1. He doesn’t accept defeat. Putin has never “lost” a conflict of scale. Sometimes that comes at high cost to #Russia, certainly the present econ sanctions are an example of that, plus high casualties. This leads to…
2. Win at all costs. See video from #Mariupol to see what Russian mass fires look like in 2022. Eastern and central #Ukraine are beginning to resemble #Aleppo Syria. He intends to hollow out Ukrainian state via mass distraction of infrastructure and economy. This achieves his…
3. Core goal: end Ukraine’s modernization. Putin said he wants to “demilitarize” the country, and many analysts thought that meant defeating Ukrainian military/occupation. So did I once. But lately my opinion has been that demilitarisation equates to destroying capacity to live…
4. Putin is pursuing a divide and conquer strategy. He obviously failed the lightning war objective; now the plan seems to be to cut off major cities of importance one at a time; forcing capitulation or reducing it via mass destruction. This means…
5. No quagmire. Putin has no intention of repeating the great power fascination with quagmire wars of nation building. His view is inverse: nation wrecking. It’s far more straightforward to accomplish and reduces Russian casualties because what’s left of the state is hollow…
6. Making an example. Putin is proving something to Eastern #Europe: “the West may sanction and isolate my country, but I can ensure that yours is utterly destroyed if you don’t do what I want”. That is the highest form of coercion, no doubt #Finland and others will take note…
7. The new Russian sphere of influence. Analysts often wrongly point to quote about Putin mourning the collapse of #SovietUnion as proof he wants another Warsaw Pact. This is misguided, he wants a new Russian Empire. Savvy empires create destroyed buffer zones as insulation…
8. He has already partially won. In 2012 #Obama mocked #Romney for the idea that Russia posed the major security threat to U.S. it was an indication of how little regard the West had for Russian hard power or Putin‘s willingness to use it. No one is under that delusion now…
9. The US/#NATO is cowed on hard power. Putin sees that #Germany is rearming, and Europe is aligned against him, but as the #Biden – #Poland MiG fiasco shows, the US and NATO utterly unwilling to go to war. Putin got the United States to cancel routine missile exercises…
10. He isn’t done. The New Russian Empire and it’s crusading czar have more objectives on the list. As I predicted the plurality Russian public are resentful of the West’s sanctions crushing their economy. Putin has all the support he needs to start new projects.
11. He is saving his best equipment. The overwhelming bulk of the Russian Air Force is not committed to the fight in Ukraine, and the S 400 missile system (which logged the farthest surface to air kill in history last month) hasn’t been a major factor. He’s saving for something.
12. Putin is also pacing the use of his soldiers. That might sound odd given the high casualty rate, but his early use of conscripts and national troops seems intentional. There are many more fighting age troops in Russia waiting to be recruited/drafted.
13. He is setting a terrifying trend. If dictators like Putin can wreck major European countries and lived to tell about it, what sort of ideas does that put into the mind of the fanatical leaders in #Tehran or #Pyongyang?
14. Putin has exposed Biden‘s standards. Joe is seeking help from #Venezuela and Saudi Arabia regarding oil, not turning to domestic capacity. The US economy hasn’t really been pushed yet, if Putin so decides to escalate economically and cyber war, relying on #Maduro is risky.
15. The US isn’t pushing for diplomacy. That says to me that Putin has already cornered Biden’s strategy, because the US is exhibiting no assurance of an alternative path should Ukraine fall. That’s why it is only focusing on arming #Kiev rather than trying to end the conflict.
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My latest post on Distant Shores is centered upon the rise of India, our approach to the relationship, and what I feel Ashley Tellis’ (increasingly infamous) article in Foreign Affairs got right and what it got wrong. (1/x)
America’s relations with South Asia, long dominated by attention to Pakistan, has swung in recent years from the collective disillusionment of the War on Terror to fervent debate on Great Power preparations, and thus a newfound American fondness for India is rising. (2/x)
Foreign Affairs recently published Ashley Tellis’ “America’s Bad Bet on India”, that circulated widely for its assertion (implied rather obviously in title) that a security dependency on New Delhi is neither to be trusted nor likely fulfilled in a China conflict (3/x)
@VictorK1862@ElbridgeColby@BenjaminNorton 1. Info-Pacific is center of world economy. An Asian hegemon dominates world. 2. 🇨🇳 is biggest potential adversary we’ve ever had in Econ/Military terms. Seize 🇹🇼 & our critical trade partners 🇯🇵🇰🇷etc all must kowtow. 3. Chips are central to modern life; 🇹🇼 is central to chips.
@VictorK1862@ElbridgeColby@BenjaminNorton 4. PLAN has global aspirations. If the 1st island chain (of which Taiwan is linchpin) is punctured then picture a PRC fleet patrolling east coast of Japan, around Hawaii, and off Los Angeles. 5. If Taiwan is subsumed, then our bases in Indo-PAC are at extreme risk of first strike
@VictorK1862@ElbridgeColby@BenjaminNorton 6. Look at the impunity of China after COVID. Just imagine any other nation lying about a global pandemic that killed millions and basically getting off for free just due to size. China will only have more leverage & unrepentant about their misadventures, with Taiwan in pocket.