Thread by @JJSchroden

Yesterday @SIGARHQ posted an interim version of its report titled "Collapse of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: An Assessment of the Factors That Led to Its Demise"

In this thread, I'll summarize the report's main findings & offer some thoughts. 1/n

@SIGARHQ (You can find the full version of the interim report here: sigar.mil/pdf/evaluation…) 2/n

@SIGARHQ First, on scoping: @SIGARHQ was directed by Congress to "examine the factors that contributed to the #ANDSF’s collapse, including the underlying factors over the past 20 years that resulted in the underdevelopment of ANDSF military and police capabilities" 3/n

@SIGARHQ 2nd on goals of the report: (1) determine the factors behind the #ANDSF’s collapse; (2) assess underlying factors since 2001 that contributed to the underdevelopment of ANDSF capabilities & readiness; (3) account for US-provided equip & US-trained ANDSF personnel if possible. 4/n

@SIGARHQ IRT goal #1, @SIGARHQ ID'd 6 factors:
1. The US-#Taliban agreement & subsequent withdrawal announcement undercut #ANDSF morale
2. The US military decreased its level of support to the ANDSF overnight after the US-TB agreement (e.g., by immediately reducing airstrikes) 5/n

@SIGARHQ 3. The US never developed the #ANDSF to be self-sustaining & they remained heavily reliant on US support
4. President @ashrafghani undercut the #ANDSF by frequently changing leaders & making a host of other bad decisions 6/n

@SIGARHQ @ashrafghani 5. The #Afghanistan govt never created a security plan for the post-US withdrawal era
6. The #Taliban's campaign effectively exploited the #ANDSF's primary weaknesses 7/n

@SIGARHQ @ashrafghani .@SIGARHQ also ID'd 9 contributing factors from the past 20 years:
1. No single country or agency had complete ownership of #ANDSF development
2. The length of US commitment did not reflect the actual time required to build an entire security sector 8/n

@SIGARHQ @ashrafghani 3. Advisors were often ill-trained & inexperienced for their mission, and personnel rotations impeded institutional memory
4. The US created long-term dependencies by taking over equip procurement for the ANDSF & providing advanced equipment it could not independently sustain 9/n

@SIGARHQ @ashrafghani 5. From 2009-2014, the US military struggled to balance the competing goals of improving security to allow for a US drawdown w/developing self-sustaining #ANDSF capabilities
6. US metrics created to measure the development of the ANDSF were insufficient 10/n

@SIGARHQ @ashrafghani 7. The US & Afghan govts failed to develop a police force effective at providing justice & responding to criminal activities that plagued the daily lives of Afghan citizens
8. Afghan government corruption harmed #ANDSF capabilities and morale 11/n

@SIGARHQ @ashrafghani 9. Afghan officials lacked ownership of military strategies and access to critically important tracking and accountability systems

These are enormously important factors in their own right, as they lit the match, added the kindling & poured gas on the fire over the years

12/n

@SIGARHQ @ashrafghani Headlines about the report so far have focused on its opening statement that "the single most important factor in the #ANDSF’s collapse in August 2021 was the U.S. decision to withdraw military forces and contractors from #Afghanistan" 13/n

npr.org/2022/05/18/109…

@SIGARHQ @ashrafghani I disagree w/that framing. The 6 main factors that @SIGARHQ identified correctly ascribe agency to the 3 main players: the US, the govt of @ashrafghani & the #Taliban. All three made choices that led directly to the collapse of the #ANDSF. 14/n

@SIGARHQ @ashrafghani But I see no analytical justification to say that any one of the 6 main factors ID'd by @SIGARHQ was more important than the others. The argument seems to be that if the US hadn't withdrawn as it did, the #ANDSF wouldn't have collapsed. 15/n

@SIGARHQ @ashrafghani But one can vary the other factors & make similar arguments of their importance: if the #Taliban had conducted an incompetent campaign instead of a brilliant one, the #ANDSF might've prevailed. If @ashrafghani had made courageous decisions instead of cowardly ones, the same. 16/n

@SIGARHQ @ashrafghani The collapse of the #ANDSF can't be pinned solely on the US nor on any single factor. As I said in my own previous examination of lessons from their collapse: "The ANDSF’s failure had many fathers." 17/n

ctc.usma.edu/lessons-from-t…

@SIGARHQ @ashrafghani This is an important distinction, b/c it prevents us from singularly assigning blame to something like the US-#Taliban agreement or the people (eg Trump, Biden, Zal) who negotiated & implemented it--and then moving on, satisfied in our shaming of them. 18/n

@SIGARHQ @ashrafghani The #ANDSF's failure demands more than that. It demands accountability of key decisions & those who made them, for sure, but those decisions extend further back & further down than Presidents. & it demands change to the processes & institutions that generated those decisions 19/n

@SIGARHQ @ashrafghani The report's conclusion provides more nuance on these points than its summary. Final sentence: "Unless the US govt understands & accounts for what went wrong, why it went wrong & how it went wrong in #Afghanistan, it will likely repeat the same mistakes in the next conflict" 20/n

@SIGARHQ @ashrafghani On that point at least, @SIGARHQ and I are in perfect agreement. 21/21

(PS: In full transparency, @SIGARHQ interviewed me for the report last NOV. I did this on the record, which resulted in me being quoted several times in the report.)

(PPS: I meant to say this in my thread but forgot—@SIGARHQ & @JamesC0706 (as usual) did a *great job* of uncovering really interesting & important new details, esp about the tactical implications of the US-#Taliban agreement to US forces, the #ANDSF & the TB. My thx for those!)