.@SkyNews reported on November 8 that #Russia flew 140M euros, a selection of captured NLAW and Javelin anti-tank missiles, and a Stinger anti-aircraft missile to #Tehran on August 20 in exchange for 160 additional Shahed-136 drones for use in #Ukraine. news.sky.com/story/russia-g…
2/ Meanwhile, the Ukrainian Resistance Center reported on November 8 that Tehran continues to supply Moscow with Mohajer, Arash, and Shahed-type drones by air and sea via both Iranian state-owned and privately-owned entities. isw.pub/UkrWar110822
3/ The Ukrainian Resistance Center additionally reported that due to failures of the Russian military-industrial complex, Russian military leaders are continuing their efforts to procure dual-use (military and non-military use) goods such as...
Nour announced Patrushev’s arrival in an English-language tweet, stating that Iranian Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Secretary Ali Shamkhani invited him and noted that he will also meet with other high-ranking Iranian officials to discuss Russo-Iranian cooperation. /1
2/ Nour is affiliated with the SNSC. The SNSC likely announced Patrushev’s arrival in #Iran to highlight the deepening cooperation between #Moscow & #Tehran to an international audience and to highlight that a high-ranking Russian official turned to Iran for help in #Ukraine.
3/ Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Qassem Soleimani notably traveled to #Moscow in 2015 to appeal to Russia to intervene in the Syrian Civil War.
Russian occupation authorities are likely beginning a new phase of evacuations from #Kherson Oblast.
Kherson occupation deputy Kirill Stremousov stated that November 7 will be the last day of organized evacuations from the west bank of the #Dnipro River. isw.pub/UkrWar110722
2/ A Russian milblogger similarly noted that November 7 is the end of centralized evacuations in #Kherson Oblast and that private evacuates will continue from November 8.
3/ Russian sources reported that the last boat transporting civilians from #Kherson City to the east bank of the #Dnipro departed on November 8 due to concerns of “increased threats to the civilian population."
The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) has remained remarkably tight-lipped about milblogger critiques of Russian failures throughout the war in #Ukraine — unlike the #Kremlin, which will occasionally indirectly address milblogger narratives. /1 isw.pub/UkrWar110722
The MoD’s public response to milblogger outcry indicates that some Russian milbloggers have considerable leverage to shape MoD interactions in the information space and additionally suggests that the situation in Pavlivka is dire enough to warrant a response. /2
The discourse regarding the widespread failures of the Russian military establishment has pervaded beyond the milblogger information space and is increasingly coloring social dynamics. /3
#Russian milbloggers amplified reports that the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade sustained severe losses during the recent offensive push towards #Pavlivka, #Donetsk Oblast. /1 isw.pub/UkrWar110622
#Russian opposition sources reported that Ukrainian shelling near #Makiivka, #Luhansk Oblast may have killed up to 500 Russian mobilized personnel in one day. /3 isw.pub/UkrWar110622
Key #Kremlin officials and entities including the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the deputy chairman of the Russian Security Council Dmitry Medvedev, and #Putin himself began collectively de-escalating their rhetoric regarding the use of nuclear weapons in early November.🧵
Putin and key Kremlin officials had increased their references to the use of nuclear weapons from Putin’s September 30 annexation speech and throughout October, likely to pressure Ukraine into negotiations and to reduce Western support for Kyiv. /2
The Kremlin’s rhetorical shift indicates that senior Russian military commanders and elements of the Kremlin are likely to some extent aware of the massive costs for little operational gain Russia would incur for the use of nuclear weapons against Ukraine or NATO. /3