followed on 30 December. They are ready to organize an extraordinary OSCC meeting but otherwise want to discuss the Russian initiative at the next ordinary session on 25 January.
3/5 Translated quote from SZ (not original): "We believe that the new condition expressed in your verbal note reflects a preference on your part as a necessity". Indeed, it is unclear, why Russia is forcing the review process of decision No. 9/02 that itself initiated in November
Read 6 tweets
Jul 9, 2020
The #Openskiestreaty docs published by #Russia yesterday also include the manuscript by S. Ryabkov from the state conference on July 6. His speech (in Russian) includes one surprisingly blunt remark and three practical issues that will come up soon 1/10 mid.ru/en/foreign_pol…
2/10 Ryabkov takes issue with Georgia's position. Remember that Tbilisi ended its treaty obligations towards Moscow in April 2012 in response to Russia implementing the treaty's 10 km border rule to non-member states with respect to Abkhazia/South Ossetia (since 2010).
3/10 This status conflict (unrelated to the treaty as such) in consequence stopped the treaty's implementation in 2018, because Russia succeeded in making a bid for a flight over Georgia. In turn, Georgia refused to give its consent to the entire quota distribution that year.
Read 11 tweets

Did Thread Reader help you today?

Support us! We are indie developers!


This site is made by just two indie developers on a laptop doing marketing, support and development! Read more about the story.

Become a Premium Member ($3/month or $30/year) and get exclusive features!

Become Premium

Don't want to be a Premium member but still want to support us?

Make a small donation by buying us coffee ($5) or help with server cost ($10)

Donate via Paypal

Or Donate anonymously using crypto!

Ethereum

0xfe58350B80634f60Fa6Dc149a72b4DFbc17D341E copy

Bitcoin

3ATGMxNzCUFzxpMCHL5sWSt4DVtS8UqXpi copy

Thank you for your support!

:(