Interestingly, while the decision talks about "rockets" and not "missiles", the MoD has earlier talked about #GMLRS/#ERGMLRS as rockets, so wouldn't be sure they are unguided based on that.
My guess is these are 122 mm #ACCULAR, which #Elbit note "the 122mm has a range of
35km with a 20kg warhead and is adaptable to existing platforms. Accular
122mm seamlessly integrates with a wide variety of traditional launchers."
This fits with two interesting coincidences: apparently #Finland took part in a live-fire demo of the podded #Romach-version (a bunch of 122 mm #Accular in a M270/HIMARS-pod).
The massed attacks on #Ukraine today again raises the question about different approaches to managing the long-range ballistic and cruise missile threat. 🧵
I am not claiming to have written the book on the topic, but I did write a chapter with that headline for the Swedish Defence Research Agency (@FOIresearch) a few years ago, so I have given it some thought. The tl;dr version is that it's hard. foi.se/en/foi/news-an…
Ballistic missiles (such as #Iskander) are very difficult targets, and only the most high-end systems are able to intercept them and then within a rather limited range. Cruise missiles (#Kalibr) are easier targets, and many systems are able to at least in theory target them.
Keep your eyes on this one: Finland acquires long-range 155 mm munitions for our #K9Moukari SPGs, which will add "significantly" to the range of the system. #artillery#turpo=#säkpol
Obviously, L/52 guns, base bleed-projectiles, and so forth has meant ranges in general have been growing in recent years for artillery. However, Finland has already picked the low-hanging fruit, including getting the @Nammo 155 mm IM HE-ER (40 km range). nammo.com/product/our-pr…
Apparently this new round has "significantly" more range than 40 km. In 2017 Nammo Lapua said their most important project on the artillery side is a new long-range munition for the K9, and that the other Nordic countries are also planning to place orders. eduskunta.fi/FI/vaski/Julka…
*However*, I hope it has been made absolutely clear to the Swedish government that it can't at this time look like they are even contemplating concessions to #Kakabaveh, and in case they do, we might have to backtrack on the promise. 2/3 svt.se/nyheter/inrike…
We might not like it, but that's where we are currently with regards to national security. Optics matter, and while we obviously will not give in to the more outrageous Turkish demands - in particular extradition claims which have already been tried - this isn't one of those. 3/3
Au contraire, as Finland has built the armed forces around conscripts and reservists, the politicians need to be honest with the fact that if we see a large war where #NATO rush to defend a member, we don't have a second defence force for the defence of others. #turpo=#säkpol
Of course, for situations where Finland's contribution is limited in size and scope, the idea argued by @charlyjsp of having a dedicated high-readiness battalion-sized unit of volunteer reservists on standby is a nice fit, and that answers all situations #NATO has faced so far.
But we still need to be clear that we are preparing for the worst, and in those cases there should be no hesitation among the other members whether Finland will show up or not, just as we expect the full force of the other members to assist our defence if need be.
With so much happening in #Ukraine, I decided to take on three shorter topics in a blog post, namely the deep #helicopter strike on #Belgorod, whether #Russia can replace their losses, and what to do with the Ukrainian requests for more advanced weaponry. corporalfrisk.com/2022/04/03/a-u…
I could also shortly comment on the mass killings in #Bucha. This should not be a surprise for anyone by now, it isn't an accident, but it is how the Russian Army and the Soviet before that has operated consistently.
...which is found in this paper: iai.it/en/pubblicazio… . Yes, there's a bunch of caveats about it being a few years old and any estimate is bound to have some uncertainty, but if we assume it gives the correct order of magnitude...
Russia has so far, only counting confirmed losses, lost 9.2 % of their T-72B3 versions, 18.4 % of their T-80-fleet, and 4.8 % of their T-90! That's huge! Even if the number of operational tanks are off by 10-30 % that's staggering losses. One in ten modern T-72, one in five T-80!