With higher expected #inflation workers demand higher wages.
Hence companies are forced to raise consumer prices.
3/17
This way high #inflation feeds into itself through wage spirals that were common in the 1970s (Arthur Burns).
At that time #inflation expectations were unanchored.
With #CPI eclipsing 9% for the first time since the 1980s the #Fed feared wage spirals could reappear today.
4/17
But #inflation expectations have remained anchored.
5y5y forward inflation expectation rate never spiked above 2.67%, lower than the 2010-2014 period.
Similarly, UoM 5yr consumer inflation expectations never went above 3.1%, lower than 2008/2011.
5/17
Also UoM 1yr consumer inflation expectations peaked at 5.4% in the neighborhood of 2008 levels.
5.4% is much lower than in the late 1970s/early 1980s when the #Fed's Paul Volcker was forced to hike aggressively (above 19%) to tame the wild #inflation expectations near 10%.
6/17
The #Fed expects a wage growth of 3-4% to be consistent with 2% #inflation.
With #inflation expectations anchored, LT wage is constant so we can remove them out of the equation to reflect:
wage growth = -f(UR)
Explanation: Lower UR increases wage growth and vice versa.
7/17
NAIRU (non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment) is UR at which #inflation is at 2% and wage growth is 3-4%.
Equation accounted for NAIRU:
wage growth = -f(UR-NAIRU)
Explanation: If UR>NAIRU wage growth is lower than 3-4% and vice versa.
8/17
Equation can be rearranged to account for #inflation:
core PCE = -f(UR-NAIRU) + inflation expectations
(just like with wages, inflation expectations can be omitted if anchored)
Explanation: If UR<NAIRU core #PCE (#PCE ex food, energy and supply side!)>2% and vice versa.
9/17
The #Fed thinks UR is currently below NAIRU bc: 1) core #PCE is above 2% and 2) UR is low by historical standards.
This view is problematic bc: 1) official core #PCE doesn't exclude supply driven components and 2) UR had been lower in the past (1948, 1951-1953, 1968-1969)
10/17
About 70% of the #CPI is not demand-driven (energy, food and supply side).
If we apply the same % to the #PCE, then we come to a conclusion that most of the core #PCE is not even driven by low UR.
Yet the #Fed want's UR to rise to 4.5%, 0.5 pp above their NAIRU estimate.
11/17
The #Fed sees NAIRU at 4% and UR has been below 4% almost YTD (since Feb).
In Aug and Sep AHE fell to 3.6% annualized.
Wage growth returning to levels consistent with 2% #inflation when UR<NAIRU is inconsistent with the Phillips Curve (NAIRU) theory.
12/17
If NAIRU is not at 4% like the #Fed thinks, but lower, say 3-3.5%, this could explain the move lower in wage growth.
Or it could be that NAIRU theory is flawed like some have suggested over the years.
Either way, this shows that low UR is mostly not driving #inflation.
13/17
The #Fed's problems: 1) they are following lagging indicators (#CPI, NFPs) to see where the #inflation is/going 2) they think they need to increase UR to 4.5% to decrease #inflation 3) by front-loading rate hikes they are not respecting time lags
1) Food decelerated a bit to +0.7% MoM from +0.8% in Aug 2) Energy a bit slower downward than one would expect due to unexpectedly higher gas prices (+2.6% vs -10.6% Henry Hub Natural Gas Spot Price - this would need to be reflected in Oct) 3) Core mixed but positive bias
2/9
ONLY 2 categories with faster MoM #inflation:
a) Apparel (surprising rise from +1.7% in Aug to +2.2%) and
b) Transportation Services (decline in airline fares ended which couldn't offset faster vehicle maintenance and insurance #inflation - trans.serv. +1.7% vs -0.2% in Aug)
3/9
Sth possibly breaking in the #UK, European financial system ( $CS, $DB...), #RBA pivoting by hiking less than expected, higher financial risk in the #US...
And every important economic indicator warranted the #Fed#pivot.
2/25
But the #Fed decided to turn the blind eye to the #economy in an effort to try to regain some of the credibility they lost last yr by "transitory" talk.
So instead of amending things, they have made another policy error.
LT #CPI average (1914-present) is 3.3% which is 63%! higher than 2%.
The #Fed prefers core #PCE as a measure of #inflation bc it's generally much less volatile than #CPI.
2/14
As repeatedly said, the #Fed targets core #PCE at 2% not #CPI.
Currently #CPI is almost twice as high as core #PCE.
In theory, it's possible for #CPI to be c4% when core #PCE drops to 2% but their gap will likely narrow as both go down towards the end of 2022 and in 2023.