@MaltaGov That Syrians are still fleeing for #Europe is no surprise, particularly those in #Lebanon where authorities are preparing to *illegally force* them back to #Syria.
5+ million #Syria refugees remain in neighboring states & polling suggests ~0.5% would consider an eventual return.
@MaltaGov Why do almost all #Syria refugees refuse to consider any future return to #Syria?
The answer is obvious when you glance across basic facts -- see this thread from last week:
- x1 more child died yesterday (3 total, now)
- Contact with the ~60 passengers was lost overnight
- #Malta has banned a cargo ship from rescuing the boat & has refused to help itself.
WTH.
@MaltaGov Under intense pressure - particularly by foreign diplomats - #Lebanon detained x5 security officers yesterday for torturing a #Syria refugee to death.
He died of "severe torture" within 3hrs of his arrest on unknown charges.
And you wonder why Syrians are fleeing on boats?
@MaltaGov UPDATE -- 63 surviving passengers from a boat of migrants from #Syria & #Lebanon were finally rescued late Tuesday, not by #Malta but a cargo ship ("BBC Pearl").
A 4yr old girl died shortly after the rescue.
They issued an SOS on Saturday -- but were ignored for 4 days.
NEW -- 250 [mostly #Syria] refugees are stranded on a boat that left #Lebanon a week ago headed towards #Europe. A 3-month old girl has died of dehydration.
The boat has run out of fuel, food & water & is stranded in the #Mediterranean, off the coast of #Malta & #Greece.
The situation in regime-controlled areas of #Syria is deteriorating exponentially -- spiraling inflation, cholera outbreak, continued insecurity, political persecution & corruption.
Refugees are not returning & they will not return -- so #Europe is once again a live destination.
Renewed large-scale #Syria refugee movement is now a very realistic possibility -- and the international community *must* acknowledge why:
#Assad's regime remains in place, unchallenged & undeterred.
It's a simple truth, but all too easy to ignore, as it has been for 11yrs now.
Though a minor player compared to #Europe, the U.S. role in taking in #Syria refugees has been appalling -- from 2021-22, we've taken ~3,800.
Interesting -- #Russia says U.S. MQ-9 Reaper drones have been flying over [#Assad-held] al-Sukhna in #Homs in recent days & on July 27, they nearly collided with Russian jets.
Treat the latter with skepticism, but ISR over Sukhna is significant -- a 🧵.
#Syria's airspace is delineated by deconfliction lines (i.e. defined areas of responsibility), agreed upon by #Russia & U.S.
CENTCOM has been increasingly concerned about #ISIS's recovery in the #Assad-held central desert & al-Sukhna has been key to that.
It's an open secret that subtle US ISR & occasional unacknowledged night-time SOF actions take place in the #Assad-held badiya -- but for #Russia to highlight MQ-9s being an issue is illustrative of (a) an increase amid (b) a failed regime "clearance operation."
Gathering from media reports, statements & leaks, #Israel's response to #Hezbollah's deadly attack on #MajdalShams is coming & it'll be bigger than anything we've seen in #Lebanon since October 2023.
It's a matter of time; a brief 🧵:
#Israel has already gone after key #Hezbollah operational 'HVTs' -- but not *the* leadership. #Beirut remains untouched (as does airport) & #Hezbollah's network of military bases, facilities & missile depots further north. Such strategic targets seem likely.
The key will be hitting #Hezbollah where it hurts, without triggering an existential response & a cycle of uncontrollable escalation -- a hard balance to strike.
Neither side wants all-out war, yes -- but domestically, #Israel has to & will escalate next.
#Israel's strike in #Damascus today is a huge development & a major escalation.
3 #IRGC-QF Generals:
- Brig. Gen. Mohammed Zahedi (Commander, #Syria & #Lebanon)
- Gen. Hossein Aminullah (Chief of General Staff, #Syria & #Lebanon)
- Maj. Gen. Haj Rahimi (Commander, Palestine)
Since the Feb 7 U.S. strike in #Baghdad, we've had zero confirmed #Iran proxy attacks on U.S. bases in #Iraq & #Syria.
It's quite likely that freeze could now end. The #IRGC has often used U.S. "soft targets" in #Iraq & #Syria as one form of retaliation for #Israel's actions.
For months, Iranian ballistic missiles, cruise missiles & suicide drones have targeted Israeli & U.S. targets in #Iraq, #Syria, the Gulf & #Israel itself -- but all launched from outside #Iran's territory.
There's not nearly enough appreciation of how #ISIS's branches have increased & enhanced their interconnectivity over the past ~18 months.
From #Africa, through the #MiddleEast & into South & SE Asia, lines of logistics, recruitment, financing & plotting overlap more than ever.
Multiple #ISIS wilayat in #Africa have recruitment & logistics lines running into #Europe & #ISIS finance bodies in #Africa have been supporting operatives as far as #Afghanistan.
Recent #ISIS plots in #Europe have been tied back to #Africa, the #MiddleEast & #Afghanistan.
In 2023, multiple #ISIS-related attack plots were foiled in northern #Europe -- most unreported, almost all linked to #ISKP.
BUT, those #ISKP plots were 1st detected *outside* #Afghanistan, underlining the group's transnational reach -- as I wrote here:
Since 2012, #Iran has been building & consolidating a formidable network of proxies across #Syria & #Iraq -- dozens of groups & 150,000+ members, all financed, trained & armed by the #IRGC.
In #Syria, they engaged in ethnic cleansing & war crimes -- completely unchallenged.
During the formative years of 2012-16, #Obama's admin consciously ignored the #IRGC's militia surge in #Syria -- dismissing it as unimportant to U.S. interests.
In 2015, orders were even granted for U.S. forces to deconflict & coordinate with #Iran's proxies in #Iraq, vs. #ISIS.
For a time ('15-17), U.S. forces fighting #ISIS in #Iraq were effectively told to coordinate with the very same groups who'd killed 100s of U.S. troops from '03-'10 & who are again back to targeting us today.
What a staggering indictment of U.S. inconsistency & ill-judgment.
The same has been true in #Syria, #Yemen & many other acute conflict zones.
The @StateDept has told Congress the #Gaza HM data is an undercount. Why? Because in every previous conflict its data has been +/- 1-3% off post-conflict analysis by #Israel, the U.S., the EU & the UN.
@StateDept Are #Hamas combatant casualties being accurately acknowledged? Clearly not — but that doesn’t affect civilian casualty rates.
With ~20,000 strikes in 6 weeks, much in dense urban environments, it’s hardly surprising that ~15,000 civilians would be dead.