September 15 Assessment Highlight
Reporting from @RFERL indicates the #Kremlin has almost certainly drained a large proportion of the forces originally stationed in Russian bases in former Soviet states, likely weakening Russian influence in those states. rferl.org/a/russia-troop…
Reporting from @RFERL indicates the #Kremlin has almost certainly drained a large proportion of the forces originally stationed in Russian bases in former Soviet states, likely weakening Russian influence in those states. rferl.org/a/russia-troop…
The Russian military has already deployed some 1500 Russian personnel from Russia’s 201st Military Base in Dushanbe, #Tajikistan, to #Ukraine and plans to deploy 600 more personnel from facilities in Dushanbe and Bokhatar, a southern Tajik city, in the future, @RFERL reported. 2/
@RFERL additionally reported on September 13 that Russia has likely redeployed approximately 300 Tuvan troops from the Russian Kant Air Base in #Kyrgyzstan to fight in Ukraine at varying points since late 2021. 3/ rferl.org/a/russia-kyrgy…
The withdrawals from the Central Asian states are noteworthy in the context of border clashes between #Kyrgyzstan and #Tajikistan, assesses @TheStudyofWar. Tajik and Kyrgyz border guards exchanged fire in three separate incidents on September 14. 4/
More: isw.pub/RusCampaignSep…
More: isw.pub/RusCampaignSep…
The uptick in violence between #Tajikistan and #Kyrgyzstan, both of which are members of the Russian-controlled Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), comes alongside renewed aggression by Azerbaijan against #CSTO member state #Armenia. 5/ 
Russian forces also withdrew 800 personnel from #Armenia early in the war to replenish losses in #Ukraine, as @TheStudyofWar previously reported here: isw.pub/RusCampaignSep… 6/
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