#IranProtests highlight how the regime has prepared itself to brutally crack down on its people. These protests also highlight the cracks in the regime’s security apparatus. A thread: 1/7 #مهسا_امینی#سنندج
The regime has optimized its internal security apparatus to preempt and violently suppress protests. The regime uses a three-pronged counter-protest strategy to achieve this effect. 2/7
The regime relies most heavily on force to suppress protests. It uses a cohesive and ideological network of military and paramilitary units to do so. This approach is currently on display in the regime’s brutal crackdown in #Sanandaj. 3/7
These different security services support one another, working together to suppress different kinds of internal threats. This is why reports of dissent and low morale among security forces is so threatening to the regime. 4/7
The regime deploys the IRGC Ground Forces when it considers protests existential. These forces operate conventional units in cities, focused on fighting Iran’s people rather than foreign enemies. The use of these forces in Sanandaj reflects how concerned Iran’s leaders are. 5/7
This thread is the first in a series from CTP that will explore the structure of the Iranian internal security apparatus, its strengths, and weaknesses. 7/7
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CTP’s third thread on #Iran’s state security services discusses some of its vulnerabilities – an expansion on yesterday’s thread on the structure and organization of these security forces. 1/7
The regime’s first major challenge is ensuring the ideological commitment and subordination of its security forces. The regime has seen dissent and defections among low-level security personnel in almost every major protest movement since 1979. 2/7
This dissent and defections have never been large-scale, but have alarmed the regime enough that they have developed increasingly ideological and well-trained forces, such as the LEC Special Units and elite Basij personnel, for protest suppression. 3/7
NEW | #Russia is intensifying efforts to set information conditions to falsely portray #Ukraine as a terrorist state to deflect recent calls to designate Russia as a terrorist state. Read today’s update from CTP and @TheStudyofWar: criticalthreats.org/analysis/russi…
#Russian sources claimed that #Ukrainian troops continued counteroffensive operations toward #Svatove and #Kreminna. Russian forces are continuing defensive operations in this area.
#Russian sources continued to claim that #Ukrainian forces are conducting ground attacks in northwestern and western #Kherson Oblast.
Supreme Leader Ali #Khamenei addressed the #Iranian protests publicly for the second time on October 12, reiterating his accusation that foreign enemies are responsible for the unrest. criticalthreats.org/analysis/iran-…
#Khamenei likely sought to reaffirm to the political and security establishment his approval of the brutal crackdown while portraying strength. 2/4
Other #Iranian officials are following Khamenei’s lead, ignoring protester grievances and boasting of their tools of repression. 3/4
Our second thread on the Iranian state security services explores their structure and organization. Here is what you need to know as #Iran experiences its fourth consecutive week of protests. 1/13 #مهسا_امینی
The regime has built a multilayered security apparatus of military and paramilitary units charged with social control. These units have varying levels of military and ideological training. They cooperate to manage different threats and repress protests. 2/13
The Law Enforcement Command (LEC) is the first layer of the regime’s internal defenses. It is the national police force and performs regular police missions while also controlling social unrest. 3/13
#Russian sources claimed that #Ukrainian troops continued ground attacks in northern and western #Kherson Oblast. 2/4
#Russian sources claimed that #Ukrainian forces continued to conduct counteroffensives east of the #Oskil River and in the direction of Kreminna-Svatove. 3/4
Simultaneous protests in the border areas and major cities strain these forces—a vulnerability that protesters and other anti-regime groups may seek to exploit. 2/5
Unobserved indications that the security forces are experiencing bandwidth issues include: 3/5