Thread by @ZimermanErik

Despite the fact that the much publicized #Ukrainian counter-offensive did not amount to anything, & the nearly equally reported encirclement of #Russian forces in NW #Kiev was completely false (as I estimated), the Russian forces have been withdrawing speedily from the area.

While the western media is conflating the 2 events, one actually delayed the other. #Russia announced the end of phase 1 & change of focus over 10 days ago. However, the Russian troops could not begin their withdrawal until the Ukrainian offensive was stopped. This is what

occurred and only after the failed offensive ran out of steam, did RU forces withdraw in good order. This is a complex & risky maneuver in itself, and it was done without units collapsing or being encircled. We also haven't seen equipment in significant amounts being left behind.

It is clear, the Russian withdrawal was intentional, pre-planned and well executed. The question now is to what end? First, we must recognize that while seizing #Kiev was not a "must" for Russian victory & likely not been seriously considered in Moscow since the very first few

days of the war (if it capitulated without much resistance of course RU forces were happy to roll in), surrounding it was. Russia was unable to surround #Chernihiv & cross the #Desna fast enough, secure the roads south to NE #Kiev, link up with the forces driving east from the

#Sumy region (likely the 20th Guards Combined Arms Army), which performed best along with forces in the south & out of #Crimea (such as the 58th CAA & the 8th Guards CAA). The same cannot be said for the 36th, 35th & 41st CAAs which spearheaded the failed encirclement of #Kiev &

tellingly are mostly Eastern Military District units (& some Central), while the better performing units are part of the more relevant Western & Southern Districts. The fact that the eastern district units were assigned to the drive on #Kiev either indicates grave arbitrary

planning or the kernel of truth in Russian claims that #Kiev was never the main thrust of the campaign, but meant only to tie up Ukrainian forces. I believe Russia hoped to at least encircle Kiev if not seize it in case that was feasible, but it goes without saying that a large

drive on the capital would shake the government (perhaps collapse it they hoped), attract the vast majority of available defense effort, and disturb reinforcement and supply of the other fronts. It is not hard to imagine the RU planners knew this, & also knew that Kiev was never

a likely possible territorial aim. Besides the units involved, another early indication of the nature of these plans is how Russia's behavior in towns, cities & villages. In the east they are "liberated" without question as part of Donetsk & Luhansk. In the south however, cities

such as #Melitopol & even #Kherson were being "integrated" from the outset. Rubles were brought in to banks, and Russia (or the #DPR) quickly established services. In the north meanwhile, despite vast swaths of Ukraine being cut off behind Russian lines, urban areas were largely

avoided and bypassed by RU forces. Larger towns even on critical supply line roads such as #Konotop were negotiated with, RU forces would not enter the town as long as there is no further resistance and the roads are open them. The Ukrainian flag remains hoisted. Despite all of

this, it is clear the Russian planners hoped for better results in the north & northwest. Had the forces on east bank coming from Belarus surrounded Chernihiv, and linked up with the forces driving west from Sumy at the Dnieper south of Kiev while the forces on the west bank

reached the #Dnieper south of #Kiev as well, the Russian victory would be total. Large parts of NE Ukraine would be cutoff along with the capital and large chunk of Ukraine's 1st rate units, in addition to the large territorial gains in the south and east. Ukraine's pool of

potential reserves would be significantly reduced, as would it logistical, industrial and economic capacity with Kiev surrounded. Russia could easily offer a withdrawal from these key areas for recognition of the territorial changes in the south and east. An even larger victory,

which I believed would actually be easier to achieve, though more daring & creative, would be a linkup from the south to the forces west of Kiev. I posted this map march 9 w/ some of these potential "victory" linkups. Red lines (green alternative) for complete victory, black ones

optimal additional ones and/or sufficient for a lesser victory. So why the reason for the Russian withdrawal? It seems simple enough. Their forces in the north had been in savage battle for about 40 days. Their elite units were battered in the early phase when the initial plan of

a quick Ukrainian collapse did not happen. Trying to take urban centers with only light infantry took a toll. Many airborne units barely were able to be rescued and link up with the main RU columns. After that they had battled the cold, snow, mud, flooded lands with endless river

crossings and a increasingly mobilized and western armed determined enemy. Russia's problem from the outset, is manpower, and the units could not be rotated while maintaining the front. No additional units were available to break through the increasingly entrenched Ukrainians.

Meanwhile, while they had terrified the Ukrainian state & threatened the capital for a month, they could not deliver the knockout blow. What they did achieve allowed a consolidation of SE Ukraine in Russian hands including the fall of #Mariupol and a solid landbridge to #Crimea.

The Ukrainian forces in Donetsk & Luhansk are pinned down in trench warfare & cannot maneuver, lest their lines collapse. But neither could the Russians. The lack of extra manpower means they cannot finish off the cauldrons they would like to close. Manpower would have been

released by the fall of Mariupol but the stubborn defense took too long. The lack of manpower was making all the Russian front line static, increasingly engaged in a war of attrition in which time works against her. Withdrawing from Kiev, while it carried with it risks, first of

collapse and encirclement, and secondly in morale as the world will report it as a defeat and withdrawal, solved many of these problems. The vast forces could rest and be restituted. Together with newly freed forced from Mariupol and a reported 10 newly raised BTGs, Russia now

once again has the freedom of action to strike where it wishes and maneuver strategically. While it is true that leaving the Kiev area frees up a lot of Ukrainian troops, the benefit is not equal. The Russians were at the end of a very long supply line at the start of the muddy

season. The Ukrainians near the west and at their capital. The Ukrainian forces have learned to defend, especially urban & entrenched positions but are still nowhere near the Russian level in maneuver & attack, especially in large formations. Will continue next post.