Thread by @ZimermanErik

Now that #Popasna has fallen & the #Siverskyi Donets has been crossed, #Russia is poised to finish the first dramatic encirclement of the war. Any UA troops not falling back to at least the Bakhmut-Siversk line & better the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk-Toretsk line will be surrounded.

They cannot withdraw too fast, & without holding the line because then the front will collapse into a rout, as the RU forces press from the east. Remains to be seen if we see a collapse or an orderly withdrawal but question first is which route #Russia will take?

In general it will continue to take the path of least resistance. It will bypass major roads, fortifications & cities when possible. However it will also be bound by roads and the rail lines in its strategy not only for its own supply but also to cut it off from the #Ukrainians.

The most obvious path cannot be taken. Finishing the capture of #Lyman, which is a rail hub, advancing towards Slovyansk, then SE towards Bakhmut, which would be attacked from #Popasna. This would secure major supply routes, encircle a large area & most importantly cut off large

number of UA forces by simply taking #Bakhmut. Not only the cauldron's forces, but the fortified positions south of the city, and threaten to cut off more on the Horlivka front. The problem with this route is that the way from Popasna to Bakhmut is heavily fortified.

These fortifications can be seen on Images from Google that predate the conflict. Fortification on this front by #Ukraine has been ongoing since 2014. The way looks like this. Since it is an obvious route it may be heavily fortified. After all this, #Bakhmut is a large city which

at this war's pace, would take a long time to capture if previous cities of similar size are any guide. This is why, if #Russia wishes to cut off the transportation hub that is #Bakhmut, it is best to do so by going around it. From either any and/or all sides. Most of the

fortifications on the Popasna Bakhmut road "face" south & don't expect an attack from the east & less from the north, which would help somewhat. The bridge at Raihorodok, in order to advance from the north & Lyman towards Slovyansk was blown by UA, and the area also fortified.

On the other hand, the road north from #Popansa is clear of entrenchments, both in Google sat images and more recent ones up to Feb of this year. Towards #Komyshuvakha we will likely see. Especially due to the lowest hanging fruit. As the first image in the thread shows, taking 2

of these three strategic intersections cuts off the #Lysychansk #Severodonetsk cauldron & also the smaller #Hirske salient with its strong fortified positions and rail line which connects south towards Popansa and north towards the rest of #Lugansk.

Not as good as a hermetic encirclement, supply & troop movements will still be possible, but only in much smaller scales and very difficult & dangerous. Major cities of Luhansk like Hirske, Lysychansk & Severedonetsk will have no road or rail connection to the rest of #Ukraine,

and nor will the UA troops in the cauldron. The distance from north #Popansa, now in RU hands to the critical junction at Vrubivka is only about 9 km. From Bilohorivka to the key junction less than 7 km, & from Serebryanka to Siversk (along the road) less than 9.

The lowest hanging fruit for #Russia are these junctions. There are a few different options for this small encirclement as the first image shows, with my preferences, but going at least for the junctions together with #Azovstal's final fall are monumental for the rest of the war.

#Ukraine cannot afford to lose the brigades in the cauldron, nor to free up the #Russian forces trying to encircle them as well as those surrounding #Azovstal. Together with the shortening of the border, the subsequent #Russian advances & encirclements will become easier.

So far, we have not seen evidence of strategic moves by #Ukraine to counter this. They remain as always focused on PR & hoping other countries will come to their aid. They may simply reduce the number of troops inside the cauldron, leave enough to maintain resistance, stockpiled

supplies and attempt to escape to a fallback line with the rest (which will suffer in artillery and air strikes as they move). If is the case, it is not imaginative enough and once again sacrifices UA's troops in suicide (or POW) missions along with hundreds of thousands of

civilians left cut off along with them. It means neither retreat, surrender nor attempt at victory but once again simply leaves their foe (Russia) no option other than defeat or to engage in destruction of urban areas where the UA troops chose to fortify & wait.

But in this case we will find that trenches in #Donbass are not the same as bunkers in #Azovstal, and regular UA troops, rightly dismayed with their command, are not #Azov fighters. Retreat and surrender, with and without #Kiev's permission, will be more & more commonplace.