Thread by @BLSchmitt

🧵 [1] ALERT: Kremlin-controlled #Gazprom informed #Polish & #Bulgarian officials that it suspended natural gas deliveries to both countries, once again demonstrating how #Moscow continues to weaponize energy against Europe.

👇Details below & in thread👇

apnews.com/article/russia…

[2] 👀 First, the latest flow rates reported by the EU @ENTSOG natural gas network flow transparency portal. According to ENTSOG, Gazprom physical flows at the Kondratki entry point to the Yamal transmission pipeline at the Poland-Belarus border is near zero:

[3] 👀 Meanwhile, @ENTSOG shows the gas flows across at Strandzha-2 interconnector, the entry point of Gazprom’s #TurkStream2 pipeline to the Bulgarian gas transmission system operated by #Bulgartransgaz sharply decreasing in last few days:

[4] The supposed justification for cutoff by #Gazprom is refusal by Polish & Bulgarian energy entities to pay for gas deliveries in Russian roubles per a decree by Vladimir Putin on 23 March, requiring such a payment scheme from “unfriendly countries.”

apnews.com/article/russia…

[5] Poland’s state owned gas entity, @GK_PGNiG, issued a statement today confirming the “decree” by #Putin is not covered in the current Yamal gas transit contract & thus no justification for PGNiG to comply & has no payments due to Gazprom at this time:

en.pgnig.pl/investor-relat…

[6] The #Kremlin move has dual purposes:

◾️To attempt to prop up rouble value by intimidating other #European gas buyers to settle energy payments in the Russian currency.

◾️To reinforce EU concerns over broader Russian energy cutoffs to deter nations from supporting #Ukraine.

[7] For #Poland itself, short & long term energy security impact is blunted by Polish policy actions. Immediately, with the end of the heating season & Poland’s 3.5 bcm capacity storage is 76% full, Warsaw won’t need to cut domestic energy consumption.

reuters.com/world/europe/r…

[8] Longer term, Poland has already committed to ending imports of Russian gas by end of 2022, when its long-developed diversification project - the Norway-Denmark-Poland #BalticPipe project comes online coupled with its LNG capacity at its Swinoujscie terminal.

[9] Bulgarian officials stated short term energy restrictions aren’t likely. But impact of these cutoffs to downstream customers is still unclear. Ex: #Germany gets gas via Yamal but gas still flowing via #NordStream1 & via 🇺🇦. But regional security of supply issues could arise.

[10] Which brings us back to the beginning of this thread:

Just as it has for many years, the #Kremlin is weaponizing energy in order to coerce political concessions from European democracies, in this case to deter them from supporting Ukrainian sovereignty as Russia attacks 🇺🇦.

[11] This is exactly why analysis arguing why the Kremlin-backed #NordStream2 pipeline was such a “bad deal for Europe” (as @POTUS @JoeBiden first stated in 2016) & needed to be stopped via sanctions & EU regulatory action is once again validated.

#NS2 is #NotJustACommercialDeal

[12] Thankfully, months of US & EU diplomacy (led by @amoshochstein) worked to identify immediate-term substitute gas volumes from global LNG suppliers for such a scenario, underscoring the vital need for energy security to be a central component of national security strategies.

[13] Beyond the immediate-term, this weaponization of natural gas exports by the #Putin regime further underscores the necessity to take action *now* to both end EU imports of Russian oil/gas & invest in diversification infrastructure at a wartime level of effort and speed.

[14] How? Check out a report that I’ve coauthored with many leading experts from the International Working Group on Russia Sanctions, coordinated by @FSIStanford @McFaul outlining an urgent comprehensive energy sanctions package on the Putin regime.
@CEPA

fsi.stanford.edu/working-group-…

[15] Some highlights of urgent #Russia energy sanctions measures suggested to be taken in the Working Group report, include:

[16] Expanded oil and gas sanctions, including a full embargo as soon as possible on Russian hydrocarbon exports to global democracies:

[17] Holding the EU to its commitments to reduce & end natural gas imports from Russia, as well as establishing near-term dates to end Russian gas export to the EU via the #NordStream1, #TurkStream2, & Yamal-Europe pipelines & energy security infrastructure development:

[18] Use all EU- & national-level legal mechanisms, including regulations within the EU Third Energy Package, to terminate any partial or majority ownership positions currently held by #Russian state-owned-enterprises in critical #European energy infrastructure installations:

[19]🚢 Increase sanctions to limit the ability of the Russian shipping sector to export hydrocarbon & other critical resources to global markets, by sanctioning Russian shipping majors, as well as increasing sanctions on international insurance & maritime certification providers:

[20] Sanction all members of governing boards of Russian state-owned enterprises, regardless of citizenship, & pass measures to make it legally impossible for former Western government officials to work for Russian state-owned enterprises:

[21] These steps might not sound easy, but Ukraine defending the west from authoritarianism isn’t easy either!

It’s what’s needed to finally break the Kremlin’s energy leverage over Western democracies & urgently support Ukraine to win its fight against Russian aggression. [END]