While #Iran and #Russia sanctions regimes are complex and comparison is hard #Iran sanctions are arguably more comprehensive. Critically its energy exports are sanctioned whereas #Russia's are relatively unfettered. Iran is a template for Russia sanctions not other way around. 2/
Now sanctions can be ratcheted up against #Iran in case of escalations by it on the nuclear issue b/c my sense is #Biden enforcement has slackened and EU and China can join. But there are reasons to doubt this will be a sufficient deterrent against Iranian nuclear escalation. 3/
First #Bennet assumes #Iran can live with a no-#JCPOA status-quo if deterred. But at least two forces would push #Raisi government toward nuclear escalation: (a) Its FP orientation and coalition drive it to be more assertive/not back down and (b) economic deterioration. 4/
Furthermore the US, EU, and China may think twice before tightening sanctions b/c this would necessarily have to include cracking down on covert Iranian oil exports that would reduce international supplies and further raise prices at a time when they're already unstable. 5/
The Islamic Republic may ultimately decide not undertake 90 percent enrichment as an international bright red line.
But have we forgotten that there are many other ways it can escalate, signaling strengthening of its nuclear threshold status, without crossing this red line? 6/
It can further increase its uranium stockpile enriched at different levels (incl. 60%), conduct experiments relevant to nuclear weapons design, reduce or end #IAEA monitoring and safeguards activities in Iran, test missiles/SLVs more relevant to ICBM development, etc. 7/
Second as with the experience of #Trump administration's maximum pressure campaign #Iran|ian retaliation may spillover outside the nuclear arena - especially if #Israel, certain GCC states, etc. are seen as having played a role in the failure of #JCPOA reimplementation talks. 8/
Circling back to my first tweet a no-#JCPOA scenario is unlikely to lead toward a stable equilibrium but rather one which will accelerate a the onset of a nuclear and further regional security crises. 9/9
3. How will it affect Iranian and regional politics? 1/
What does it mean for Iran's nuclear program? #Fakhrizadeh is said to have headed the AMAD plan: Scientific and technological projects allegedly aimed to give the IRI the capability to build a nuclear explosive device. This murder represents both practical and symbolic blows. 2/
We don't have full clarity on #Fakhrizadeh's current work and if he was indeed retired as some claim. But practically, if the IRI wanted to restart its alleged weaponization effort, his loss denies it an enormous technical-managerial talent who could have overseen/advised it. 3/
Excited to share my first piece in 18 months and in @ForeignPolicy, co-authored w/ Simon Miles, an assistant professor @DukeSanford, completing a book on US-Soviet relations during the early 1980s based on new Eastern bloc archival sources. 1/ foreignpolicy.com/2018/10/30/wha…
Context: @mike_giglio had an excellent piece last month on how the #Trump admin may be executing a strategy of "maximum pressure" against #Iran, partly inspired by the book "Victory" & its claim that Reagan used this strategy to defeat the Soviet Union. 2/ buzzfeednews.com/article/mikegi…
There's only one problem: "Victory" is not good history, to put it politely. The most basic critique is that the author didn't have access to US & Soviet archives when the book was published in 1994. You can find much harsher academic critiques online. 3/ amazon.com/dp/0871136333/…
New @nytimes piece captures recent wave of #Iran|ian nationalism, particularly among non-principlists (-conservatives), that seasoned analysts have been noting for some time. But there are some important caveats to consider. nytimes.com/2017/11/26/wor… 1/
Article starts w/ beheading of Mohsen Hojaji by #ISIL. Then, bizarrely, article attributes cause of nationalist wave to #Trump & #Saudi. ISIL carried out terrorist attack on #Tehran!!! It is arguably larger structural factor that triggered wave since 2014, but largely ignored! 2/
One piece of evidence given to prove #Trump & #Saudi have caused #Iran nationalist wave is popularity of #Soleimani & #Zarif. Only one problem: High favourability numbers for both predate Trump election & significantly heightened Iran-Saudi tensions iranpoll.com/publications/j… 3/