For those interested in context, amid fears that #Russia might stage false-flag chem. (or bio) attack in #Ukraine, I've followed the #Russia#Chemical weapons dossier
Some background readings that might be useful (1/6)
After #US-#Russia cooperation in removing #Syria's declared CW in 2013-14, things unravelled, w/Russia obstructing efforts at attribution & accountability for CW use in Syria. Over time, rebels were blamed for staging "false-flag attacks". Long read: tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.108… (2/6)
I commented here on how the Russian narrative on #CW in Syria - always shielding the Syrian government, blaming rebels for "false-flag" ops - must be understood in context of broader Russian war objectives in Syria: nonproliferation.org/chemical-weapo… (3/6)
(@tobiaschneider is among those who has chronicled the military role of CW in the context of Syria's broader war objectives: gppi.net/2019/02/17/the…) (4/6)
On how Russia has, over time, argued from within the increasingly fractured @OPCW, offering its own interpretation of the Chemical Weapons Convention rules, to push its case on #Syria#CW and #navalny poisoning, see here: foreignpolicy.com/2021/04/19/org… (5/6)
In December, I concluded that contestation over #CW has long become part of broader #Russia-#West standoff, with #Russia essentially no longer caring about growing polarisation @OPCW, and what implications are for the chem. weapons taboo, see here: carnegiemoscow.org/commentary/860… (6/6)
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#Russia and #UA, after 3 meetings - Feb 28, March 3 and 7 - in Belarus keep "constantly" talking online now; in video talks, working groups have been created. Zelenskiy on the talks: the sides are talking, "and not just throwing around ultimatums";
Podolyak: There's a dozen proposals on the table, on the political & military settlement: ceasefire (& formula for it), withdrawal of RUS troops...now all is addressed in working groups...once "mutual reciprocal legal formats" are worked out, there will be 4th (physical) meeting;
An under-appreciated feature of the #UkraineWar is the emergence of #Israel and #Turkey as key international intermediaries. Israeli PM was in Moscow this past weekend, and Lavrov/Kuleba are meeting in Antalya for 1st high-level meeting since bgn of invasion tomorrow. A🧵(1/7)
After Cold War, ISR & TUR emerged as important economic partners for Russia in ME. Russian bilat trade w/both is more significant than with most Arab partners. W/Turkey: Gas, Akkuyu NPP, tourism, mil-tech cooperation. W/Israel: agricultural & food products, minerals, metals (2/7)
Both ISR & TUR, however, also entertain major economic ties with Ukraine. And they've been worried about minority communities suffering under the #UkraineInvasion. Turkey pulled out Crimean Tatars, Israel evacuated Jewish communities. (3/7)
Leaving Moscow as Russia marks "Defender of the Fatherland Day" with a heavy heart after days of intensive mtgs. Some Russians said I witnessed a historic moment (DNR/LNR recognition) but one devoid of euphoria, unlike 2014. Instead, I sensed disbelief & shrugging shoulders (1/8)
Among more liberal/pro-Western minded, the predominant feeling Monday night was bewilderment - with folks thinking until the last moment that "he's not gonna go there" - mixed with a deepening worry about the future trajectory of the country: domestic & its foreign policy. (2/8)
The more hawkish felt vindicated by the building of momentum up to Monday (coercive diplomacy needed as gamble toward rectifying past injustices) but were equally caught by surprise by Putin speech (tone & substance). And seem to lack clear sense of where all this will end. (3/8)