🧵The Russian defeat in #Kharkiv Oblast and #Lyman, combined with the #Kremlin’s failure to conduct partial mobilization effectively and fairly are fundamentally changing the Russian information space. isw.pub/RusCampaignOct2
https://twitter.com/TheStudyofWar/status/1576777811053801472
2/ #Kremlin-sponsored media & Russian milbloggers – a prominent Telegram community composed of Russian war correspondents, former proxy officials, & nationalists – are grieving the loss of #Lyman while simultaneously criticizing the bureaucratic failures of partial mobilization.
3/ #Kremlin sources and milbloggers are attributing the defeat around #Lyman and #Kharkiv Oblast to Russian military failures to properly supply and reinforce Russian forces in northern #Donbas and complaining about the lack of transparency regarding the progress of the war.
4/ Some guests on heavily-edited Kremlin television programs even criticized #Putin’s decision to annex four Ukrainian oblasts before securing their administrative borders or the frontline, expressing doubts about Russia’s ability ever to occupy the entirety of these territories.
5/ #Kremlin propagandists no longer conceal their disappointment in the conduct of the partial mobilization, frequently discussing the illegal mobilization of some men and noting issues such as alcoholism among newly mobilized forces. isw.pub/RusCampaignOct2
6/ Some speaking on live television have expressed the concern that mobilization will not generate the force necessary to regain the initiative on the battlefield, given the poor quality of Russian reserves. isw.pub/RusCampaignOct2
7/ The Russian information space has significantly deviated from the narratives preferred by the #Kremlin and the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) that things are generally under control. isw.pub/RusCampaignOct2
8/ #Putin relies on controlling the information space in #Russia to safeguard his regime much more than on the kind of massive oppression apparatus the Soviet Union used, making disorder in the information space potentially even more dangerous to Putin than it was to the Soviets.
9/ #Putin never rebuilt the internal repression apparatus the Soviets had in the KGB, Interior Ministry forces, & Red Army to the scale required to crush domestic opposition by force. He's not until recently even imposed the extreme censorship that characterized the Soviet state.
10/ Chechen leader Ramzan #Kadyrov and Wagner Private Military Company financier Evgeniy #Prigozhin have further damaged the Kremlin’s vulnerable narratives during and after the fall of Lyman. Their statements likely publicly undermined Putin’s leadership, possibly inadvertently.
11/ #Putin likely recognizes the dangerous path #Kadyrov and #Prigozhin had begun to walk, prompting push-back by #Kremlin-controlled voices and milbloggers against the direct critiques of military commanders. isw.pub/RusCampaignOct2
12/ #Putin has not previously censored nationalist milblogger figures, #Kadyrov, war correspondents, and former proxy officials, likely because he has seen them as voices pushing for his preferred policies that Russians willing to support him are more likely to trust.
13/ The milblogger community may begin to undermine #Putin’s narratives to his core audience amidst the defeats and failures of the Russian war in #Ukraine, however, especially as their narratives spread to mainstream #Kremlin-controlled outlets. isw.pub/RusCampaignOct2
14/ It remains to be seen how much #Putin will tolerate and what will happen if and when he attempts to shut down the milbloggers and their critiques, increasingly of his own decisions, that he has allowed for the moment to circulate in #Russia. isw.pub/RusCampaignOct2
• • •
Missing some Tweet in this thread? You can try to
force a refresh
