Ireland, like almost all the other other interveners, invokes both its right to intervene pursuant to art 63 of the ICJ Statute as well as the nature of the obligations found in the Genocide Convention to justify its intervention. 2/
Ireland (only) invokes two provisions of the Convention as those it seeks to give its construction on: art I (prevention and punishment of genocide) and art IX (compromissory clause). 3/
On art I, presumably addressing Russia's contention in its communication that its "genocide" allegations do not concern "genocide" under Convention, 🇮🇪 argues that a party to Convention purporting to prevent "genocide" is understood to be purporting to act under the Convention.4/
Citing standards sources on reasonable and good faith application of treaties, it then argues that action purporting to prevent genocide on false claims is unreasonable and subverts Convention's object & purpose, violating obligation to interpret and apply in good faith. 5/
Moving on to art IX, it first seeks to define "dispute", quoting from a line of cases which have elaborated on this concept. Without much more, it concludes that "these criteria are clearly met in the present case". 6/
Ireland then considers the extent of jurisdiction. It argues that the Convention need not necessarily be invoked for dispute to arise regarding acts prohibited or required under Convention.
It notes the wording of art IX is non-exhaustive... 7/
...thus extending to disputes on prevention of genocide.
Finally, like several other interveners, it points to the "any of the parties" formula in art IX as providing also the party accused of committing genocide the right to seise the Court. 8/
To conclude, Ireland's declaration is brief and at times quite assertive or laconic, such as how subverting object and purpose of Convention constitutes a violation of the Convention (rather than an external obligation) or how there is "clearly" a dispute between the parties. 9/
Ultimately, these are issues which Ireland can elaborate upon if admitted as an intervener, or perhaps will suffice with its contentions on these issues being "grouped" (the vague term other interveners alluded to) with other interveners making similar arguments. 10/10
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Both 🇫🇮🇪🇪 invoke their right of intervention under art 63 and the nature of obligations enshrined in Genocide Convention. 🇪🇪 also invokes J Cançado Trindade's opinion in Whaling case underlying importance of intervention for treaties where collective interests are concerned. 2/
🇫🇮🇪🇪 also consider capacity to intervene on jurisdictional issues, noting art 63 does not distinguish between different phases. They refer both to Judge Schwebel's opinion in the Nicaragua case and to leading treatises on the subject to justify intervention on such issues. 3/
To begin all three states invoke their "right" to intervene under art 63 of the Statute, while Denmark and Italy also invoke the nature of obligations in the Genocide Convention. All three also try to add their respective personal touches. 2/
🇵🇱 invokes its "history of supporting efforts to prevent and punish genocide", following "genocide perpetrated on Polish nationals during [WWII] by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union (the predecessor of [Russia])", while noting Soviet perpetrators were never held to account. 3/
Starting off, France invokes its right to intervene under art 63 of the Statute, while also underlining the legal nature of the obligations under the Genocide Convention (no personal touch but does later quote the Court observing the prohibition on genocide is peremptory(!)). 2/
As for the provisions of the Genocide Convention it seeks to offer its construction, by reference to Ukraine's application France cites arts I, II, IV, VIII, IX. 3/
To begin, Romania's declaration is very much to-the-point. While it does underline the importance of the Genocide Convention, it doesn't expand so much beyond the Statute's requirements for justifying its intervention. 2/
As for the provisions it plans to offer its construction on, Romania cites arts IX (compromissory clause) and I (prevention and punishment), the latter in turn necessitating interpretation of arts II, III, VIII. 3/
As is becoming routine for these interventions, Sweden invokes both its "right" to intervene under art 63 of the Statute and the nature of the obligations under the Genocide Convention (though first to cite Judge Cançado Trindade's sep op in the Whaling case order). 2/
For its personal touch, Sweden invokes itself being a "a keen proponent of a rules-based world order", finding that "it is necessary for it to intervene in this case, in order to place its interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Convention". 3/
In its opening remarks, the #US follows the trend of other states by invoking its right of intervention under art 63, but also underlining the erga omnes partes nature of the Genocide Convention obligations. 2/
For its personal touch, US underlines its involvement in developing the Convention and pointing to its past invocation of art VIII regarding Darfur (recourse to UN organs) and its support [yes, I know] for tribunals prosecuting genocide and other crimes. 3/