An under-appreciated feature of the #UkraineWar is the emergence of #Israel and #Turkey as key international intermediaries. Israeli PM was in Moscow this past weekend, and Lavrov/Kuleba are meeting in Antalya for 1st high-level meeting since bgn of invasion tomorrow. A🧵(1/7)
After Cold War, ISR & TUR emerged as important economic partners for Russia in ME. Russian bilat trade w/both is more significant than with most Arab partners. W/Turkey: Gas, Akkuyu NPP, tourism, mil-tech cooperation. W/Israel: agricultural & food products, minerals, metals (2/7)
Both ISR & TUR, however, also entertain major economic ties with Ukraine. And they've been worried about minority communities suffering under the #UkraineInvasion. Turkey pulled out Crimean Tatars, Israel evacuated Jewish communities. (3/7)
Both ISR & TUR have to tread carefully not just given econ. relations with both RUS & UA. They also deconflict w/RUS in Syria, where Moscow gives "yellow light" to Israeli strikes against Iran-backed targets, while pursuing careful deconfliction w/Turkey in NW and NE Syria. (4/7)
With TUR, the "deconfliction-cooperation-competition" game extends beyond Syria, to Libya, Nagorno-Karab. & Black Sea. Will be fascinating to see how TUR's invocation of Montreux Convention will affect Russian mil ops in Black Sea & Eastern Med, if UA war drags on for long. (5/7)
Can ISR or TUR really mediate between RUS-UA during this confrontation? I doubt it.
But they're proving useful as messengers (ISR) & conveners (TUR), at a time when Russia has completely discarded W. countries as viable dialogue platforms (notwithstanding Macron efforts). (6/7)
As a Russian contact put it to me, Russians might start "looking East" for economic salvation amid pressure, but "looking South" for platforms for arbitration, mediation, off-shore activity etc. Too early to tell how much to make of this, but watch this space. (7/7)
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For those interested in context, amid fears that #Russia might stage false-flag chem. (or bio) attack in #Ukraine, I've followed the #Russia#Chemical weapons dossier
Some background readings that might be useful (1/6)
After #US-#Russia cooperation in removing #Syria's declared CW in 2013-14, things unravelled, w/Russia obstructing efforts at attribution & accountability for CW use in Syria. Over time, rebels were blamed for staging "false-flag attacks". Long read: tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.108… (2/6)
I commented here on how the Russian narrative on #CW in Syria - always shielding the Syrian government, blaming rebels for "false-flag" ops - must be understood in context of broader Russian war objectives in Syria: nonproliferation.org/chemical-weapo… (3/6)
Leaving Moscow as Russia marks "Defender of the Fatherland Day" with a heavy heart after days of intensive mtgs. Some Russians said I witnessed a historic moment (DNR/LNR recognition) but one devoid of euphoria, unlike 2014. Instead, I sensed disbelief & shrugging shoulders (1/8)
Among more liberal/pro-Western minded, the predominant feeling Monday night was bewilderment - with folks thinking until the last moment that "he's not gonna go there" - mixed with a deepening worry about the future trajectory of the country: domestic & its foreign policy. (2/8)
The more hawkish felt vindicated by the building of momentum up to Monday (coercive diplomacy needed as gamble toward rectifying past injustices) but were equally caught by surprise by Putin speech (tone & substance). And seem to lack clear sense of where all this will end. (3/8)